Supplement Translation

Aquinas: Soul and Intellect

Fall 2012, Marquette University (Milwaukee),

Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium) &

Universidad Panamericana (Mexico City)

© Richard C. Taylor, Marquette University, 23 September 2012.

All rights reserved.

These translations may be freely used for non-commercial purposes only. Commercial reproduction is forbidden.

The translations may not be modified in any way.

Attribution to the author is required.  Richard.Taylor@Marquette.edu

Albertus Magnus on the Soul in his De homine

(1) On the nature of the intellect Albert holds, as did Thomas, that the agent intellect and the possible intellect are powers in the individual soul.  Albert cites with precision the texts of Avicenna and his followers al-Ghazali and Gundissalinus who hold that the Agent Intellect is the last of the hierarchy of immaterial separate substances.  This is a view Albert rejects with detailed argumentation.

Albert himself understands Avicenna to hold the agent intellect to exist as a substance outside the soul:

(1.1) “We concede that the agent intellect is in the soul (concedimus quod intellectus agens universaliter est in anima 402.40)” and clearly holds that “In is necessary to assert that the universal agent is in the intellect (necesse est ponere agens universale in intellectu 402.62).”

(1.2) “<Avicenna> expressly accepted that the agent intellect is the separate intelligence of the tenth order of the separate intelligences (expresse accipitur quod intellectus agens est intelligentia separata decimi ordinis intelligentiarum secondarum 408.68).”

(1.3) But Albert himself held that these are in us and not separate: “Since, therefore, one of these is the agent intellect and the other the the possible <intellect>, each of those intellects will be in us and not a separate substance. . . . (Cum igitur unum horum sit intellectus agens et alterum possibilis, uterque istorum intellectorum erit in nobis existens et non separata substantia . . . . 411.51).” My emphasis.

(1.4) Albert clearly rejects the views of the philosophers who say that the Agent Intellect is separate and writes at 412.69 in his solutio that he follows the view of Averroes who says that the human agent intellect is conjoined with the human soul, is simple and does not itself have the intelligibles but instead brings them about in the human possible intellect by abstracting them from phantasms.

“But we say none of these things. For following Aristotle and Averroes we say that the heavens do not have a soul beyond the intelligence, as was determined above on the question of the heavens. And likewise we say that the human agent intellect is conjoined to the human soul, is simple and does not possess the intelligibles, but brings them about in the possible intellect from phantasms, as Averroes expressly sais in <his> Commentary on De Anima. (Sed nos nihil horum dicimus. Sequentes enim Aristotelem et Averroem dicimus caelum non habere animam praeter intelligentiam, ut supra in quaestione de caelo determinatum est. Et similiter dicimus intellectum agentem humanum esse coniunctum animae humanae, et esse simplicem et non habere intelligibilia, sed agere ipsa in intellectu possibili ex phantasmatibus, sicut expresse dicit Averroes in commento libri de anima. 412.69).”

The doctrine of Averroes is that the agent intellect does not have all the intelligibles in it — as Albert correctly notes — but rather abstracts them from images in the individual human soul and impresses them onto the separate material (scil., possible) intellect.  Both these are separate substances for Averroes and yet they must come to be present in the soul (في النفس fī nafs) through a form of sharing and presence.  This is required to be the case because that in virtue of which something formally acts must be intrinsic to it. Hence, for Averroes the separate substances, the Agent Intellect and the Material Intellect, must come to be in the soul, that is, intrinsic to it.  But Albert does not understand Averroes in this (correct) way but rather understands those two powers to be powers existing intrinsic to the individual human intellect with each person having his or her own powers of agent and possible (scil., material) intellect.

Albert is well aware of the importance of his way of understanding Averroes and even quotes Averroes on this point of the intellects being “in the soul”:

(1.5) “Again, Averroes <writes>: ‘Every intellect existing in us has two actions. One is of the genus of affection and it is to understand; the other <is> of the genus of action and it is to abstract these from matter, which is nothing but to make them understood in act after they were understood in potency.’ Since, therefore, one of these is the agent intellect and the other the possible <intellect>, each of those intellects will be existing in us and not a separate substance. (Item, Averroes: ‘Omnis intellectus in nobis existens habet duas actiones. Quarum una est de genere passionis, et est intelligere; alia de genere actionis, et est abstrahere eas a materia, quod nihil aliud est quam facere eas intellectas in actu postquam erant intellectae in potentia’. Cum igitur unum horum sit intellectus agens et alterum possibilis, uterque istorum intellectuum erit in nobis existens et non separata substantia 411.46-53).”

Cf. “Let us say, therefore: the intellect existing in us has two activities insofar as it is ascribed to us, one of the genus of affection, namely, understanding, and the other of the genus of activity, namely, to extract forms and denude them of matters, which is nothing but making them intelligible in act after they were such in potency. . . .” LCDA, p. 395. Averroes, In Arist. De Anima (ed. Crawford), lib. 3, comm. 5,  p.495: Dicamus igitur: quoniam autem intellectus existens in nobis habet duas actiones secundum quod attribuitur nobis, quarum una est de /465/ genere passionis (et est intelligere), et alia de genere actionis (et est extrahere formas et denudare eas a materiis, quod nichil est aliud nisi facere eas intellectas in actu postquam erant in potentia). . . .

As indicated, Albert’s view involves the rejection of the Avicennian emanation of intelligibles from the separate agent intellect. The human agent intellect is not full of forms, but rather is what provides the power for a genuine abstraction or separation of forms from the content of experience in phantasms or images.

(1.6) 414.27-38: “And this is what Averroes says in his Commentary on Book Three of the De Anima: ‘It is evident that, when all the theoretical intelligibles are in us in potency, then the agent <intellect> is united with us in potency, because it is not united with us except through them. And when they are existing in us in act, then it too is united with us in act. For the act of the agent intellect is determined by reference to the phantasms, and in this way a determined <action> moves the possible intellect and brings it forth into act, as the action of light is determinate in reference to colors and in this way a determinate <action> brings forth vision into act. And in virtue of this it is evident that the agent intellect is not a substance full of forms.’ (Et hoc est quod dicit Averroes in commento super tertium de anima: ‘Manifestum est, quoniam quando omnia speculativa fuerint in nobis existentia in potentia, tunc et agens continuatur nobis in potentia, quia non continuatur nobis nisi per illa; et cum fuerint existentia in nobis in actu, tunc et ipse continuatur nobis in actu’. Actio enim intellectus agentis determinatur ad phantasma, et sic determinata movet intellectum possibilem et educit eum in actum, sicut actio luminis  determinatur ad colores, et sic determinata visum educit in actum. Et per hoc patet quod intellectus agens non est substantia separata plena formis 414.27-38).” My emphasis.

Cf. “It is evident [then] that when all the theoretical intelligibles exist in us in potency, it will be united with us in potency. When all the theoretical intelligibles exist in us in act, it will then be united with us in act.” LCDA, p. 399. Et manifestum est quod, cum omnia intellecta speculativa fuerint existentia in nobis in potentia, quod ipse erit copulatus nobiscum in potentia. Et cum omnia intellecta speculativa fuerint existentia in nobis in actu, erit ipse tunc copulatus nobis in actu. Latin 500.599-603.

Hence, for Albert the two intellects, agent and possible, are parts of the human soul.

(1.7) “. . .  And on account of this the agent intellect and the possible intellect are intrinsic parts of the rational soul . . . . (. . . Et propter hoc intellectus agens et possibili possunt esse intrinsicae partes animae rationalis . . . .  416.52).“ My emphasis.

That is, in substance and definition the agent intellect is a power and principle of the soul for apprehending intelligibles.

On the question of the substance and definition of the agent intellect, Quid sit intellectus agens secundum substantiam et diffinitionem (418.4), Albert comes to the conclusion:

(1.8) “Solution: It should be said that the agent intellect in substance and definition is a power and an active principle of intelligibles, and on account of this the Philosopher says that the intellect is ‘that by which  all things are made’. (Solutio: Dicendum quod intellectus agens secundum substantiam et diffinitionem est potentia et principium activum intelligibilium, et propter hoc dicit Philosophus quod est intellectus ‘quo est omnia facere’ 419.15 ff.).”

For Albert the human separate intellect is not to be identified with the agent intellect. Still the human intellect in which knowledge is realized (called the speculative intellect) is separate from matter and its concomitants.

(1.9) “The <human> separate intellect is not the same as the agent intellect but rather the speculative intellect is separate from matter and its concomitants (. . . separatus intellectus non est idem quod agens intellectus; sed intellectus speculativus est separatus a materia et appendiis materiae . . . . 419.41).”

He cites the same text of Averroes he had cited earlier again for this now indicating that the possible intellect is affected by the formal actualizing character of the power called agent intellect and also by the intelligible species received into it.

(1.10) “For Averroes says in <his > Commentary on the Third Book of De Anima that ‘when all the theoretical intelligibles are in us in potency, then the agent <intellect> is united with us in potency, because it is not united with us except through them. And when they are existing in us in act, then it too is united with us in act.’ From this it is accepted that the intellect is in potency to the species of the agent <intellect> and to the intelligible species. In this way it is in potency to two species at once. (Dicit enim Averroes super tertium de anima quod ‘quando omnia speculativa fuerint in nobis existentia in potentia, tunc et agens continuatur nobis in potentia, quia non continuatur nobis nisi per illa; et cum fuerint existentia in nobis in actu, tunc et ipse continuatur nobis in actu’. Ex hoc accipitur quod intellectus est in potentia ad speciem agentis et ad speciem intelligibilis, et ita est in potentia ad duas species simul. 438.64-438.4) My emphasis.

This theoretical or speculative intellect is the power of the possible intellect when we are in the state of knowing.

(1.11) “We say that the action of the agent intellect is on the possible <intellect> for bringing it into act. For it was held above that the agent plays the role of principle in the soul from the fact that it is that ‘by which’ for the rational soul, while the possible <intellect> <is> from that fact that it is a substrate for that in the rational soul. Hence, as  the act ‘by which’ which is the being of the soul, it is only in the possible <intellect> ( . . . Dicimus quod actio intellectus agentis est super possibilem educendo ipsum in actum. Habitum enim est supra, quod agens principiatur in anima ab eo quod est ‘quo est’ anima rationalis, possibilis autem ab eo quod substat illi in anima rationalis. Unde sicut actus ‘quo est’, qui est esse animae rationalis, non est nisi in possibili. . . . 421.17 ff.).”

(2)  What is essentially the foundation of the doctrine of Aquinas on the abstraction and apprehension of the species intelligibilis is spelled out by Albert at 435.47:

(2.1) “Solution: It should be said that all the intelligibles are denuded of matter and the concomitants of matter or stripped per se, and on account of this the theoretical intellect is the species of all the intelligibles and the same in act with them. But act has a twofold relation. One is to the thing of which it is the act, and in this way it is the ratio of the thing and a quiddity having not difference from it. For if it were to have a difference according to that in which it differs the thing known would not be cognized in virtue of that. For this reason the species which is in the soul, which is the principle of understanding the whole thing and the whole being of the thing, is taken completely as the act of the whole thing. Since it is in the intellect in this way, because it is in this way the principle of understanding, knowledge is the thing known in act and the theoretical intellect <is> the theoretical <intelligible> in act.  It has another comparison to that in which it as as in a subject and in this way it is not the principle of understanding but rather the principle of being.  Because there is in the intellect an accidental likeness,  it causes in it accidental being; because there is a natural form in the thing, it makes in it natural being.  Noting this the Philosopher says that knowledge in some way is the thing known and in another passage he says that intellect is the same in act as that which is understood, but the being is different.  And likewise sense is the same in act as the sensible but its being is different, as we explained earlier. (Solutio: Dicendum quod omnia intelligibilia denudata sunt a materia et appendiciis materiae vel nuda per seipsa, et propter hoc intellectus speculativus species omnium intelligibilium et idem actu cum omnibus. Sed actus duplicem habet comparationem. Unam ad rem cuius est actus, et sic est ratio rei et quiditas nullam habens differentiam ab ipsa. Si enim haberet differentiam secundum illud in quo differret, non cognosceretur per ipsum res scita; et ideo species quae est in anima, quae est principium intelligendi totam rem et totum esse rei, omnino accipitur ut actus rei totius, et cum sic sit in intellectu, eo quod principium sic sit intelligendi, est scientia res scita in actu, et intellectus speculativus speculatum in actu. Aliam habet comparationem ad id in quo est ut in subiecto, et sic non est principium intelligendi, sed principium esse; et quia in intellectu est similitudo accidentalis, causat in ipso esse accidentale; quia vero in re est forma naturalis, facit in ipsa esse naturale. Et hoc attendens Philosophus dicit quod scientia modo quodam est res scita, et in alio loco dicit quod intellectus est idem actu cum eo quod intelligitur, sed esse est aliud; et similiter sensus cum sensibili est idem actu, sed esse est aliud, sicut supra exposuimus. 435.47 ff.).”

This notion of the content but not the mode of being of the thing being what is grasped Albert further emphasizes writing,

“The definition which is through the principles of knowing is given in virtue of forms abstracted from the particular which are the genus and difference. (Diffinitio autem quae est per principia cognoscendi, datur per formas abstractas a particulari, quae sunt genus et differentia. 446).”

At 456-57 Albert makes it clear that he accepts the abstractionist accounts of Avicenna except for Avicenna’s final step which involves linking with the separate agent intellect to apprehend the intelligibles in it.

Albert quotes Avicenna’s De Anima (ed. Van Riet, pp. 102-104) on the value of the senses for abstraction but I will not bother with the translation here.

Quarum ‘prima est quod intellectus separat unumquodque universalium a singularibus abstrahendo intentiones eorum a materia et ab appendiciis materiae et a consequentibus eam, et considerat in quo conveniunt et in quo differunt, et cuius esse est essentiale et cuius accidentale. Ex quo accidit animae habere principia intelligendi’.

‘Secundum est quod anima ponit habitudines inter quaeque universalia secundum affirmationem et negationem, et id de quo fuerit affirmatio vel negatio per se nota, percipiet; quod autem non fuerit ita, dimittet quousque inveniat medium terminum’.

‘Tertium est acquirere propositiones experimentis, scilicet ut inveniat per sensum quod aliquis praedicatus comitatur subiectum aliquod affirmando vel negando vel affirmando coniunctionem et negando contradictionem, et non sit hoc in quibusdam horis et non in aliis differenter, sed semper sic, quousque quiescat, et quod inter naturam huius praedicati et huius subiecti  est haec habitudo, aut natura huius consequentis comitatur naturam huius antecedentis, aut removetur essentialiter, non casu. Et tunc haec conceptio erit adepta ex sensu et syllogismo’.

‘Quartum est verba, quibus facile assentit anima, eo quod probabilia sint’.

A few summary remarks on Albert’s use of his Arabic sources

It is quite clear in this work that Albert was very familiar with the abstractionism of Avicenna and that he accepted the Avicennian account of the preparation of the individual human rational soul for the apprehension of intelligibles. But Albert rejected the view of Avicenna that the Agent Intellect is a separate substance and that human efforts with bodily external and internal sense powers were only a preparation for the reception of intelligibles from the agent intellect through a linking described by Avicenna with use of the metaphors of uniting with and receiving an emanation from the agent intellect. Instead Albert follows Averroes in asserting that the intelligibles in act which are the objects of human intellectual understanding are not in the agent intellect.

For the agent intellect, Albert follows Averroes and finds for it only the role minimally required for the completion of Aristotle’s account: the agent intellect will be what provides the power for the abstraction or separation of the content intelligible in potency in the images or phantasms derived from sensory experience of the world. What is more, the activity of the agent intellect for Averroes — in contrast to what we find in Avicenna — is genuinely to abstract or separate off the content intelligible in potency in the things of the world and to transfer that content to a new mode of being as intelligible in act in the separate material intellect. But Albert misread Averroes because of the novelty of Averroes’s doctrine of the separate and shared material intellect and also because Albert did not understand Averroes’s repetition of the phraseology of ‘in the soul’ used to describe the role of the separate agent intellect and separate material intellect. As I have explained in several other places, the argument from intrinsic formal cause set forth by Averroes and later used by Aquinas against Averroes, required for Averroes that the separate intellects — so essential to the natures of human beings as animals that are rational — be formally ‘in the soul’ for human intellectual understanding. But in the De homine Albert holds that the agent intellect and the possible (material) intellect are not separate substances but rather immaterial powers of the soul separate from body, as the text at 411.51 quoted above indicates clearly with the phrase in nobis.