Brief notes for lectures on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Book I

The Highest Good: Happiness

Good is the end or goal of every craft, investigation, action or decision.

Ends are of several sorts: Activities and Products of activities

The hierarchy of ends has a corresponding hierarchy of goods.

That is, some things are chosen for the sake of others.

The good is the end as desired; the end is what is achieved and so can also be called the good or the goal.

The highest or greatest good:

Pursued for its own sake

Not chosen because of something else

Not infinitely pursued (: achievable)

The best good

Political Science

Prescribes what is to be studied and directs learning

Other honored capacities such as generalship, household management, rhetoric are subordinate to it

It makes use of other sciences and determines what is to be done or avoided

Therefore: “its end will include the ends of the other sciences, and so will be the human good.”

“And since it uses the other sciences concerned with action, and moreover legislates what must be done and what avoided, its end will include the ends of the other sciences, and so this will be the human good. For even if the good is the same for a city as for an individual, still the good of the city is apparently a greater and more complete good to acquire and preserve. For while it is satisfactory to acquire and preserve the good even for an individual, it is finer and more divine to acquire and preserve it for a people and for cities. And so, since our line of inquiry seeks these [goods, for an individual and for a community], it is a sort of political science.”

The Method of Political Inquiry

How exact can political science be?

It is not clear what is just or fine in every case. Convention seems to play a role.

The aim is the truth roughly (generally) since we argue about what is usually good and so our conclusions can be expected to be no better.

Book II: Virtues of Character in General

How a Virtue of Character is Acquired

Virtue comes about by habituation,

not by a process of nature.

(1) What is natural cannot be changed by habituation

(2) Natural capacities are not acquired by habituation

(3) Legislators concentrate on habituation

(4) Virtue and vice are formed by good and bad actions

Conclusion: The importance of habituation

"A state [of character] arises from [the repetition of] similar

activities. Hence we must display the right activities, since

differences in these imply corresponding differences in the

states. It is not unimportant, then, to acquire one sort of habit

or another, right from our youth; rather, it is very

important,indeed all-important." 1103b22-25

What is the right sort of habituation?

Good question, because the aim of ethical theory is practical.

We don't just want to know, we want to become good.

We must then consider the right way to act.

1. Action should express right reason

2. The account is flexible and inexact.

And the right sort of habituation must avoid excess and

deficiency since these work to undermine the establishment

of habituation

Pleasure and pain are important in habituation.

Virtue is concerned with pleasure and pain.

But these sorts of claims about habituation present a puzzle.

How can we become good without being

good already?

OR:

To do what is just, must we not already be just?

Plato in the MENO raises the question of the Lazy Man’s Paradox in the same vein.

First Reply:

Conformity versus understanding

It is possible to conform without understanding. But what we are after here requires understanding so that we can be assured that the action done is not by chance or under someone else's orders or guidance.

In other words, understanding allows that

the activity is ours in the right way.

Second Reply:

Craft versus Virtues.

Still, the case of the virtues is not the same as that of the crafts, since good work in the crafts is determined by evaluation of the distinct product. But in the case of the virtues, it is not just the product that is to be considered in the evaluation.

The Agent has to be in the right state:

(1) know that he is doing virtuous action,

(2) choose or decide on it for itself,and

(3) do it from a firm and unchanging state of character

Virtue requires habituation, and therefore requires practice, not just theory.

Hence virtue requires:

- a natural capacity,

- learning (and teaching that brings it about), and

- habituation or practice,

as Plato indicated in his dialogue called MENO.

A formal definition of virtue

This will enable us to understand fully just what we mean by moral virute

We need to consider: genus, difference and species.

The Genus. This is constituted by these three:

(i) Feelings [appetite, anger fear, etc.],

(ii) Capacities [the ability to become angry, afraid,

etc.] or

(iii) States [this is our disposition in relation to

feelings]

Virtue is NOT a feeling (or passion).

(1) excellence or baseness of character is not based on

feelings

(2) praise or blame is not for feelings

(3) anger and fear do not involve decision (PROAIRESIS), but

virtue requires it

(4) feelings move us but virtue or vice put us in a certain

state or condition

NOR is it a capacity:

We don't generally call people good or bad because of the capacities they have.

So, it is a state, since it is not a feeling or a capacity

Given that it is a state, what kind of state is it?

The Species:

The differentia or distinguishing mark of virtue?

Virtue and the human function:

Whatever this is, it causes what has it to function well and so the virtue or excellence of a human being will be what makes that human being good and makes that human perform the human function well

The numerical mean and the mean relative to us:

Relative to our own nature and position, this will involve a mean or intermediate point between destructive contraries of excess and deficiency. But it is in this way not numerical but relative to us.

Virtue seeks the mean relative to us

Argument from craft to virtue:

In this case we might say that, like the craftsperson who regularly makes good products by avoiding the extremes of excess and deficiency, so virtue will also aim at the intermediate between extremes.

Arguments from the nature of virtue of character:

In the case of character formation, it also seems to be the case that virtue aims at the intermediate and avoids the extremes.

(That is clear in the case of athletic training and many other activities.)

So we have now the Definition of virtue:

Virtue is

(a) a state that decides

(b) consisting in a mean

(d) which is defined by reference to reason

(e) that is, to the reason by reference to which the intelligent person

would define it.

BUT the definition must not be misapplied to cases in

which there is no mean, e.g. ADULTERY

The Definition of Virtue as a Mean Applies to the Individual Virtues.

Recall that virtue (aretē) is nothing less than excellence.

We should be clear that there are two types of excellence / virtue with which we are concerned in Virtue or Eudaimonistic Moral Philosophy, namely, excellences of character and excellences of thought.

Here we consider virtues of character, and leave virtues of thought for Book VI.

Classification of virtues of character

Virtues concerned with feelings:

(1) bravery: This is the mean in feelings of fear and confidence

(2) temperance: This is the mean in pleasure and pain.

Virtues concerned with external goods:

(3) generosity: This is the mean in giving and taking money

(4) magnificence: This is the mean in giving and taking large sums of money.THIS IS

(5) magnanimity: This is the mean in honor and dishonor. The extremes are vanity and pusillanimity. (Pusillanimity is faintheartedness or having a lack of fitting courage. It is a kind of irresoluteness, couwardliness.

(6) a virtue concerned with small honors

Virtues concerned with social life

(7) mean with respect to anger

(8) mean with respect to truth-telling: The extreme are boastfullness and self-deprecation.

(9) wit: The extremes are baffoonery and boorishness

(10) friendliness: The extremes are the person who is an ingratiating flatterer and the quarrelsome person

Means states that are not virtues

(11) prone to shame

(12) proper indignation

What about Justice: This social virtue will be considered in its own right in Book 5.

Aristotle does provide some practical advice on ways to

achieve the mean:

Avoid the more opposed extreme.

Avoid the easier extreme.

Be careful with pleasures.

These rules do not give exact and detailed guidance.

Review

Recall that:

Virtue is

(a) a state that decides

(b) consisting in a mean

(d) which is defined by reference to reason

(e) that is, to the reason by reference

to which the intelligent person

would define it.

Book III: The Preconditions of Virtue

Voluntary Action

Praise and blame require voluntary action: This is because these are not given for involuntary actions. Such involuntary actions receive pardon or perhaps pity, but not praise or blame.

Force makes an action involuntary: This has an origin outside the agent or victim and so the agent or victim contributes nothing to it.

Duress does not make an action involuntary:

For Aristotle duress in itself is not sufficiently exculpatory.

Actions under duress sometimes seem forced, sometimes not.

Aristotle raises a question about a forceful tyrant threatening a person’s family. But for him this is more like the case of people choosing to through a ship’s cargo overboard rather than risk the ship sinking and consequent death. That is, it is voluntary though done under severe duress. Under severe duress, the action might near being involuntary but Aristotle would classify it differently then.

Such an action is a mixture of voluntary and involuntary,

but,taken as a whole, it is voluntary: For Aristotle, it is more like the voluntary since it is done willingly and has its origin in the agent. It is up to the agent whether the action will or will not be done.

Hence:

Praise and blame for mixed actions assumes they are voluntary.

And actions under duress are not forced, and our definition of force is not undermined.

Does what is pleasant or fine does make an action involuntary?

Examples: pen; lottery ticket; seduction. No human being is irresistible, but every human being struggles with desire and temptation.

Ignorance without regret does not make an action involuntary.

Everything causes by ignorance is non-voluntary, but what is involuntary also causes pain and regret.

Action done in ignorance but not caused by ignorance is not necessarily involuntary.

Consider action done under the influence of drugs and action done in disregard of context and the particulars of the situation.

Ignorance of particulars makes an action involuntary.

"THE CAUSE" OF INVOLUNTARY ACTION"IS IGNORANCE OF PARTICULARS WHICH THE

ACTION CONSISTS IN AND IS CONCERNED WITH; FOR THESE ALLOW BOTH PITY AND

PARDON, SINCE AN AGENT ACTS INVOLUNTARILY IF HE IS IGNORANT OF ONE OF

THESE PARTICULARS." 1111A1-2

The definition of voluntary action:

Voluntary action seems to be what has its origins in the agent him/herself when the particulars that the action consists in are known to the agent.

Are we controlled by emotion, desire, appetites so that we cannot act voluntarily?

Emotions and appetites cannot be regarded as involuntary causes of actions. If so,

children and animals would never act involuntarily; but they do act in that way.

Decision (proairesis)

What decision is not.

It is not appetite: non rational animals have this but not decision. Incontinent people have this but not decision as the basis of their actions.

It is not emotion: Emotional actions seem to express little decision.

It is not wish: We can wish for the impossible but we do not exercise decision regarding it.

It is not belief: We can have belief about eternal things and impossible things, but we do not exercise decision regarding them. Also, beliefs are true or false, but decisions are good or bad.

Decision requires deliberation: So it also involves reason and thought.

Further, not everything is open to deliberation: We deliberate about what is up to us, not about what is eternal or unchangeable, for example, God’s nature or whether 2 + 2 = 4.

Hence, we deliberate about the actions we can do:

"DELIBERATION CONCERNS WHAT IS USUALLY [ONE WAY RATHER THAN ANOTHER], WHERE THE OUTCOME IS UNCLEAR AND THE RIGHT WAY TO ACT IS UNDEFINED. AND WE ENLIST PARTNERS IN DELIBERATION ON LARGE ISSUES WHEN WE DISTRUST OUR OWN ABILITY TO DISCERN [THE RIGHT ANSWER]." 1112B8-12

Note that we do not deliberate about the human end which is happiness. But we do deliberate about what promotes or gets us to the end or goal of human life.

The scope and method of deliberation:

We consider means to reach an end previously set down. We consider how certain means will enable us to reach an end and how the means itself are reached, until we come to the first cause in our action which is the last thing to be discovered in our deliberation:

"AND THE LAST THING [FOUND] IN THE ANALYSIS IS THE FIRST THAT COMES TO

BE." 1112B24

Decision, then, is:

Deliberate desire to do an action that is up to us, for when we have judged that it is right as a result of deliberation, our desire to do it expresses our rational wish.

Rational Wish for the End:

We wish for the end or good of our action.

Do we wish for the good?

Some say that this must be the case, even when we choose incorrectly. But we wish for the real good, not the apparent good, though the apparent good is what we often attain. No one wishes for what is not good. Hence, the problem is that of how things seem or appear.

Or do we wish for the apparent good?

Solution:

What is really and unconditionally wishes for is the real good, but for each person what is wished is is the good as it appears to that person.

The excellent person is the standard:

The ideal or standard in this case is the person of virtue / excellence, since what s/he wishes is not only the apparent good but also the real good. As an ideal, we can say that what s/he does and how s/he does it is the standard or model for what and how we should act.

Hence, for Aristotle, virtue and vice are in our control. The relevant actions are in our power.

We wish for the end or good and we deliberate and decide about what promotes it or how to get it. These actions express decision and are voluntary. Acting or not acting is up to us. Being good or bad are up to us. The idea that no one does wrong willingly found in Plato is then partly right and partly wrong.

Hence, we form our character by how we live.

Our responsibility is clear from the parallel between character and health.

That is, character formation takes more than wish, just as recovering from illness takes more than wish. These can take hard work in thought about what is right and also in habituation in what is right action through exercise or practice.

Is our character really up to us?

This is a good question because we are NOT responsible for the initial formation of our attitudes and habits as children. These come from social setting, family and community, and from certain native traits (which we now call genetic disposition).

Objection: Everyone aims at the apparent good and we cannot control how things appear to us. Character controls that.

Reply:

Each person is responsible for character and so responsible for how character affects his or her perceptions.

Nicomachean Ethics V

Justice

Justice is both lawfulness and fairness in social settings as a virtue or excellence relating ultimately to social

Decency. (More later on Decency.)

Two Understandings of Justice:

General Justice: The Totality of Virtue

Special Justice: The Social Virtue which has as its ultimate end Decency

Special Justice as a virtue is a state, not a capacity, relating to actions

Justice in Distribution

Justice in Rectification

Justice in Exchange

Justice in the Political Realm (Political Justice)

Political Justice:

What is the goal or end of Political Justice?

Why are individuals tempted to be unjust?

Who can participate in Political Justice?

NOMOS and PHYSIS:

Justice by nature, Justice by Law or Convention (Custom)

Is there no natural justice?

How to understand Natural Justice

Justice and Just Action:

What is a Just Action?

How does it relate to Just Character?

Voluntary Actions require knowledge which is suitable, as we have seen.

Aristotle on Agency

What is the Self for Aristotle?

Soul?

Body?

Both?

Can a person voluntarily suffer injustice?

The incontinent person: Is this person unjust to him/herself?

Does this person voluntarily suffer injustice?

Decency

“It is clear from this what is decent, and clear that it is just, and better than a certain way of being just. It is also evident from this who the decent person is; for he is the one who decides on and does such actions, not an exact stickler for justice in the bad way, but taking less than he might even though he has the law on his side. This is the decent person, and his state is decency; it is a sort of justice, and not some state different from it.”

Is it better to do or to suffer injustice?

What is it to suffer? What suffers? What is better?

Nicomachean Ethics VI

This book is concerned with the virtues or excellences of thought mentioned in Book 1, ch. 13.

Truth and action are controlled by sense perception, understanding and desire, but humans can control desire through a form of intellect, practical intellect or practical understanding. This is what it is to deliberate before deciding on an action. Once we have decided, we then have decision or rational wish directed toward an end to be achieved by human action. This is goal-oriented action guided by reason.

The virtue at work here is prudence which differs from craft knowledge, scientific knowledge, understanding, and wisdom.

Aristotle discusses the use or lack of use of prudence in the practical syllogism in Book VII which concerns how we fail to employ prudence and instead are incontinent or worse regarding right actions.

Nicomachean Ethics VII: Incontinence

What is incontinence?

Is it lack of knowledge? Yes, and No.

The Practical Syllogism:

Ignorance of the Universal

Particular ignorance of the Universal

Ignorance of the Particular

Particular ignorance of the Particular

Characters:

Virtuous Continent Incontinent Simply Incontinent Vicious

What importance does knowing have for this distinction of characters?

Why is Intemperance worse than incontinence?

Responsibility: Agency in Aristotle

Deliberation and decision

Pleasure and Happiness

Hedonism

Pleasures of the Body

Nicomachean Ethics X: Pleasure and Happiness

Pleasure and Human Happiness

What is pleasure, again?

Good and Bad pleasures: What determines the pleasure to be good or bad?

Pleasure arises in the context of activities but is not an activity

Pleasure is the culmination of an activity, something consequent upon activity.

“Why does everyone desire pleasure? We might think it is because everyone also aims at being alive. Living is a type of activity, and each of us is active toward the objects he likes most and in the ways he likes most. The musician, for instance, activates his

hearing in hearing melodies; the lover of learning activates his thought in thinking about objects of study; and so on for each of the others. Pleasure completes their activities, and hence completes life, which they desire. It is reasonable, then, that they

also aim at pleasure, since it completes each person’s life for him, and life is choiceworthy.” 1175a12-18

Happiness:

This is not a state but an activity. Hence, it might be best to call it human fulfillment. And as living beings we are active and alive in our seeking of human fulfillment.

In that sense, we are seeking happiness. The happiness or fulfillment we seek is that of the person of excellence.

Happiness is of two sorts.

First, the Highest Kind of Happiness: virtue/excellence of character and virtue/excellence of thought

Human Nature and the Function Argument

The activity of reason in theoretical or contemplative study is the highest fulfillment possible for human beings.

Second, the Live of Moral Excellence or Virtue, the excellence of citizenship

Why this is excellence.

Why this is second best.

Some further remarks on Ethics and Politics