Gorgias, On Nature
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Gorgias, On Nature
GORGIAS' ON THE NONEXISTENT OR ON NATURE
3. SEXTUS, AGAINST THE SCHOOLMASTERS VII 65: Gorgias of Leontini
began from the same position as those who have abolished the
criterion, but did not follow the same line of attack as the school of
Protagoras. In what is entitled On the NONEXISTENT OR ON NATURE he
proposes three successive headings: first and foremost, that nothing
exists; second, that even if it exists it is inapprehensible to man;
third, that even if it is apprehensible, still it is without a doubt
incapable of being expressed or explained to the next man.
(66) Now he concludes in the following way that nothing exists:
If <anything> exists, either the existent exists or the nonexistent or
both the existent exists and the nonexistent. But, as he will
establish, neither does the existent exist nor the nonexistent, as he
will make clear, nor the existent and <the> nonexistent, as he will
also teach. It is not the case then that anything exists. (67) More
specifically, the nonexistent does not exist; for if the nonexistent
exists, it will both exist and not exist at the same time, for insofar
as it is understood as nonexistent, it will not exist, but insofar as
it is nonexistent it will, on the other hand, exist. It would,
however, be entirely absurd for something to exist and at the same
time not to exist. The nonexistent, therefore, does not exist. And
to state another argument, if the nonexistent exists, the existent
will not exist, for these are opposites to each other, and if
existence is an attribute of the nonexistent, nonexistence will be an
attribute of the existent. But it is not, in fact, true that the
existent does not exist. <Accordingly>, neither will the nonexistent
exist. (68) Moreover, the existent does not exist either. For if the
existent exists, it is either eternal or generated, or at the same
time eternal and generated. But it is neither eternal nor generated
nor both, as we shall show. The existent therefore does not exist.
For if the existent is eternal (one must begin with this point) it
does not have any beginning. (69) For everything which is generated
has some beginning, but the eternal, being ungenerated, did not have a
beginning. And not having a beginning it is without limit. And if
it is without limit it is nowhere. For if it is somewhere, that in
which it is, is something other than it, and thus if the existent is
contained in something it will no longer be without limit. For the
container is greater than the contained, but nothing is greater than
the unlimited, so that the unlimited cannot exist anywhere. (70)
Moreover, it is not contained in itself. For in that case container
and contained will be the same, and the existent will become two
things, place and body (place is the container, body the contained).
But this is absurd. Accordingly, existence is not contained in
itself. So that if the existent is eternal it is unlimited, and if it
is unlimited it is nowhere, and if it is nowhere it does not exist.
Accordingly, if the existent is eternal, it is not existent at all.
(71) Moreover, neither can the existent be generated. For if it has
come into being, it has come either from the existent or the
nonexistent. But it has not come from the existent. For if it is
existent, it has not come to be, but already exists. Nor from the
nonexistent. For the nonexistent cannot generate anything, because
what is generative of something of necessity ought to partake of
positive existence. It is not true either, therefore, that the
existent is generated. (72) In the same way it is not jointly at the
same time eternal and generated. For these qualities are mutually
exclusive of each other, and if the existent is eternal it has not
been generated, and if it has been generated it is not eternal.
Accordingly, if the existent is neither eternal nor generated nor both
at once, the existent should not exist. (73) And to use another
argument, if it exists, it is either one or many. But it is neither
one nor many, as will be set forth. Therefore, the existent does not
exist. For if it is one, it is an existent or a continuum or a
magnitude or a body. But whatever of these it is, it is not one,
since whatever has extent will be divided, and what is a continuum
will be cut. And similarly, what is conceived as a magnitude will not
be indivisible. And if it is by chance a body it will be
three-dimensional, for it will have length, and breadth and depth.
But it is absurd to say that the existent is none of these things.
Therefore, the existent is not one. (74) And moreover it is not
many. For if it is not one, it is not many either, since the many is
a composite of separate entities and thus, when the possibility that
it is one was refuted, the possibility that it is many was refuted as
well. Now it is clear from this that neither does the existent exist
nor does the nonexistent exist. (75) It is easy to conclude that both
the existent and the nonexistent do not exist either. For if the
nonexistent exists and the existent exists, the nonexistent will be
the same thing as the existent as far as existence is concerned. And
for this reason neither of them exists. For it is agreed that the
nonexistent does not exist, and the existent has been shown to be the
same as the nonexistent and it accordingly will not exist. (76) Of
course, if the existent is the same as the nonexistent, it is not
possible for both to exist. For if both exist, they are not the same,
and if the same, both do not exist. To which the conclusion follows
that nothing exists. For if neither the existent exists nor the
nonexistent nor both, and if no additional possibility is conceivable,
nothing exists.
(77) Next it must be shown that even if anything exists, it is
unknowable and incomprehensible to man. For, says Gordias, if things
considered in the mind are not existent, the existent is not
considered. And that is logical. For if "white" were a possible
attribute of what is considered, "being considered" would also have
been a possible attribute of what is white; similarly, if "not to be
existent" were a possible attribute of what is being considered,
necessarily "not to be considered" will be a possible attribute of
what is existent. (78) As a result, the statement "if things
considered are not existent, the existent is not considered" is sound
and logically follows. But things considered (for this must be our
starting point) are not existent, as we shall show. The existent is
not therefore considered. And moreover, it is clear that things
considered are not existent. (79) For if things considered are
existent, all things considered exist, and in whatever way anyone
considers them. Which is absurd. For if one considers a man flying
or chariots racing in the sea, a man does not straightway fly nor a
chariot race in the sea. So that things considered are not existent.
(80) In addition, if things considered in the mind are existent,
nonexistent things will not be considered. For opposites are
attributes of opposites, and the nonexistent is opposed to the
existent. For this reason it is quite evident that if "being
considered in the mind" is an attribute of the existent, "not being
considered in the mind" will be an attribute of the nonexistent. But
this is absurd. For Scylla and Chimaera and many other nonexistent
things are considered in the mind. Therefore, the existent is not
considered in the mind. (81) Just as objects of sight are said to be
visible for the reason that they are seen, and objects of hearing are
said to be audible for the reason that they are heard, and we do not
reject visible things on the grounds that they are not heard, nor
dismiss audible things because they are not seen (since each object
ought to be judged by its own sense, but not by another), so, too,
things considered in the mind will exist even if they should not be
seen by the sight nor heard by the hearing, because they are perceived
by their own criterion. (82) If, therefore, someone considered in the
mind that chariots race in the sea, even if he does not see them, he
should believe that there are chariots racing in the sea. But this is
absurd. Therefore, the existent is not an object of consideration and
is not apprehended.
(83) But even if it should be apprehended, it would be incapable
of being conveyed to another. For if existent things are visible and
audible and generally perceptible, which means that they are external
substances, and of these the things which are visible are perceived by
the sight, those that are audible by the hearing, and not
contrariwise, how can these things be revealed to another person?
(84) For that by which we reveal is LOGOS, but LOGOS is not substances
and existing things. Therefore we do not reveal existing things to
our neighbors, but LOGOS, which is something other than substances.
Thus, just as the visible would not become audible, and vice versa,
similarly, when external reality is involved, it would not become our
LOGOS, (85) and not being LOGOS, it would not have been revealed to
another. It is clear, he says that LOGOS arises from external things
impinging upon us, that is, from perceptible things. From encounter
with a flavor, LOGOS is expressed by us about that quality, and from
encounter with a color, an expression of color. But if this is the
case, LOGOS is not evocative of the external, but the external becomes
the revealer of LOGOS. (86) And surely it is not possible to say that
LOGOS has substance in the way visible and audible things have, so
that substantial and existent things can be revealed from its
substance and existence. For, he says, even if LOGOS has substance,
still it differs from all the other substances, and visible bodies are
to the greatest degree different from words. What is visible is
comprehended by one organ, LOGOS by another. LOGOS does not,
therefore, manifest the multiplicity of substances, just as they do
not manifest the nature of each other.
(87) Such being, in Gorgias' view, the problems, insofar as they
are valid, the criterion is destroyed. For there would be no
criterion if nature neither exists nor can be understood not conveyed
to another. Similar summary in [Aristotle] MELISSUS, XENOPHANES, AND
GORGIAS 5, 6, 979a11-980b21. Aristotle himself wrote a monograph IN
REPLY TO THE OPINIONS OF GORGIAS. See Diogenes Laertius V 25.
From: THE OLDER SOPHISTS, ed. by Rosamund Kent Sprague
(Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina
Press, 1972) pp.42-46.