international Workshops

 









    

                   Aquinas,               Alfarabi,                       Avicenna,         Averroes,              Maimonides  &    Albertus


                                                                                                       

The next AAIWG meeting is at the Universidad Panamericana, Mexico City, 24-25 August 2018. Click HERE.

































The Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ International Working Group

(AAIWG) Annual Spring Workshop Conference 2018

Part 2 of 2 Events in Morocco


Languages: Arabic, French, English


Programme of Presentations


Thursday 15 March 2018


09h30 – 09h40 Mot du Doyen de FLSHM

09h40 – 09h50 Mot du président de  AAIWG

09h50 – 10h00 Mot de la directrice du Laboratoire


First work session : Directed by Med Maouhoub

10h00 – 10h20 Richard Taylor (Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA, & DWMC KatholiekeUniversiteit Leuven, Belgium)

“Averroes’s Critique of  Ibn Bāğğa on Abstraction”

10h20 – 10h40 Jamal Rachak (Cadi Ayyad University, Marrakech, Morocco)

“La représentation et les formes spirituels chez Ibn Bāğğa”

10h40 – 11h10 Tea Break

11h10 – 11h30 Mohammed Lachkar (Moulay-Ismaïl University, Meknes, Morocco)

Le problème de l’interprétation  chez Alghazali”

11h30 - 11h50 Mohamed Abouhafs (Moulay-Ismaïl University, Meknes, Morocco)

“La médecine chez Ibn Bāğğa”

12h00  - 12:20 Debate


Second work session: Directed by Michael Chase

15h00 - 15h30 Irfan Omar (Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA)

“Al-Ghazali’s notion of Knowledge in light of his Views on Prophet al-Khidr.”

15h30-16h00 

16h00 - 16h30 Tea Break

16h30 - 17h00 David Twetten (Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA)

“Knowing the Essence-Existence Distinction : al-Ghazali as the Key to Aquinas’ Teaching”

17h00 - 17h30 Youssef El Amari (Regional Academy of Education and Formation, Tangier-Tetouan-al-Hoceima, Morocco)

“Facing the ‘double-truth’ and making space for human knowledge. Ibn Rušd, Aquinas, and Galileo”

17h30 - 18h00 Debate


Friday 16 March 2018


First work session : Directed by Richard Taylor

09h30 – 10h00 Michael Chase (CNRS, Paris, France)

“The scientific epistemology of al-Naẓẓām”

10h00 – 10h30 Mohamed Maouhoub (Cadi Ayyad University, Marrakech, Morocco) “Esquisses d'une désobstruction de la pensée islamique”

10h30 – 11h00 Tea Break

11h00 – 11h30 Mohamed El Boughali (Cadi Ayyad University, Marrakech, Morocco) “Ibn Masarra et son disciple Arru‘aynī critiqués par Ibn Ḥazm”

11h30 – 12h00 Hadel Jarada (Postdoc. Scholar, University of Jyväskylä, Finland)

“Ethical Value in Post-Classical Māturīdī Kalām”

12h00 – 12h30 Aziz Abou Charaa (Université Ibn Tofaïl, Kenitra, Morocco)

La présence de la philosophie dans l’espace de Fiqh et Kalām en occident musulman entre14ème et 17ème siècle


Second work session : Directed by Luis López-Farjeat

(Associate Director of the AAIWG)

15h00 – 15h30 Terrence Kleven (Central College, Pella, Iowa, USA)

“Dialectic as a Necessary Preparation for Demonstration in al-Fārābī’s Book of Dialectic (Kitāb al-Ğadal)

15h30 – 16h00 Janis Esots (Ismaili Institute, London, UK)

“Mullā Ṣadrā’s Reappraisal of Suhrawardī’s Epistemology, or What Is the True Illuminative Relation?”

16h00 – 16h30 Celia López Alcalde (University of Porto, Portugal)

“Knowledge as Natural Illumination and Rabi Moses in Petrus Hispanus’ Commentary on the De anima

16h30 – 17h00 Tea Break

17h00 – 17h30 Hammadi Habad (Cadi Ayyad University, Marrakech,  Morocco)

“Philoponus against Proclus on  ‘al-ğūd’ vs ‘al-wuğūd’”

17h30 – 18h00 Allan Neves (Visiting PhD Candidate, State University of Minas Gerais, Brazil, & Cadi Ayyad University, Morocco)

“Vestiges of Epistemology in Proclus Arabus”


Samedi 17 mars 2017


9.30 – 12.30  Visite guidé à la médina de Marrakech

12.30 – 17.00 Déjeuner (à cotisation individuel de 100dh (12$) par personne) et balade dans la vallée d’Ourika (30km de Marrakech)


Prof. Rachak has recommended Hôtel Tichka which according to Booking.com is about $60-79 per night, but each participant should determine his or her own accommodation. TripAdvisor.com is often a very reliable site for recommendations.


As for visa requirements, see http://www.travel-exploration.com/page.cfm/Visa_Requirements.


Confirmed AAIWG members or friend spresenting include: Michael Chase, Davkat Dadikhuda, Youssef Elamari, Janis Esots, Gretchen Head, Hadel Jarada, Terry Kleven, Celia López, Irfan Omar, Richard Taylor, David Twetten.


Confirmed Moroccan colleagues presenting include:  Aziz Abou Charaa, , Mohammed Abouhafs, Mohamed El Boughali, Hammadi Habad,  Mohamed Maouhoub, Allan Naves, Jamal Rachak



Aziz Abou Charaa, Université Ibn Tofaïl, Kenitra, Morocco

“La présence de la philosophie dans l’espace de Fiqh et Kalam en occident musulman Entre 14- et 17 siècle”

   Généralement en parle du déclin de la philosophie dans l’orient-musulman après la critique de la philosophie par al-Ghazli, alors que cette histoire n’a commencé en occident musulman qu’après ce déclin.

Ibn Rushd a vécue une crise qui a touché sa liberté et son activité scientifique. Une crise qui a durée une année (594 au 595h) et qui a était considérée comme un signe du déclin de la philosophie dans l’occident-musulman. Dans mon intervention je vais essayer de jeter de la lumière sur le sujet en essayant de répondre à la question suivante :

Peut-on parlé d’une présence de la philoasophie entre 14 ème et 17 ème ? Et quelle est la nature de cette philosophie, est-elle néoplatonicienne ou péripatéticienne?

A fin de répondre à cette question, je vais interroger des manuscrits et des textes pour la première fois ; que ce soit des textes de philosophie, de logique ou de d’autres de Kalam ou de Fiqh, à savoir que Ibn Ruchd, et Ibn Baja seront l’axe de ces discussions et débats.


Mohammed Abouhafs, Université Moulay-Ismaïl, Marrakech, Morocco

La médecine chez Ibn Bajja”

   Ce travail veut nous donner une aperçue sur la médecine de Ibn Bajja, en présentant une image synthétique du total de ses Epitres en médecine, malgré qu’ils sont incomplètes, comme le reste de ses textes philosophiques ,ils reflète une expérience riche dans ce domaine.

Ma première intention s’interroge sur les textes fondateurs de la médecine et les références et les prof ainsi les contributions d’Ibn Bajja.

Ma deuxième intention vise a éclairer sa méthodologie de recherche et l'approche à suivre dans cette science, a savoir la méthode pratique et expérimentale, d’après un texte «Commentaire sur les aphorismes d’Hippocrate » « Sharh fi al-Fusul » et le commentaire de Galien, ou il précise la méthode la plus efficace qui permette de montrer les caractéristiques personnelles et profonds du maladie et le suivi dans toutes ses étapes, ses origines, ses symptômes, sa durée, sa fréquence et le mode de sa guérison, qui sera une tradition inaugurée par Ibn Bajja et parachevée par Ibn Ruchd (Avérroès).


Mohamed El Boughali,  Université Cadi Ayyad, Marrakech, Morocco

“Ibn Masarra et son disciple Arrouaini critiqués par Ibn Hazm”

  Nous sommes redevables a Ibn Hazm( mort en 1064/ 456 h)de l’idée la plus importante qui nous soit parvenue d’Ibn Masarra, selon laquelle le monde serait gouverné par al- arche (le trône divin). il est admis également que le arche dans la théologiechiite ismaélienne correspond à l'intellect suprême  ou encore créateur, Démiurge.

  Il est à noter par ailleurs qu’Ibn Hazm a évoqué d’Ibn Masarra a l’occasion de son discours sur un personnage très connu du chiisme qui n’est autre que Hisham ibn Hakam. Quant à Arrouaini lui-même disciple d’Ibn Masarra et contemporain d’Ibn Hazm, il est cité par ce dernier en faisant le lien avec Ahmed Ibn Khabit, theologien mu’tazilite (mort en 537 h).

  Nous essayons ici de montrer que la critique d’Ibn Hazm, dont Ibn Masarra et Arrouaini, ont fait l’objet n’était en fait qu’une partie du projet d’Ibn Hazm qui ose à rejeter ‘ilm al-kalām en général et ‘ilm al-kalām chiite en particulier.


Michael Chase, CNRS, Paris, France

The scientific epistemology of al-Naẓẓām”

   The early Mu‘tazlite theologian Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām (c. 760-ca. 845 CE) is usually neglected in histories of Islamic philosophy. This is a shame, I believe, for although he was later dismissed as a heretic, even within Mu‘tazilism, his thought is important in several ways. While he was a theologian rather than a philosopher, he, like other represetatives of the early Kalam, had a fully developed ontology, physics, and epistemology, which are interesting both in their own right and because such early Islamic philosophers as the members of the circle of al-Kindī were, at least to some extent, reacting to the debates within the Mu‘tazlia between Naẓẓām, his uncle Abū l-Huḏayl, and their predecessors and contemporaries.

Here I’ll restrict myself to examining a few aspects of Naẓẓām’s thought on ontology and physics, in order to see whether we can extract from the fragmentary remains of his writings some principles that may be said to characterize what I would like to call his scientific epistemology. Along the way, I’ll compare this epistemology to some features of contemporary science and philosophy.


Davkat Dadikhuda, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich, Germany

“Ṭūsī’s truth-makers: from nafs al-amr to the Active Intellect”

   In his commentary on I.1 of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s (d. 1274) Tajrīd al- ͑Aqā ͗id, Allāma Ḥillī (d. 1325) writes that he once asked Ṭūsī what the philosophers mean when they say that for a claim to be true is for it to correspond to nafs al-amr. Ṭūsī responds by identifying nafs al-amr with a mind separate from matter. In making this move, Naṣīr al-Dīn is squarely within the Aristo-Avicennian philosophical tradition which he, as is well-known, refines and defends against its detractors. But this sort of assessment is usually based on his famous commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt, a work that explicates and regiments Avicenna’s doctrines against the distinguished Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s (d. 1209) critique. However, there is another way in which Ṭūsī carries out this project, one less known and appreciated in the secondary literature, namely, in smaller, independent treatises. In this paper, I look at one such treatise, entitled Risāla fī ithbāt al- ͑aql al-mujarrad (Treatise on establishing the existence of the separate intellect), in which Ṭūsī argues for an Avicennian conclusion based on considerations about the nature of truth. After situating Ṭūsī conclusions in the context of the Avicennian doctrine they propound, highlighting how they are similar and different from that doctrine, I then offer an analysis of the argument of the Risāla, unpacking its compact reasoning in order to clarify exactly how Ṭūsī infers the existence of an immaterial entity on the basis of the truth-makers for the necessary and universal judgments that we make. I then end by briefly answering two questions: first, is the correspondence relation to facts or objects? And second, is Ṭūsī a realist or a non-realist about truth?


Youssef El Amari,  Regional Academy of Education and formation, Tangier-Tetouan-al-Hoceima, Morocco

“Facing the ‘double-truth’ and making space for human knowledge. Ibn Rushd, Aquinas and Galileo”

   Three years after the death of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier (d.1279), issued a letter with 220 decrees condemning the violation of the existing hierarchy among faculties by a group of professors of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris and the boldness to deal with and “dispute certain obvious and abominable errors”. He was keen to expose the form of their response when they were alerted to their slips and advised to stop quoting opinions which ran contrary to the Catholic doctrine and based on the books of the infidels. They say those opinions have a binding force that cannot be revoked, and then resort to cover up their commitment and adoption of them by saying “that is true according to philosophy, but not according to Catholic faith, “as if there were two contrary truths, and as if contrary to the truth of Sacred Scripture there could be truth in the statements of the damned gentiles...”. It’s about “a loose way of talking” which later became known to scholars of philosophy, science and theology during the Middle Ages as “double truth”, an “ambiguous” and “provocative” attitude to the teachings of the Scriptures or at least to their intended interpretations, according to a kind of "radical rationalism" which considers that the fulfillment of philosophical methods is sufficient to gain the truth in what would be known according to human capacity.

   Much has been written on this condemnation and on the “double truth”, with a wide variety of judgments and interpretations among scholars of medieval thought since the nineteenth century. Today, the condemnation is subject to a multidisciplinary study that evokes the complexity of the relationship between philosophy and religion, and the multifaceted impact of institutional and educational context in which medieval thinkers treated philosophical and theological issues. One of these issues in which we are interested here is how the intellectuals of the Middle Ages developed a vision of a peaceful and sound relationship between philosophy and religion, a conception that recognizes the powers of human mind to acquire a solid knowledge about the world and free it from the constraints of dependence or service to theology.The doctrine of “double truth” has also been a controversial issue for a long time. But it is well stressed today that Ibn Rushd, who was suspected for beingthe leading champion of this doctrine, embraces nearly the complete opposite, since he declares openly an opposite principle so pertinently called the “principle of the unity of truth” and uses this principal genuinely in dealing with the question of the relationship between philosophy and religious law.

   Nevertheless, if the “double truth” has “a long and confusing history”,the history of the “principle of the unity of truth” after Ibn Rushd is nothing less than surprising. Numerous thinkers, from the Medieval to the Early Modern Ages embraced the same principle to solve the same problem: conceiving a peaceful and sound relationship between philosophy and religion. This paper is a modest attempt to explore the manner in which Thomas Aquinas and Galileo Galilei “received” this genuine principle of Averroes in dealing with the same problem.Yet, none of them openly cites Averroes though using his principle. In fact, Aquinas used it against Averroes himself and Galileo against other theologians.

   My basic purpose in this essay isto draw attention to this fact which has been unperceived among scholars for a long time, as far as I know, and to bring textual evidence that testifies to our finding. Two works will be invoked in order to achieve this goal: TheSumma Contra Gentiles, where Aquinas stressed the main conception of the relationship between the truth of the Christian faith and the truths of human natural reason and theLetter the Grand Duchess Christine of Lorraine,a key text in the Galilean conception of the relationship between the demonstrated propositions of natural sciences and the scriptural passages dealing with its contents, where Galileo constructs ac ritical methodological framework for the scriptural interpretation.

My paper, however, is a part of a large project aiming at a deepest study of the whole epistemological and institutional context that was the basis of the debate on the relationship between philosophy and religion and on the interpretation of sacred texts in Ibn Rushd and Galileo.


Janis Esots, Ismaili Institute, London

“Mullā Ṣadrā’s Reappraisal of Suhrawardī’s Epistemology, or What Is the True Illuminative Relation?”

According to Suhrawardī, we can know the things with certainty only by presential knowledge (ʿilm ḥuḍūrī), acquired through establishing an “illuminative relation” (iḍāfa ishrāqiya) between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, which entails the illuminated presence of the latter to the former. Importantly, Suhrawardī understood the perceived thing as an externally existent entity (whence his focus on vision).

    Challenging Suhrawardī’s view, Mullā Ṣadrā argues that what the soul essentially perceives, is the forms which arise from it and subsist through it. Therefore, according to him, the illuminative relation is the relation between the soul and these forms, or between the agent of the form and its essence. Ṣadrā views perception as the manifestation of substantial motion, the perceived forms serving as means of the perfection of their perceiver.


Hammadi Habad, FLSH-UCA de Marrakech, Morocco

“Philoponus against Proclus on  ‘al-jūd’ vs ‘al-wujūd’”

Al-Farabi noted that he doesn’t understand how commentators could unanimously approve the Canon of Proclus which is based on his commenting on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione where he presented a Canon on mutual entailment between metathetic and plain statements. Al-Farabi’s rejection of Proclus entailment is grounded only on Aristotelian logical point of view; therefore, he didn’t regard the nature of the words that the latter used in his examples such as ‘‘just, not-just’ which not only referred to ethical statements but also to the Ontological Argument that shed light on a special philosophical issue of great importance: the relation between Goodness and Being, value and fact, well known, in the Arabic version of the Proclean Elements of Theology, under the doctrine: Being ‘‘al-Wujūd’’ is affected by Goodness ‘‘al-Jūd’’. Accordingly, the question is as follows: Is it im-possible to entail being from goodness? Thus Philoponus, al-Antaki, al-Isfizari, etc., have a controversy against Proclus.


Gretchen Head, Yale-NUS College, Singapore

“From Augustine to al-Yusi: the Rhetoric of Self-knowledge across Traditions”

  For Augustine, the impetus behind looking inward is to look out again, or, more accurately, to look up; truth is to be found in knowing God, not in knowing oneself. Or rather, knowing oneself is a project inextricably linked to an intimate knowledge of the Divine. Despite the claims of most genre criticism concerned with autobiography, the Confessions is not a convenient precursor to contemporary ideals of the expression of individuality, or an early example of modern self-consciousness. It is deeply typological, the form of narrative imitation in which the Hebrew Bible is interpreted in such a way as to predict or prefigure events in the Christian Bible. It bears a resemblance to archetypalism, yet archetypes are characterized by constant cyclical replication and typology is always predictive, focused on a new and better time to come. Typology is a surprisingly productive lens through which to consider premodern Arabic autobiography as well, though its contours here are Islamic rather than Christian. This paper will read the Moroccan Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥasan al-Yūsī’s (1631-1691) Fahrasa (autobiography) to show how the text’s rhetorical devices are grounded in typology and used to craft a representation of the development of self-knowledge consistent with those found in Antiquity. It will demonstrate that reading the premodern Arabic autobiographical text, particularly those from the Moroccan tradition, next to Augustine allows us a new and more nuanced understanding of the meaning of self-knowledge in the Arabic context.


Hadel Jarada, Postdoctoral Scholar, University of Jyväskylä, Ph.D., Harvard University

“Ethical Value in Post-Classical Māturīdī Kālam.”

  A much debated topic in Islamic speculative theology (kalām) is how humans know the ethical value of acts. Theologians disagreed about whether acts have intrinsic moral qualities or whether we know these qualities through revelation (al-sharʿ), which through its commands and prohibitions, subtly instructs us of the particular moral qualities each thing has. Some theologians argued that God instructs us to obey particular injunctions precisely because of their moral goodness, while others argued that injunctions are good simply because God commands them. The later Māturīdī tradition took an approach that differed from the prevalent Ashʿarī view by harkening back to an older stance concerning the innateness of ethical value and human rational knowledge thereof. While this issue has been explored in Ashʿarī and Muʿtazilī thought, the Māturīdī position is still relatively underresearched and understudied. In this paper, I explore the Māturīdī position through an analysis of one of the more important Hanafī uṣūl al-fiqh works, al-tawḍīḥ fī ḥall ghawāmid al-tanqīḥ, written by the eminent Central Asian theologian and logician Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Maḥbūbī (d. 1347), alongside an analysis of commentaries on the treatise contained within it, titled “The Four Preliminary Statements,” which presents an original take on the issue of human moral knowledge of good (ḥusn) and bad (qubḥ) and the ethical valuation of acts. My paper will analyze how Māturīdīs understood this issue in relation to their Ashʿarī counterparts through a textual analysis of this text and its later commentaries in the Māturīdī and Ashʿarī schools.


Terrence Kleven, Central College, Pella, Iowa, USA

“Dialectic as a Necessary Preparation for Demonstration in al-Fārābī’s Book of Dialectic (Kitāb al-Jadal)

Al-Fārābī’s Book of Dialectic (Kitāb al-Jadal) is one of a series of treatises which present his account of the five syllogistic arts, the arts of rhetoric, poetry, sophistry, dialectic and demonstration. In this extended treatise (thirty folios in MS Bratislava), he explains the relation of dialectic to sophistry and to demonstration. He says that “the ultimate end of dialectic is so that man may attain the faculty of investigation and the preparation of the mind for philosophy” (f. 197r ll. 6-8). At the same time, this dialectical art identifies sophistical premises and arguments, and in doing so, dialectic prepares the mind for the recognition and formulation of demonstrative premises and arguments. Dialectic is not presented as an art that is useful after demonstration is complete, but rather it is a necessary preparation (tawṭi’a) for the art of demonstration.

Livre de dialectique (Kitāb al-Jadal) par al-Fārābī est une des séries de traités qui montre son récit des cinq arts syllogistiques : l’art de rhétorique, l’art de poésie, l’art de sophisme, l’art de dialectique, et l’art de démonstration. Dans ce traité prolongé (trente pages dans MS Bratislava), al-Fārābī explique la relation de la dialectique au sophisme et à la démonstration. Il dit que « la fin ultime de la dialectique est pour que l’homme puisse réaliser la faculté d’investigation et la préparation de l’esprit pour faire la philosophie » (f. 197r ll. 6-8). Au même temps, cet art dialectique identifie des prémisses et des arguments sophistiques, et ce faisant, la dialectique prépare l’esprit pour reconnaître et formuler des prémisses et arguments démonstratives. La dialectique n’est pas montrée comme un art qui est utile après la démonstration se termine, mais comme une préparation (tawṭi’a) nécessaire pour l’art de la démonstration. 


Mohammed Lachkar, Université Moulay Ismail de Meknes

Le problème de l’interprétation chez Alghazali”

Notre intervention portera sur le problème de l’interprétation dans la pensée d’Alghazali. Nous y tenterons, à partir de ce que permet la chronologie de ses œuvres, de saisir les contours et les nuances de sa conception de l’interprétation, mais également de mettre en relief le contexte et le cadre qui ont présidé à cette conception tant au niveau théorique que pratique.

Nous montrerons que les caractéristiques fondamentales de l’activité interprétative, selon Alghazali, peuvent être ramenées à trois aspects, savoir son aspect inéluctable, son aspect hiérarchique et son aspect infini.


Celia López Alcalde, University of Porto, Portugal

“Knowledge as Natural Illumination and Rabi Moses in Petrus Hispanus’ Commentary on the De anima

Petrus Hispanus’ Commentary to the De anima, in its general view, describes intellectual knowledge as natural illumination.  The intellect, as light, reflects over the phantasms as to grasp intellectual species. This intellectual light is understood as auto-reflexive, being the origin of a natural and innate knowledge of the soul itself and God. The three kinds of knowledge, thus, are obtained by the natural light and action of the agent intellect. Peter quotes twice «Rabi Moses» to support this scheme, introducing some kind of transcendent knowledge, in what seems to be a reference to Maimonides’ prophecy theory. This paper will analyze the role of Maimonides’ quotations within Petrus’ general explanation of knowledge, which possibly can be considered the first to be recorded in the Latin tradition.


Mohamed Mauohoub, Université Cadi Ayyad, Marrakech

“Esquisses d'une désobstruction de la pensée islamique”

Seul un double ancrage , d'abord dans notre présent, nous modernes qui interprétons les textes, (les traditions, les provenances), qui nous interpellent; ensuite, un ancrage dans le présent du texte (de la pensée, du concept, du philosophe, de la doctrine, du phénomène) visé — seul ce double ancrage pourrait nous permettre d'être à la hauteur, chaque fois différent et différemment, du présent en jeu dans la lecture, dans ce qui est lu, dans l'approche, dans ce qui est approché, bref dans la re-présentation de notre objet et de ses enjeux. 

C'est ce souci méthodologico-philosophique, qui régit autant mon approche de la théologie musulmane (ilm-al-kalam), le statut de la traduction dans la tradition arabo-musulmane, que mes cours sur la modernité de Descartes, les lumières de kant ou l'historisme de Hegel,  autant d'occasions, aussi, pour questionner ce souci et le mettre à l'épreuve — que je propose de montrer à l'oeuvre dans le débat contemporain autour du religieux, autour du rapport multiple au corpus(Coran, traditions, interprétations/représentations): la pensée islamique en devenir.



Allan Neves, PhD candidate, State University of Minas Gerais, Brazil, & Cadi Ayyad University, Morocco, Morocco

“Vestiges of Epistemology in Proclus Arabus

  In the commentary on the Book 1 of the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas quotes the Liber de Causis (LdC) to support the principle according to which whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver and applies it in his understanding of sensible perception. This is a suggestive use of the LdC, since its overall structure and content, at a first glance, does not comprise any standing discussion about epistemology in the human realm. In this presentation, I shall track some vestiges of it in the LdC calling upon the Arabic tradition, in which the book makes part of the corpus of what is known as Proclus Arabus. I shall also suggest a doctrinal influence from the Plotiniana Arabica as a result of the intellectual activity of the translation movement in the beginning of the Arabic Philosophy.


Irfan Omar, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA

“Al-Ghazali’s notion of Knowledge in light of his Views on Prophet al-Khidr.”

Khidr is a legendary figure mentioned in the Qur’an in Surat al-Kahf (18: 60-82). These verses relate an allegorical story about Moses’ journey in search of a mysterious spiritual person, later identified as al-Khidr. Both Moses and Khidr are viewed as individuals who received knowledge from God; the former in his capacity as a messenger (rasul) received revelation, while the latter, in the words of the Qur’an, is “a man to whom [God] had given knowledge of [God’s] own [presence] (‘ilm ladunni).” The two forms of knowledge are said to be like the two “seas” - both originating in, and ultimately uniting in/with God. For Ghazali, like many other prominent Sufis of his time, Khidr’s knowledge is as important as that of Moses, however, it is categorically different and possibly of a higher order. Ghazali’s view of khidrian knowledge is in line with his overall beliefs concerning the esoteric dimensions of faith. Despite his orthodox roots, he defended the right of the Sufis to believe and engage in mystical practices so long as they did not directly contradict orthodox beliefs. At the same time, Ghazali argued that the knowledge produced by scholastics and theologians using Greek philosophy was not reliable. Ghazali believed in spiritual experiences which he regarded to be “beyond the grasp of the rational mind and cannot be expressed in human language” (Jones). Reason alone is not sufficient to attain God; divine inspiration and help is vital for achieving spiritual knowledge or illumination of the heart. Khidr’s encounter with Moses suggests that true knowledge is often veiled and is not readily apparent. For example, in the quranic story Khidr does three things that are seemingly anti-sharia without revealing the truths behind his actions. As a result, Moses becomes visibly upset by these actions as he is unable to see the “esoteric” meanings behind Khidr’s actions. In a khidrian trope, knowledge remains hidden until it becomes absolutely necessary for it to be revealed. Similarly, Ghazali believed that “dreams and visions” are spiritual gifts and are a “true” source of knowledge and knowing. Ghazali was however not very keen to share his own experiences; he does not provide any noteworthy account of his own “dreams and mystical charisms.” He admits to having the experience but declines to say more than that. This presentation offers a reading of the khidrian trope of knowledge in the context of Ghazali’s understanding of mystical truths.


Jamal Rachak, Université Cadi Ayyad, Marrakech

“La représentation et les formes spirituels chez Ibn Bajja”

Aristote a mentionné dans sa noétique l’apport de la représentation, mais

sans fournir aucune explication à propos du passage des formes de la

représentation à l'intellect. Ibn Bāğğa en tant que philosophe péripatéticien à essayer de répondre à cette problématique de façon non déclaré. Dans mon intervention, je vais analyser et interpréter les textes d’Ibn Bāğğa afin de répondre à cette question. Les textes de ce philosophe de l’occident musulman sont d’une grande richesse qui nous suscite à les comprendre d’abord et les interpréter.


Richard Taylor, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA, & DWMC Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium

“Averroes’s Critique of  Ibn Bajjah on Abstraction”

In Book 3, Comment 36, of his Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, Averroes criticized Ibn Bajjah on the latter’s understanding of abstraction as a way to understanding separate substances and attaining happiness. Thomas Aquinas agreed with Averroes and criticized Ibn Bajjah in detail. But Aquinas was unaware of the real historical and textual foundations for the critique of Ibn Bajjah in Averroes’s Long Commentary on the De Anima. This presentation explains the importance of authentic and inauthentic writings ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisias in the formation of the teaching of Ibn Bajjah and the nature and importance of Averroes’s critique.


David Twetten, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA

Knowing the Essence-Existence Distinction: al-Ghazali as the Key to Aquinas’ Teaching”

The Essence-Existence Distinction is well known in Arabic Philosophy because of Avicenna, and in European thought, medieval and contemporary, because of Aquinas. There is increasing, though grudging, recognition that Aquinas’ doctrine comes from Avicenna. What is not known is the source of Aquinas’ proofs as to how we know this distinction. I disclose these for the first time.