Supplementary Translations:

Aquinas Disputed Question on the Union of the Incarnate Word.

     This text has been translated by the students of the KU Leuven

MPhil course W0FD2a “Thomas in Context” (instructors : Andrea A.

Robiglio, Richard C. Taylor, and L.X. López-Farjeat).

     This translation was necessary to complete that available at

http://www4.desales.edu/~philtheo/loughlin/ATP/De_Unione/Dating.html

     This work has been conducted on the text recently established

by B. Bartocci, W. Senner, and K. Obenauer (Stuttgart 2011), which

includes some relevant improvements.

     A new English translation is forthcoming in the Series edited at

Peeters (Louvain) by Philipp W. Rosemann :

http://www.dallasmedievaltexts.org

On the Union of the Incarnate Word

Article V :

Whether there is only one operation in Christ.

Fifth, it is asked whether there is only one operation in Christ. And it

seems that it is so.

<Arg. 1> For Dionysius says in the Letter to the Monk Gaius: “When

God was made a human being,1 a change was brought about by a

certain new operation belonging to God and the human being”. But

there would not be a new operation belonging to God and the human

being, unless one and the same operation were to belong to both.

Therefore in Christ there is a single operation belonging to God and

man.

<Arg. 2> Furthermore. Those things which concur in the same

operation do not do not bring about diversity in that operation. But

in Christ divinity and humanity concur in the same operation, just as

both divine power and carnal touch2 concur in the healing of

leprosy.

<Arg. 3> Furthermore. Action proceeds from an agent by some

principle of action, just as heating <proceeds> from fire by heat. Thus

it is necessary that the plurality and the unity of an action be

considered from the perspective of the agent and from the

perspective of the principle by which the agent acts. But the number

of actions in Christ is not determined according to the principle by

which He acts. <This is> because in this way there would be many

more actions belonging to Christ than two according to the diversity

of the powers of the soul. Therefore it must be said that there is one

action in Christ on account of one acting supposit (suppositum).

<Arg. 4> Furthermore. One and the same action belongs to the

principle agent and to the instrument, just as sawing is an action

belonging to the carpenter and belonging to the saw. But the

humanity in Christ was the instrument of the divinity in Christ, as

Damascenus says in the III° Book of The Orthodox Faith. Thus the

action belonging to the humanity and belonging to the divinity in

Christ is one and the same.

<Arg. 5> Furthermore. To act is characteristic of supposits

(Suppositorum est agere). But in Christ there is no other supposit

except the eternal supposit. In view of this it can not be said that he

acts thanks to his human nature, because in this way something

would be derived from the human nature and <the eternal supposit>

would have being and actuality through this human nature. <This is>

because any given thing acts insofar as it is a being in act. (inquantum

est ens actu) Therefore there is no action in Christ except what is

thanks to his divine nature. Thus there are not two actions in Christ

according to two natures, namely the divine and human.

<Arg. 6> Furthermore. A supposit is more connected (coniunctius)3 to

the nature than the operation is. But the human nature in Christ

does not have its own supposit on account of its union with the

divine. Thus much less does it have its own operation. Thus there are

not two operations in Christ.

<Arg. 7> Furthermore. Operations belong to what is connected

(operationes sunt coniuncti): thus the Philosopher says in De Anima I

that one who says that the soul thinks is like one who says that it

weaves or builds. But Christ is one person in whom humanity is

connected4 to divinity. Thus in Christ there is only one operation.

<Arg. 8> Furthermore. The first and chief operation of the

intellectual nature is understanding itself. But understanding is not a

transitive operation taking place through an external nature, but

one that remains in the agent itself. To act is characteristic of the

supposit. But in Christ there is only one uncreated supposit which is

simple. Since, therefore, there cannot be a double understanding

(duplex intelligere) in one simple thing (in uno simplici) it seems that

there could not be two intellectual operations in Christ.

<Arg. 9> Furthermore. The operation of any given thing follows from

its own proper character (proprietatem). But according to

Damascenus, the two natures in Christ share with one another their

own proper characteristics (idiomata, languages??)5, that is, their

properties, on account of the unity of the supposit. Thus by parity of

reason a sharing of operations takes place there. And in this way

they are not distinct operations according to the distinctiveness of

natures.

<Arg. 10> Furthermore. All the operations in a human being traced

back (reducuntur) to one first principle, namely to the will, which

moves all other powers to action. But in <the case of> Christ likewise

one principle must be asserted, namely divinity, by which his

humanity was moved. And in this way the operations of humanity in

Him are referred to divinity as to a first principle. Thus there is only

one operation in Christ.

<Arg. 11> Furthermore. “Just as the rational soul and flesh are one

man, so God and man are one Christ”, as Athanasius says. But an

operation of the human body or of a rational soul is said to be a

human operation. Thus the operation of divinity as well as the

operation of humanity should be said to be ‘Christian’ operation.

And in this way there will be in Christ only one operation, just as

there is one Christ.

<Arg. 12> Furthermore. Every operation proceeds from some form or

power. But the principle agent does not give some form or power to

the instrument. Thus the instrument does not have some operation

inasmuch as it is an instrument. But the human nature in Christ was

the tool of divinity, as Damascenus says. Thus the human nature in

Christ does not have any operation. Therefore in this way there is

just one operation in Christ, that of divinity.

<Arg. 13> Furthermore. Action informs the agent. (Actio informat

agentem) But in Christ there is only one supposit, namely the eternal

one, which cannot be informed by a created operation. Since,

therefore, to act is characteristic of a supposit, (agere sit suppositi) it

seems that there is no created operation in Christ. And so only one

uncreated operation is there.

<Arg. 14> Furthermore. One thing has one operation. (Unius una est

operatio) But Christ is one absolutely speaking (simpliciter loquendo)6,

as was said above. Therefore there is only one operation in Christ.

But to the contrary, in the sixth sentence of the Synod it is said: “We

exalt (glorificamus) two natural operations undividely,

uninterchangeably, unconfoundedly, and inseparably (indivise,

inconvertibiliter, inconfuse, inseparabiliter) in the same Lord Jesus

Christ, our true God, that is, the divine operation and the human

operation

<Contra 2> Furthermore. Damascenus says in the III° Book: “We say

that there are two actions in Lord Jesus Christ: for, as consubstantial

with the divine Father, he has divine action, and as made human, he

has the action of human nature.

<Contra 3> Furthermore. Just as in the Trinity there is one nature in

three persons, so in Christ there are two natures in one person. But

the whole trinity has one operation on account of the unity of its

nature. Therefore in Christ there are two operations on account of

the duality of his natures.

<Contra 4> Furthermore. Boethius says in the book ‘On Two Natures’,

that a nature is that which can act and be acted upon. (natura est, que

agere et pati potest) And in this way action follows on nature. But in

Christ there are two natures. Thus there are also two actions.

<Contra 5> Furthermore. Operation follows on power, but power

follows on essence, which is the nature of a thing. Thus where there

are two natures, there are two powers and consequently two

operations. And thus there is not just one operation in Christ, but

two.

Answer. We must say that the unity or plurality of action may be

considered from two points of view.

On the one hand, from the perspective of the agent. From this

perspective, the action’s unity or plurality is considered according to

numerical unity, just as any given accident has its numerical unity or

<numerical> plurality on the basis of the subject. For this act of

seeing or act of hearing by Socrates is numerically other than the act

of seeing or the act of hearing by Plato.

On the other hand, the action’s unity or plurality can be considered

according to the principle by which the agent operates. On the basis

of this an action is said to be one or many according to the species,

as the act of seeing and that of hearing are two specifically distinct

operations. For an action proceeds from the agent according to the

character of the power by which <the agent> acts. That actions

belong to a given species thanks to <their> objects, is of no hindrance

here, since the determinate powers correspond to <their>

determinate objects.

Still, one must consider that, if a power which is a principle of action

is moved by another superior power, the operation that proceeds

from the former is not only an action but a passion too, as far as it

proceeds from a power which is moved by something superior to it.

In the case of a human being, however, all powers of the sensitive

part <of the soul> are to some extent moved by the will, as by a first

principle. For this reason hearing, seeing, imagining, desiring, and

rejecting are not only actios, but also – in a way – certain passions

proceeding from the motion of the will, namely, insofar as a human

being proceeds <to hear, to see, to imagine, etc.>, by one’s own will.

For this reason, even though in one human being there appear to be

several actions of specifically distinct kinds, we still say that there is

one action by one human being, because all <the actions> proceed

from one first action of the will, as if one craftsperson were to use

many instruments, <still> we would say that his action is one <and

not many>.

For this reason, then, some authors stated that in Christ there is just

one operation, because in Him the human nature is subordinated to

the divine nature and moved by the latter. In this way, in

comparison to His divine action, therefore, the human operation has

the character of a passion. As a consequence, because of the unity of

the divine action, <those authors> said that in Christ there is only

one action.

Nonetheless, such a claim is unreasonable for two reasons.

First, <it is unreasonable> because any given power moved in this

way by a superior <power> does not have control over its own act

since it itself does not move but rather is moved. This is why also

Aristotle in the sixth book of his Nicomachean Ethics says that the

senses are not the principle of any action. But a power which has

control over its own acts, as the will does, is moved in this way by a

superior power, as by God, because it is not only acted upon, but it

also acts. Now, in Christ the power of the will has been created

according to the human nature as also is His intellect, since He does

not miss anything that belongs to the fulfillment of the human

nature. Consequently, the motion of the human will in Christ is an

action and not only a passion. Were it otherwise, He could not

garner any merit according to His human nature.

Second, <it is unreasonable> because anything’s operation takes its

species and unity from the first principle belonging to the very same

nature. So it happens with the will, from which all human actions

derive their unity, which is a certain intrinsic principle of the human

nature. Still, some actions do not get their unity from the fact that

they may traced back to some first principle belonging to another

nature. Were it otherwise, it would follow that there would be one

action of all things because there is one first principle moving all

things, namely God. In this way, therefore, even if the human nature

in Christ were moved by the divine — and these are nevertheless two

distinct natures — it is also necessary that they be two distinct

actions. Therefore, from the fact that someone asserts one action to

be in Christ it follows that only one nature and one sole will is there.

For this reason this position was condemned in the sixth Synod as

heretical.

< ad 1> We must say that the operation of Christ according to

humanity is called the-andr-ic, i.e. of God and of Man (male -

andros), insofar as the humanity of Christ was acting thanks to the

divine power <of His divinity>. From this derived the salvific

character of the action of the humanity <of Christ>, as an instrument

acts thanks to the agent. To this extent that action is called “newly

made”, since it was newly made that the humanity of Christ would

be the instrument connected (OR conjoined) to <His> divinity in the

unity of the person. However, <that is> not in such a way that one

single action would be made from two actions.

< ad 2> We must say that the humanity and the divinity of Christ

concur in the same operation without being confused (inconfuse).

<This is> because, as said in the epistle of Pope Leo, each nature,

brought about (agebat) what is proper to itself in communion with

the other nature. Think, for instance, that the divine power healed

the man afflicted by leper by the touch of his human body since this

touch received its effectiveness from the divine power.

< ad 3> We must say that all the human actions in Christ which

pertain to the human nature are traced back to one single action

because of the unity of the connatural principle, namely the

(human) will. However, as we have already said, the criterion (OR:

character or nature) of the humanity and the criterion (OR:

character or nature) of the divinity are not the same.

< ad 4 > We must say that the human nature in Christ is not an

instrument such that it is only acted upon, but that it is also the

principle of action inasfar as it has the control of its act.

< ad 5 > We must say that something acts by the power of something

else in a twofold way. In one way <it does so>, insofar it is moved by

something else’s power, as natural ‘heat’ acts by the power of the

soul. In another way <it does so> insofar as some acting thing uses

the power of some instrument, as the soul ‘sees’ thanks to the visual

power of the eye. It is in this <second> way that the eternal supposit

(suppositum) acted thanks to the intrinsic power of the human

nature.

<ad 6 > We must say that ‘supposit’ is what is distinct from other

things. For this reason, if the human nature were to have a supposit

per se, it would oppose (repugnaret, resist) the personal union. The

operation <itself>, however, does not imply a reason for some

distinction <from other things>. For this reason the argument does

not follow.

<ad 7 > We must say that the operations belong to what is connected

(OR: conjoined) on the basis of many things coalescing in one nature.

However, such a thing is not the connection (OR: conjoining) of

humanity and divinity in Christ. As a consequence, the argument

does not follow.

< ad 8 > We must say that understanding in itself is intrinsic to the

intellect. But in Christ there are two intellects, the uncreated and the

created. For this reason a double act of understanding is also

<present> there.

< ad 9 > We must say that in Christ there is a sharing of proper

characteristics (OR: the ‘communication of the languages’,

communication idiomatum ??), not that there be some confusion of the

natural properties, but because the properties of each nature are

predicated of the same supposit. The sharing of the operations is the

same since the supposit is the same <and> to this <supposit> the

same operation in attributed, divine and human.

< ad 10 > We must say that the will is a connatural principle for the

other powers of the soul. The divine nature, however, is not

connatural to humanity. As a consequence the criterion of the

argument is not similar.

<ad 11 > We must say that that simile is employed by Athanasius with

respect to the unity of person, not with respect to the unity of

nature. For soul and body come together in one person and in one

<human> nature; and for this reason it is called one human

operation. The divine nature and the human <nature>, however,

come together in one person but not in one nature, and,

consequently, neither <do they come together> in one action.

< ad 12 > We must say that the agent does not always bestow on the

instrument a new form or a power that remains dormant in it. But

still the instrument, insomuch it is moved upon by the agent, attains

(consequitur) a certain intentional power through the influence of

the agent, who passes into its effect through the instrument.

< ad 13 > We must say that, just as vision informs man through the

mediation of the eye, so also the created action informs the eternal

supposit through the mediation of the human nature.

< ad 14 > We must say that Christ is absolutely one on the account of

His supposit. Still, in Him there two natures. For this reason Christ is

one agent but in Him there are two <species of> actions.

The questions on the virtues of the soul considered in common by

friar Thomas Aquinas come to conclusion.

Objections translated by Daniel Ruderman, KUL

Response & responses to objections translated by AAR at KUL

Entire document revised by RCT 12 May 2013, MU