Some literature:

Putallaz, François-Xavier. Le sens de la réflexion chez Thomas d'Aquin. Paris : J. Vrin, 1991

Black, Deborah, L., “Consciousness and self-knowledge in Aquinas’ critique of Averroes’ psychology,” Journal of the History of Philosophy (Berkeley) 31 (1993), 349-385.

Martin, Christopher J., “Self-Knowledge and Cognitive Ascent: Thomas Aquinas and Peter Olivi on the KK-Thesis,” 93-108, in Forming the Mind. Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment, ed. Hendrik Langerlund. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007.

See Summa theologiae, prima pars, Q.87.

Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate (“Disputed Questions On Truth”)

ARTICLE VIII

(Parallel readings: De veT., 8, 6; C. G., II, 75; III, 46; S. T., I, 14, 2, ad 3; 87, I;

Q. D. de anima, 16, ad 8; II de anima, 6, nn. 304-308; III de anima, 9. nn. 721 ,

724-726.)

In the Eighth Article We Ask: DOES THE MIND

KNOW ITSELF THROUGH ITS ESSENCE OR

THROUGH SOME SPECIES?

Difficulties:

It seems that it knows itself through some species, for

I. As the Philosopher says: "Our intellect understands nothing without

a phantasm."l But it cannot receive a phantasm of the very essence

of the soul. Therefore, our mind must understand itself through some

other species abstracted from phantasms.

2. Those things which are seen through their essence are most certainly

apprehended without error. But many err about the human

mind, for some2 say it is air, others3 fire, and hold many other foolish

opinions about it. Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its

essence.

3. It was said that through its essence the mind sees that it exists, but

can err in the investigation of its nature.-On the contrary, to know

something through its essence is to know what it is, for the essence of

a thing is the same as its quiddity. Therefore, if the soul saw itself

through its essence, everyone would unerringly know the essence of

his soul, which is obviously false.

4. Our soul is a form joined to matter. But every form of this kind

is known through abstraction of the species from matter and from

material conditions. Therefore, the soul is known through an abstracted

species.

5. Understanding is not an act of the soul alone, but of the composite,

as is said in The Soul,4 But every such act is common to soul

and body. Therefore, there must always be something from the body

in understanding. But this would not be if the mind saw itself through

its essence without any species abstracted from the bodily senses.

Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its essence.

6. The Philosopher says5 that the intellect understands itself just as

it understands other things. But it does not understand other things

through its essence, but through species. Therefore, it does not understand

itself through its essence.

7. Powers are known through their acts, and acts through their objects.

But the essence of the soul can be known only when its powers

are known, for what a thing can do manifests the nature of the thing.

Therefore, it has to know its essence through its acts and through the

species of its objects.

8. As sense is related to what is sensible, so understanding is related

to what is intelligible. But there has to be some distance between sense

and the sensible. For this reason, the eye cannot see itself. Therefore,

there also has to be some distance in intellectual vision, with the result

that mind can never understand itself through its essence.

9· According to the Philosopher,6 in a demonstration we should not

proceed in a circle, because it would follow that a thing would become

known through itself. Thus, it would follow that it would exist before

itself and be better known than itself, which is impossible. But, if the

mind sees itself through its essence, that which is known and that

through which it is known will be the same. Therefore, the same un~

enable conclusion would follow, for something would exist before

Itself and be better known than itself.

• 10. Dionysius says7 that the soul knows the truth of existing things

ill a sort of circle. However, a circular movement is from the same

thing to the same thing. Therefore, it seems that the soul goes out

from itself in its understanding, and through things outside returns

to knowledge of itself. Thus, it does not understand itself through its

essence.

I I. While the cause remains, the effect remains. Therefore, if the

mind saw itself through its essence because its essence is present to it,

it would always see it, for it is always present to it. Therefore, since

it is impossible to understand many things at once, the mind would

never understand anything else.

12. Things that follow have more composition than those which

come earlier. But understanding follows existing. Therefore, there is

more composition in the understanding of the soul than in its existence.

But, in the soul, that which exists is not the same as that by which

it exists. Therefore, that in the soul by which it understands will not

be the same as that which is understood. Thus, the mind does not see

itself through its essence.

13. The same thing under the same aspect cannot be form and that

which is informed. But, since the understanding is a power of the

soul, it is a kind of form of its essence. Therefore, the essence of the

soul cannot be the form of the understanding. Therefore, the mind

does not see itself through its essence.

14. The soul is a subsistent substance. However, intelligible forms

are not of themselves subsistent. Otherwise, knowledge, which is made

up of these intelligible forms, would not be classified as an accident.

Therefore, the essence of the soul cannot have the character of intelligible

form by which the mind sees itself.

IS. Since acts and movements are distinguished in their terms, intelligible

things which belong to the same species are understood according

to their species in the same way. But the soul of Peter belongs

to the same species as that of Paul. Therefore, the soul of Peter understands

itself just as it understands Paul's soul. But it does not understand

Paul's soul through its essence, for it is not present to it. Therefore,

it does not understand itself through its essence.

16. Form is simpler than that which is informed through the form.

But the mind is not simpler than itself. Therefore, it is not informed by

itself. Consequently, since it is informed by that through which it

knows, it will not know itself through itself.

To the Contrary:

I'. Augustine says: "Mind knows itself through itself because it is

incorporeal. For, if it does not know itself, it does not love itself."8

z'. The Gloss on the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12: 2) reads:

"By that sight which is called intellectual, those things are known

which are not bodies and do not have any forms like bodies, as mind

itself and every disposition of the soul."9 The same Gloss adds: "Intellectual

sight contains those things which have no likenesses not

identical with themselves."lo Therefore, the mind does not know itself

through something not identical with it.

3'. In The Soul we read: "In things separated from matter, that

which understands and that by which it is understood are the same."ll

But the mind is an immaterial thing. Therefore, it is understood

through its essence.

4'. Everything which, as intelligible, is present to the understanding

is understood by the understanding. But the essence of the soul is present

to understanding in an intelligible manner, for it is present to it

through its truth. Truth, however, is the reason for understanding, as

goodness is the reason for loving. Therefore, the mind understands

itself through its essence.

5'. The species through which something is understood is simpler

than that which we understand through it. But the soul does not have

any species simpler than itself to be abstracted from it. Therefore, the

soul does not understand itself through a species, but through its essence.

6'. All knowledge takes place through an assimilation of the knower

to the thing known. But there is nothing else more like the soul than

its essence. Therefore, it understands itself through nothing else but

its essence.

7'. That which is a cause by which other things are made knowable

is not known through anything other than itself. But the soul is a cause

which makes other physical things knowable, for they are intelligible

inasmuch as we make them intelligible, as the Commentator says.12

Therefore, the soul is understood only through itself.

8'. According to the Philosopher,13 knowledge about the soul is most

certain. But that which is more certain is not known through that

which is less certain. Therefore, we do not have knowledge of the

soul through something other than itself.

9'· Every species through which our soul understands is abstracted

from sensible things. But there is no sensible thing from which the

~oul can abstract its own quiddity. Therefore, the soul does not know

Itself through any likeness.

10'. As physical light makes all things actually visible, so the soul

through its light makes all material things actually intelligible, as is

clear from The Soul.14 But physical light is seen through itself and

not through any likeness of itself. Therefore, the soul, too, is understood

through its essence and not through any likeness.

I I '. As the Philosopher says, the agent intellect "does not at one time

understand and at another not understand, but always understands."15

But it is only itself which it understands at all times. This would not

be possible if it understood itself through a species abstracted from

the senses, for thus it would not understand itself before the abstraction.

Therefore, our mind understands itself through its essence.

REPLY:

When we ask if something is known through its essence, we can

understand the question in two ways. In the first, "through its essence"

is taken to refer to the thing known, so that we understand that a thing

is known through its essence when its essence is known, and that it is

not known through its essence when not its essence but only certain

of its accidents are known. In the second way, it is taken to refer to

that by which something is known, so that we thus understand that

something is known through its essence because the essence itself is

that by which it is known. It is in this sense that we ask here if the

soul understands itself through its essence.

For a clear understanding of this question we should observe that

each person can have a twofold knowledge of the soul, as Augustine

says.16 One of these is the knowledge by which the soul of each man

knows itself only with reference to that which is proper to it. The

other is that by which the soul is known with reference to that which

is common to all souls. This latter, which concerns all souls without

distinction, is that by which the nature of the soul is known. However,

the knowledge which each has of his soul, in so far as it is proper to

himself, is the knowledge of the soul as it exists in this individual. Thus,

it is through this knowledge that one knows whether the soul exists,

as when someone perceives that he has a soul. Through the other type

of knowledge, however, one knows what the soul is and what its

proper accidents are.

With reference to the first type of cognition we must make a distinction,

because one can know something habitually or actually. Concerning

the actual cognition by which one actually considers that he

has a soul, I say that the soul is known through its acts. For one perceives

that he has a soul, that he lives, and that he exists, because he

perceives that he senses, understands, and carries on other vital activities

of this sort. For this reason, the Philosopher says: "We sense that

we sense, and we understand that we understand, and because we sense

this, we understand that we exist."17 But one perceives that he understands

only from the fact that he understands something. For to understand

something is prior to understanding that one understands. Therefore,

through that which it understands or senses the soul arrives at

actual perception of the fact that it exists.

Concerning habitual knowledge I say this, that the soul sees itself

through its essence, that is, the soul has the power to enter upon actual

cognition of itself from the very fact that its essence is present to it.

This is like the case of one who, because he has the habit of some

knowledge, can by reason of the presence of the habit perceive those

things which fall under that habit. But no habit is required for the

soul's perception of its existence and its advertence to the activity

within it. The essence alone of the soul, which is present to the mind,

is enough for this, for the acts in which it is actually perceived proceed

from it.

But, if we speak of the knowledge of the soul when the human mind

is limited to specific or generic knowledge, we must make another

distinction. For the concurrence of two elements, apprehension and

judgment about the thing apprehended, is necessary for knowledge.

Therefore, the knowledge by which the nature of the soul is known

can be considered with reference to apprehension and with reference

to judgment.

If, then, we consider this knowledge with reference to apprehension,

I say that we know the nature of the soul through species which

we abstract from the senses. For our soul holds the last place among

intellectual things, just as first matter does among sensible things, as

the Commentator shows.18 For, as first matter is in potency to all sensible

forms, so our possible intellect is in potency to all intelligible

forms. Thus, it is, in fact, pure potency in the order of intelligible

things, as matter is in the order of sensible reality. Therefore, as matter

is sensible only through some added form, so the possible intellect

is intelligible only through a species which is brought into it.

Hence, our mind cannot so understand itself that it immediately

apprehends itself. Rather, it comes to a knowledge of itself through

apprehension of other things, just as the nature of first matter is known

from its receptivity for forms of a certain kind. This becomes apparent

When we look at the manner in which philosophers have investigated

the nature of the soul.

For, from the fact that the human soul knows the universal natures

of things, they have perceived that the species by which we understand

is immaterial. Otherwise, it would be individuated and so would

not lead to knowledge of the universal. From the immateriality of the

species by which we understand, philosophers have understood that

the intellect is a thing independent of matter. And from this they have

proceeded to a knowledge of the other properties of the intellective

soul. Thus, the Philosopher says: "The intellect is intelligible just as

other intelligible things are."19 The Commentator also affirms this in

his explanation: "Intellect is understood through an intention in it,

just as other intelligible things."2o This intention is nothing but the

intelligible species. But this intention is in the intellect as actually intelligible.

In other things, however, it is not actually but only potentially

intelligible.

But, if we consider the knowledge which we have of the nature of

the soul in the judgment by which we decide that it exists in such a

way, as we had apprehended from the deduction mentioned above,«we

have knowledge of the soul inasmuch as "we contemplate inviolable

truth. This is the truth from which we define to the best of our

power not the kind of mind each man has, but the kind of mind it

ought to be according to eternal norms," as Augustine says.21 We see

this inviolable truth in its likeness which is impressed on our mind to

the extent that we naturally know some things as self-evident. We examine

all other things with reference to these, judging of them according

to these.

Thus it is clear that our mind knows itself in some way through its

essence, as Augustine says,22 and in some way through an intention or

species, as the Philosopher23 and the Commentator24 say; and, moreover,

in some way in the contemplation of inviolable truth, as Augustine

says.25 In this way, then, one must answer both sets of reasons.

Answers to Difficulties:

I. Our understanding can actually understand nothing before it abstracts

from phantasms. Nor can it have habitual knowledge of things

other than itself, which are not within it, before the abstraction just

mentioned, because species of other intelligible things are not innate

in it. However, its essence is innate in it, so that it does not have to

obtain it from phantasms, just as it is not the essence of matter which

is received from the natural agent, but only its form, which is related

to physical matter as intelligible form is related to sensible matter, as

the Commentator says.26 Therefore, before the mind abstracts from

phantasms, it has habitual knowledge of itself, by which it can perceive

that it exists.

2. No one has ever made the mistake of not perceiving that he was

alive, a fact which belongs to the knowledge by which one knows in

its singularity what goes on in his soul. It is according to this knowledge

that the soul is said to be habitually known through its essence.

Many, however, do fall into error regarding knowledge of the specific

nature of the soul, and on this point the conclusion of the objection is

true.

3. From this the answer to the third difficulty is clear.

4· Although the soul is joined to matter as its form, it is not so dominated

by matter that it becomes material, and thus not actually intelligible,

but only potentially intelligible by abstraction from matter.

S. The objection holds for actual knowledge, according to which

the soul perceives its existence only by perceiving its act and object,

as has been said. «-

6. The citation from the Philosopher should be taken as referring

to the intellect's understanding of what it is and not to the habitual

knowledge which it has of the fact that it exists.

7· The seventh difficulty must be answered in like manner.

8. Sensitive activity is brought to completion through the action of

the sensible thing on the sense. This is action which is connected with

position and therefore needs a definite distance. Intellectual activity is

not limited to any position. Therefore, in this way they are not alike.

9· There are two ways in which we can say a thing is known by

means of something else. In the first, from knowledge of another thing

one arrives at knowledge of the thing in question. In this way conclusions

are said to be known from principles. A thing cannot be known

by means of itself in this way. In the second way, a thing is said to

be known by means of something else in the sense that it is known

in that something. In this case, an act of cognition distinct from that

in which the thing is known is not required in order that the medium

in which the thing is known might itself be known. So, there is nothing

to prevent something from being known by means of itself in

this way, as God knows Himself by means of Himself. Thus, in some

way the soul, too, knows itself through its essence.

10. We do find a circle in the knowledge of the soul, in so far as it

seeks the truth of existing things by reasoning. Hence, Dionysius says

this in order to show how the knowledge of the soul falls short of the

knowledge of an angel. The circularity is observed in this, that reason

reaches conclusions from principles by way of discovery, and by way

of judgment examines the conclusions which have been found, analyzing

them back to the principles. Therefore, this difficulty is not to the

point.

I I. Just as it is not necessary always actually to understand that of

which we have habitual knowledge through species existing in the

understanding, so, too, it is not necessary always actually to understand

the mind, knowledge of which is habitually in us because its

essence is present to our understanding. .

12. "That by which a thing is understood" and "that which is understood"

are not related to each other as "that by which a thing is" and

"that which is." For existence is the act of a being, but understanding

is not the act of that which is understood but of that which understands.

Hence, "that by which a thing is understood" is related to that

which understands as "that which is to that by which it is." And,

therefore, just as in the soul "that which is," is different from "that by

which it is," so that by which it understands, that is to say, the intellective

power, which is the source of the act of understanding, is different

from its essence. However, it does not necessarily follow from

this that the species by which a thing is understood must be different

from that which is understood.

13. The intellective power is a form of the soul with reference to

its act of existing, for it has existence in the soul as a property in a

subject. But there is nothing to prevent the opposite of this from being

true with reference to the act of understanding.

14. The knowledge by which the soul knows itself is not classified

as an accident in so far as it is the source of habitual knowledge, but

only as an act of cognition which is an accident. Thus, Augustine also

says27 that knowledge is in the mind substantially in so far as the mind

knows itself.

15. The objection holds for the knowledge of the soul by which it

is known according to the nature of the species in which all souls

share.

16. When the mind understands itself, the mind is not itself the form

of the mind, because nothing is its own form. But it does follow the

manner of form, inasmuch as the action by which it knows itself terminates

at itself. Hence, it is not necessary for it to be simpler than itself,

unless, perhaps, according to the manner of understanding, in so far as

that which is understood is taken as simpler than the intellect itself

which understands, and is thus considered as a perfection of the intellect.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

I'. We must understand these words of Augustine to mean that the

mind knows itself through itself, since from itself the mind has the

power to enter upon the act by which it actually knows itself, by perceiving

that it exists. Similarly, from the species habitually retained in

the mind, there results in the mind the power actually to consider the

thing. But the mind can perceive what its own nature is only from

the considera(ion of its object, as has been said.·

2'. The wadis of the Gloss which read: "Intellectual sight contains

those things ..." are to be referred to the object of knowledge rather

than to that by which it is understood. This is clear from a consideration

of what is said about other kinds of sight. For the same Gloss

reads: "Through bodily sight bodies are seen; through spiritual sight

(that is, sight of imagination) likenesses of bodies are seen; through

intellectual sight those things which are neither bodies nor likenesses

of bodies are seen."28 If this were referred to that by which we understand,

there would be no difference between bodily sight and spiritual

sight (that of imagination), because even bodily sight takes place

through the likeness of a body. For the stone is not in the eye, but a

likeness of the stone.

But between the kinds of sight mentioned there is this difference,

that bodily sight terminates at the body itself, whereas the sight of

imagination terminates at the image of the body, as at its object. So,

also, when it is said that intellectual sight embraces things which have

no likenesses not identical with themselves, this does not mean that

spiritual sight does not take place through species which are not the

same as the things understood, but that intellectual sight does not terminate

at the likeness of a thing but at the very essence of the thing.

For, as by bodily sight one sees a body itself without seeing a likeness

of the body, although he sees through a likeness of the body, so

in intellectual sight one sees the very essence of a thing without seeing

the similitude of the thing, although sometimes he sees that essence

through some likeness, as is clear from experience. For, when we understand

the soul, we do not construct a likeness of the soul and look

at it, as happens in imagination. Rather, we study the essence of the

soul itself. Nevertheless, this does not deny that this sight takes place

through a species.

3'. What the Philosopher says should be understood of an intellect

Which is altogether separated from matter, as the intellects of angels.

And this is the way in which the Commentator explains29 the passage.

However, it should not be applied to the human intellect; otherwise, it

would follow that speculative science would be the same as the thing

known. But this is impossible, as the Commentator also concludes.30

4'. The soul is present to itself as intelligible, in the sense that it can

be understood, but not in the sense that it is understood through itself,

but from its object, as has been said.3!

5'. The soul is not known through a species abstracted from it, but

through the species of its object, which becomes its form in so far as

it actually understands. Hence, the reason does not follow.

6'. Although our soul is most like itself, it cannot be the principle

of knowing itself in the manner of an intelligible species, just as first

matter cannot. The reason for this is that our understanding occupies

a position in the order of intelligible things similar to that of first matter

in the order of sensible things, as the Commentator says.32

7'. The soul is the cause why other things are knowable not in so

far as it is a means of knowing, but in so far as physical things are

made intelligible through the activity of the soul.

8'. Knowledge about the soul is most certain in this, that each one

experiences within himself that he has a soul and that acts of the soul

are within him. But it is very difficult to know what the soul is. Hence,

the Philosopher adds: "It is extremely difficult to get any assurance

about it."33

9'. The soul is not known through a species abstracted from sensible

beings, as though that species were understood to be a likeness of the

soul. Rather, from a study of the nature of the species abstracted from

sensible things we discover the nature of the soul in which such a

species is received, just as matter is known from form.

10'. Physical light is seen through itself only in so far as it is the

reason for the visibility of visible things and a kind of form making

them actually visible. Now, we see the light which exists in the sun

only through its likeness which exists in our sight. For as the specific

nature of stone is not in the eye, but its likeness, so the form of light

which is in the sun cannot be the same form that is in the eye. Similarly,

we understand the light of the agent intellect, in so far as it is the

reason for the intelligible species, making them actually intelligible.

II'. What the Philosopher says can be explained in two ways, according

to the two opinions about the agent intellect. For some34

have held that the agent intellect is a separated substance, one of a

number of intelligences. According to this it always actually understands,

as the other intelligences do.

Others35 hold that the agent intellect is a power of the soul. According

to this it is said that the agent intellect is not a power which sometimes

understands and sometimes does not, because the cause of understanding

at some times and not at others does not come from it, but

from the possible intellect. For, in every act by which man understands,

the action of the agent intellect and that of the possible intellect

concur. Moreover, the agent intellect does not receive anything from

outside. Only the possible intellect does so. Hence, with reference to

the requirements for our thought, there is nothing on the part of the

agent intellect to keep us from always understanding, but there is on

the part of the possible intellect, for it is brought to completion only

through intelligible species abstracted from the senses.

ARTICLE IX

(Parallel readings: III Sent., 23, I, 2; Quodl., VIII, 2,4; S. T., I, 87, 2.)

In the Ninth Article We Ask: Is IT THROUGH THEIR

ESSENCE OR THROUGH SOME LIKENESS THAT

OUR MIND KNOWS HABITS WHICH

EXIST IN THE SOUL?

Difficulties:

It seems that it knows them through their essence, for

I. The Gloss on this passage, "I know a man...." in the second

Epistle to the Corinthians (12: 2) reads: "We do not see love in one

way in the species through which it exists when it is present, and in

another way in some image similar to it when it is not present. But it

is perceived in so far as it can be discerned by the mind, more by one,

less by another."! Therefore, love is perceived by the mind through

its essence and not through some likeness of it. This is true of every

other habit for the same reason.

2. Augustine says: "What is as present to knowledge as that which

is present to the mind?"2 But habits of the soul are present to the mind

through their essence. Therefore, they are known by the mind through

their essence.

3. The cause of the perfection of a thing has that perfection in an

even higher degree. But habits of the mind are the cause whereby other

things which fall under the habits are known. Therefore, habits are

known by the mind especially through their essence.

4. Everything which the mind knows through its likeness arises in

sense before it arises in the mind. But a habit of the mind never arises

in sense. Therefore, these habits are not known by the mind through

a likeness.

5· The closer a thing is to the mind, the more it is known by the

mind. But habit is closer to the intellective power of the mind than

act, and act is closer than object. Therefore, the mind knows habit

more than act or object. So, it knows habit through its essence and

not through acts or objects.

6. Augustine says3 that the mind and art are known by the same kind

of sight. But the mind is known through its essence by the mind.

Therefore, art, also, is known through its essence, and so are the

other habits of the mind.

. 7. The true is related to understanding as the good is related to

affection. But the good is not in affection through some likeness of

itself. Therefore, neither is the true known by understanding through

some likeness. Therefore, whatever understanding knows it knows

through essence and not through a likeness.

8. Augustine says: "Faith is not seen by its possessor in the heart in

which it is," as the soul of another man is seen from movements of

the body; "rather, certain knowledge clings to it, and consciousness

proclaims it."4 Therefore, according to this, knowledge of the mind

clings to faith in so far as consciousness proclaims it. But consciousness

proclaims faith in so far as it is present in it. Therefore, faith is known

by the mind in so far as it is present in the mind through its essence.

9. Form is most exactly proportionate to that of which it is the form.

But habits exist in the mind as forms of the mind. Therefore, they

are most exactly proportionate to the mind. Consequently, our mind

knows them immediately through their essence.

10. Understanding knows the intelligible species which is in it, not

through another species, but through its essence. Otherwise, there

would be an infinite series. But this is so only because these species

inform the understanding. Since understanding is informed in a similar

way through habits, it seems that the mind knows them through

their essence.

I I. The mind knows habits only by intellectual vision. But intellectual

vision concerns those things which are seen through their essence.

Therefore, habits are seen by the mind through their essence.

To the Contrary:

I'. Augustine says: "Behold in the fields and caves and numberless

caverns of my memory, full beyond reckoning, there are innumerable

sorts of things, [present] either through images, as those of all bodies,

or through actual presence, as that of the arts, or through I know not

what notions, as those of affections of the mind which memory retains

even when the mind is not acted upon."5 From this it seems that affec-

tions of the mind are not known through their essence, but through

some notions of them; and for the same reason neither are habits of

the virtues, which group themselves around affections of this kind.

z'. Augustine says: "We have another sense of the interior man

which surpasses that sense," the bodily, "and through which we perceive

just and unjust things, the former through an intelligible species,

the latter through its privation."6 But he calls just and unjust things

the habits of virtues and vices. Therefore, habits of virtues are known

through a species and not through their essence.

3'. Understanding knows through its essence only that which is present

in the understanding. But habits of virtues are not present in the

understanding, but in the affective part. Therefore, they are not

known through their essence by the understanding.

4'. Intellectual vision is superior to bodily sight. Therefore, it entails

greater distinction. But in bodily sight the species through which

something is seen is always different from the thing seen through it.

Therefore, habits, which are seen through intellectual vision, are not

seen by the mind through their essence, but through some other

species.

5'. We desire only what we know, as Augustine proves.7 But some

people who do not have habits of the soul desire them. Therefore,

they know those habits, but not through their essence since they do

not have them. Therefore, they know them through a species of them.

6'. Hugh of St. Victor says8 that eye can have three meanings in

man. There can be the eye of reason, the eye of intelligence, and the

eye of flesh. We see God with the eye of intelligence which, Hugh

says,9 was plucked out after the fall. We see physical things with the

eye of flesh, which has remained intact after the fall. We know intelligible

created things with the eye of reason, which has become blear

since the fall, for we know intelligible things only partially and not

entirely. But everything that is seen only partially is not known

through its essence. Therefore, since habits of the mind are intelligible,

it seems that the mind does not see them through their essence.

7'· God is much more present to the mind through His essence than

habits are, for He is innermost in everything. But God's presence in

the mind does not make our mind see God through His essence. Therefore,

habits, too, are not seen by the mind through their essence, although

they are present in it.

8'. Intellect, which potentially understands, needs something to reduce

it to act, if it is actually to understand. And it is by reason of

this that intellect does actually understand. But the essence of a habit,

in so far as it is present to the mind, does not reduce intellect from

potency to act, for, if it did, things would necessarily be understood

as long as they were present in the soul. Therefore, that by which

habits are understood is not their essence.

REPLY:

Knowledge of habits, as that of the soul, is twofold. One knowledge

is that by which one knows whether he has a habit. The other is that

by which one knows what a habit is. Nevertheless, these two types of

knowledge relate to habits in a way different from that in which they

relate to the soul. For the knowledge by which one knows he has a

habit presupposes the knowledge by which he knows what that habit

is. For I cannot know that I have chastity unless I know what chastity

is. This is not the case with the soul. For many know that they have

a soul without knowing what the soul is.

The reason for such diversity is this, that we perceive that habits

as well as the soul exist in us only by perceiving acts of which the

soul and habits are the principles. And by its essence a habit is the

principle of a certain kind of act. Thus, if we know a habit as the

principle of such an act, we know what it is. Accordingly, I know

what chastity is if I know it is that through which one refrains from

illicit thoughts in matters of sex. But the soul is a principle of acts not

through its essence, but through its powers. Thus, from a perception

of the acts of the soul we perceive that the principle of such acts, for

example, of movement and of sense, is in the soul. Nevertheless, we

do not know the nature of the soul from this.

Accordingly, in so far as we know that habits exist, there are, then,

two things which we have to keep in mind when we speak of them:

the apprehension of the habit and the judgment we form about it. For

apprehension we must get knowledge of the habits from objects and

acts. The habits themselves cannot be grasped through their essence,

because the power of any faculty of the soul is limited to its object.

For this reason its activity is directed first of all and principally to its

object. It extends only through a kind of return to those things by

which it is directed to its object. Thus, we see that sight is first directed

to color, but is directed to the act of seeing only through a kind

of return, when, in seeing color, it sees that it sees. But this return is

incomplete in sense and complete in understanding which goes back

to know its essence by a complete return.

As is said in The Soul,l° in this life our understanding is related to

phantasms as sight is related to colors, not, however, so that it knows

phantasms as sight knows colors, but that it knows the things which

the phantasms represent. Thus, the activity of our understanding is

directed, first, to the things which are grasped through phantasms,

then returns to know its act, and then goes further to the species,

habits, powers, and the essence of the mind itself. For these are not

related to understanding as primary objects, but as those things by

which understanding attains its object.

Moreover, we have judgment about each one of these according to

that which is its measure. And the measure of any habit is that to

which the habit is ordained. This object has a triple relation to our

knowledge. For, sometimes, it is obtained from sense, either .from

sight or hearing, as when we see the usefulness of grammar or medicine,

or we hear it from others, and from this usefulness we know

what grammar or medicine is. Sometimes it is inherent in natural

knowledge, as is abundantly clear in the habits of virtues, whose ends

natural reason proposes. Sometimes it is divinely infused, as appears

in faith, hope, and other infused habits of this kind. In both of these

latter, uncreated truth is taken into account, because even natural

knowledge arises in us from divine enlightenment. Hence, the judgment

in which knowledge about the nature of a habit is brought to

completion takes place either according to that which we receive by

sense or according to a comparison with uncreated truth.

There are two things to be considered in the knowledge by which

we know whether habits are present in us: habitual knowledge and

actual knowledge. From the acts of the habits which we experience

within us we actually perceive that we have the habits. For this reason,

the Philosopher saysll that we should take pleasure attendant on

a work as a sign of habits.

But, with reference to habitual knowledge, habits of the mind are

said to be known through themselves. For the cause of habitual knowledge

is that by which someone is rendered capable of entering into

the act of knowing the thing which is said to be known habitually.

From the very fact that habits are in the mind through their essence,

the mind can enter upon actual perception of the existence of the

habits within it, in so far as through the habits which it has it can

enter upon acts in which the habits are actually perceived.

But, in this, habits of the cognitive and affective parts differ. For a

habit of the cognitive part is the source both of the very act by which

th~ habit is received and also of the knowledge by which it is perceived.

For the actual knowledge proceeds from the cognitive habit,

Whereas a habit of the affective part is the source of that act from

principle, not by their presence, which is in the affections, but through

the knowledge or definition of it which is in the understanding. Yet,

by their presence, habits of the affective part are also a remote principle

of knowledge in so far as they elicit acts in which understanding

knows them. As a result, we can in a sense also say that they are known

by reason of their presence.

2'. That species through which justice is known is not something

other than the very notion of justice through the privation of which

injustice is known. Moreover, this species or notion is not something

abstracted from justice, but it is that which, as a specific difference, is

the ultimate perfection of its being.

3'. Understanding, properly speaking, is not an activity of the intellect,

but of the soul through the intellect, just as to make warm is

not an activity of heat, but of fire through heat. Nor again are those

two parts, understanding and affection, to be thought of as distinguished

according to position, as sight and hearing, which are acts of

organs. Therefore, that which is in affection is also present to the

understanding soul. For this reason, through understanding, the soul

returns to know not only the act of the understanding but also the act

of the affections. In a similar way, through the affections it returns to

seek and desire not only the act of the affections but also the act of

the understanding.

4'. The distinctness (discretio) which has a bearing on the perfection

of knowledge is not the state of being distinct (discretio) by

which that which is understood is distinct from that by which it is

understood, for, thus, the divine cognition by which God knows Himself

would be most imperfect. Rather, it is the discernment (discretio)

by which that which is known is [seen as] distinct from everything

else.

5'. Those who do not have habits of the mind do not know these

habits by that knowledge in which one perceives that they exist in

himself, but by that in which one knows what they are, or perceives

that they exist in others. This is not through presence, but in another

way, as has been said.*

6'. The eye of reason is said to be blear in relation to created intelligible

things in so far as it actually understands nothing without getting

something from sensible things, to which intelligible things are

superior. Therefore, it does not have all that is needed to know intelligible

things. Nevertheless, nothing prevents those things which are

in reason from immediately tending through their essence toward acts

in which they are understood, as has been said.*

7'. Although God is more present to our mind than habits are, still,

from objects which we naturally know, we cannot see the divine essence

as perfectly as we see the essence of habits, for habits have a

proportion to the objects and acts and are their proximate principles.

We cannot say this about God.

8'. Although the presence of a habit in the mind does not make the

mind actually know that habit, it does cause the mind to be actually

perfected through the habit by which the act is elicited. And the habit

is known from this.

St. Thomas Aquinas, THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS ON TRUTH

Translated from the definitive Leonine text by JAMES V. McGLYNN, S.}., PH.D. West Baden College

QUESTIONS x-xx Volume II HENRY REGNERY COMPANY Chicago, 1953

De veritate, q. 10 pr. 8 Octavo utrum mens seipsam per essentiam cognoscat, aut per aliquam speciem.

Articulus 8

[53944] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 tit. 1 Octavo quaeritur utrum mens seipsam per essentiam cognoscat, aut per aliquam speciem

[53945] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 tit. 2 Et videtur quod per aliquam speciem.

[53946] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 1

Quia, ut philosophus dicit in III de anima, intellectus noster nihil intelligit sine phantasmate. Sed ipsius essentiae animae non potest accipi aliquod phantasma. Ergo oportet quod per aliquam aliam speciem a phantasmatibus abstractam mens nostra seipsam intelligat.

[53947] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 2

Praeterea, ea quae per sui essentiam videntur, certissime cognoscuntur sine errore. Sed de mente humana multi erraverunt: cum quidam dicerent eam esse aerem quidam ignem, et multa alia de ea inepta sentirent. Ergo mens non videt se per essentiam suam.

[53948] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 3

Sed dicebat, quod mens per essentiam suam videt se esse; errare tamen potest in inquirendo quid sit.- Sed contra, scire aliquid per essentiam suam, est scire de eo quid est, cum essentia rei sit idem quod quidditas eius. Si igitur anima videret se ipsam per essentiam quilibet sine errore sciret de anima sua quid est; quod manifeste patet falsum esse.

[53949] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 4

Praeterea, anima nostra est forma coniuncta materiae. Sed omnis huiusmodi forma cognoscitur per abstractionem speciei a materia, et materialibus conditionibus. Ergo anima cognoscitur per aliquam speciem abstractam.

[53950] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 5

Praeterea, intelligere non est actus animae tantum, sed actus coniuncti, ut dicitur in I de anima. Sed omnis talis actus est communis animae et corpori. Ergo oportet quod in intelligendo semper sit aliquid ex parte corporis. Sed hoc non esset, si mens seipsam per essentiam suam videret, sine aliqua specie a corporeis sensibus abstracta. Ergo, mens non videt se ipsam per essentiam.

[53951] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 6

Praeterea, philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod intellectus intelligit se sicut et alia. Sed alia intelligit non per essentiam suam, sed per aliquas species. Ergo nec se ipsam mens intelligit per suam essentiam.

[53952] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 7

Praeterea, potentiae cognoscuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta. Sed essentia animae non potest cognosci nisi potentiis eius cognitis; cum virtus rei cognoscere faciat rem ipsam. Ergo oportet quod essentiam suam per actus suos et per species obiectorum suorum cognoscat.

[53953] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 8

Praeterea, sicut se habet sensus ad sensibile, ita intellectus ad intelligibile. Sed inter sensus et sensibile requiritur quaedam distantia, ex quo provenit quod oculus seipsum videre non possit. Ergo et in intellectuali cognitione requiritur quaedam distantia, ut nunquam se per essentiam suam intelligere possit.

[53954] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 9

Praeterea, secundum philosophum in I Poster., non est circulo demonstrare: quia sequeretur quod aliquid per seipsum notum fieret; et sic sequeretur quod aliquid esset prius et notius seipso; quod est impossibile. Sed si mens seipsam per essentiam suam videt, erit idem quod cognoscitur et per quod cognoscitur. Ergo sequitur idem inconveniens, ut aliquid sit prius et notius seipso.

[53955] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 10

Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de divinis nominibus, quod anima circulo quodam cognoscit existentium veritatem. Circularis autem motus est ab eodem in idem. Ergo videtur quod anima, a seipsa egrediens intelligendo per res exteriores, ad sui ipsius cognitionem redeat; et sic non intelliget se per essentiam suam.

[53956] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 11

Praeterea, manente causa, manet eius effectus. Si igitur mens se per essentiam suam videret, propter hoc quod essentia sua sibi est praesens: cum semper ei sit praesens, semper ipsam videret. Ergo, cum impossibile sit simul plura intelligere, nunquam aliud intelligeret.

[53957] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 12

Praeterea, posteriora sunt magis composita prioribus. Sed intelligere est posterius quam esse. Ergo in intelligentia animae invenitur maior compositio quam in eius esse. Sed in anima non est idem quod est et quo est. Ergo nec in ea est idem quod intelligitur et quo intelligitur; et sic mens non se videt per suam essentiam.

[53958] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 13

Praeterea, non potest idem esse forma et formatum respectu eiusdem. Sed intellectus, cum sit quaedam potentia animae, est quasi quaedam forma essentiae eius. Ergo non potest esse quod essentia animae sit forma intellectus; sed id quo aliquid intelligitur est forma intellectus; ergo mens non videt se ipsam per essentiam suam.

[53959] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 14

Praeterea, anima est quaedam substantia per se subsistens. Formae autem intelligibiles non sunt per se subsistentes; alias scientia quae ex huiusmodi formis intelligibilibus consistit, non esset de genere accidentis. Ergo essentia animae non potest esse ut forma intelligibilis, qua mens seipsam videat.

[53960] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 15

Praeterea, cum actus et motus penes terminos distinguantur, intelligibilia quae sunt unius speciei, eodem modo secundum speciem intelliguntur. Sed anima Petri est unius speciei cum anima Pauli. Ergo anima Petri eodem modo intelligit seipsam sicut intelligit animam Pauli. Sed animam Pauli non intelligit per eius essentiam, cum ab ea sit absens. Ergo nec se intelligit per essentiam suam.

[53961] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 arg. 16

Praeterea, forma est simplicior eo quod per formam informatur. Sed mens non est simplicior seipsa. Ergo non informatur se ipsa; cum igitur informetur eo per quod cognoscit, non cognoscet seipsam per seipsam.

[53962] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 s. c. 1

Sed contra. Est quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Trinitate: mens seipsam per seipsam novit quoniam est incorporea: nam si non seipsam novit, non seipsam amat.

[53963] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 s. c. 2

Praeterea, II Cor., XII, 2, super illud, scio hominem, etc., dicit Glossa: hac visione, quae dicitur intellectualis, ea cernuntur quae non sunt corpora nec ullas gerunt formas similes corporum; velut ipsa mens, et omnis animae affectio. Sed ut in eadem Glossa dicitur: intellectualis visio eas res continet quae non habent imagines sui similes, quae non sunt quod ipsae. Ergo mens non cognoscit seipsam per aliquid quod non sit idem quod ipsa.

[53964] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 s. c. 3

Praeterea, sicut dicitur in III de anima, in his quae sunt separata a materia, idem est quod intelligitur et quo intelligitur. Sed mens est res quaedam immaterialis. Ergo per essentiam suam intelligitur.

[53965] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 s. c. 4

Praeterea, omne quod est praesens intellectui ut intelligibile, ab intellectu intelligitur. Sed ipsa essentia animae est praesens intellectui per modum intelligibilis; est enim ei praesens per suam veritatem. Veritas autem est ratio intelligendi sicut bonitas ratio diligendi; ergo mens per essentiam suam se intelligit.

[53966] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 s. c. 5

Praeterea, species per quam aliquid intelligitur, est simplicior eo quod per eam intelligitur. Sed anima non habet aliquam speciem se simpliciorem, quae ab ea abstrahi possit. Ergo anima non intelligit se per aliquam speciem, sed per essentiam suam.

[53967] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 s. c. 6

Praeterea, omnis scientia est per assimilationem scientis ad scitum. Sed nihil aliud est animae similius quam sua essentia. Ergo per nihil aliud se intelligit quam per essentiam suam.

[53968] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 s. c. 7

Praeterea, illud quod est causa cognoscibilitatis aliis, non cognoscitur per aliquid aliud quam per seipsum. Sed anima est aliis rebus materialibus causa cognoscibilitatis: sunt enim intelligibilia inquantum nos ea intelligibilia facimus, ut Commentator dicit in II Metaph. Ergo anima per seipsam solum intelligitur.

[53969] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 s. c. 8

Praeterea, scientia de anima est certissima, secundum philosophum in I de anima. Sed magis certum non cognoscitur per minus certum. Ergo de anima non habetur scientia per aliud a seipsa.

[53970] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 s. c. 9

Praeterea, omnis species per quam anima nostra intelligit, est a sensibilibus abstracta. Sed nullum sensibile est a quo anima possit suam quidditatem abstrahere. Ergo anima non cognoscit seipsam per aliquam similitudinem.

[53971] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 s. c. 10

Praeterea, sicut lux corporalis facit omnia esse visibilia in actu, ita anima per suam lucem facit omnia materialia esse intelligibilia actu, ut patet in III de anima. Sed lux corporalis per seipsam videtur, non per aliquam similitudinem sui. Ergo et anima per suam essentiam intelligitur, non per aliquam similitudinem.

[53972] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 s. c. 11

Praeterea, sicut philosophus dicit in III de anima, intellectus agens non aliquando quidem intelligit, aliquando autem non, sed semper intelligit. Sed non intelligit semper nisi seipsum: nec hoc etiam posset, si per speciem a sensibus abstractam se intelligeret, quia sic ante abstractionem non se intelligeret. Ergo mens nostra intelligit se per suam essentiam.

[53973] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 co.

Responsio. Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur utrum aliquid per essentiam suam cognoscatur, quaestio ista dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo ut hoc quod dicitur, per essentiam, referatur ad ipsam rem cognitam, ut illud intelligatur per essentiam cognosci cuius essentia cognoscitur; illud autem non, cuius essentia non cognoscitur, sed accidentia quaedam eius. Alio modo ut referatur ad id quo aliquid cognoscitur; ut sic intelligatur aliquid per suam essentiam cognosci, quia ipsa essentia est quo cognoscitur. Et hoc modo ad praesens quaeritur, utrum anima per suam essentiam intelligat se. Ad cuius quaestionis evidentiam sciendum est, quod de anima duplex cognitio haberi potest ab unoquoque, ut Augustinus dicit in IX de Trinit. Una quidem, qua cuiusque anima se tantum cognoscit quantum ad id quod est ei proprium; alia qua cognoscitur anima quantum ad id quod est omnibus animabus commune. Illa igitur cognitio quae communiter de omni anima habetur, est qua cognoscitur animae natura; cognitio vero quam quis habet de anima quantum ad id quod est sibi proprium, est cognitio de anima secundum quod esse habet in tali individuo. Unde per hanc cognitionem cognoscitur an est anima, sicut cum aliquis percipit se habere animam; per aliam vero cognitionem scitur quid est anima, et quae sunt per se accidentia eius. Quantum igitur ad primam cognitionem pertinet, distinguendum est, quia cognoscere aliquid est habitu et actu. Quantum igitur ad actualem cognitionem, qua aliquis se in actu considerat animam habere, sic dico, quod anima cognoscitur per actus suos. In hoc enim aliquis percipit se animam habere, et vivere, et esse, quod percipit se sentire et intelligere, et alia huiusmodi vitae opera exercere; unde dicit philosophus in IX Ethicorum: sentimus autem quoniam sentimus; et intelligimus quoniam intelligimus; et quia hoc sentimus, intelligimus quoniam sumus. Nullus autem percipit se intelligere nisi ex hoc quod aliquid intelligit: quia prius est intelligere aliquid quam intelligere se intelligere; et ideo anima pervenit ad actualiter percipiendum se esse, per illud quod intelligit, vel sentit. Sed quantum ad habitualem cognitionem, sic dico, quod anima per essentiam suam se videt, id est ex hoc ipso quod essentia sua est sibi praesens est potens exire in actum cognitionis sui ipsius; sicut aliquis ex hoc quod habet habitum alicuius scientiae, ex ipsa praesentia habitus, est potens percipere illa quae subsunt illi habitui. Ad hoc autem quod percipiat anima se esse, et quid in seipsa agatur attendat, non requiritur aliquis habitus; sed ad hoc sufficit sola essentia animae, quae menti est praesens: ex ea enim actus progrediuntur, in quibus actualiter ipsa percipitur. Sed si loquamur de cognitione animae, cum mens humana speciali aut generali cognitione definitur, sic iterum distinguendum videtur. Ad cognitionem enim duo concurrere oportet: scilicet apprehensionem, et iudicium de re apprehensa: et ideo cognitio, qua natura animae cognoscitur, potest considerari et quantum ad apprehensionem, et quantum ad iudicium. Si igitur consideretur quantum ad apprehensionem, sic dico, quod natura animae a nobis cognoscitur per species quas a sensibus abstrahimus. Anima enim nostra in genere intellectualium tenet ultimum locum, sicut materia prima in genere sensibilium, ut patet per Commentatorem in III de anima. Sicut enim materia prima est in potentia ad omnes formas sensibiles, ita et intellectus possibilis noster ad omnes formas intelligibiles; unde in ordine intelligibilium est sicut potentia pura, ut materia in ordine sensibilium. Et ideo, sicut materia non est sensibilis nisi per formam supervenientem, ita intellectus possibilis non est intelligibilis nisi per speciem superinductam. Unde mens nostra non potest se intelligere ita quod seipsam immediate apprehendat; sed ex hoc quod apprehendit alia, devenit in suam cognitionem; sicut et natura materiae primae cognoscitur ex hoc ipso quod est talium formarum receptiva. Quod patet intuendo modum quo philosophi naturam animae investigaverunt. Ex hoc enim quod anima humana universales rerum naturas cognoscit, percipit quod species qua intelligimus, est immaterialis; alias esset individuata, et sic non duceret in cognitionem universalis. Ex hoc autem quod species intelligibilis est immaterialis, perceperunt quod intellectus est res quaedam non dependens a materia; et ex hoc ad alias proprietates cognoscendas intellectivae animae processerunt. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod intellectus est intelligibilis, sicut alia intelligibilia: quod exponens Commentator dicit quod intellectus intelligit per intentionem in eo, sicut alia intelligibilia: quae quidem intentio nihil aliud est quam species intelligibilis. Sed haec intentio est in intellectu ut intelligibilis actu; in aliis autem rebus non, sed ut intelligibilis in potentia. Si vero consideretur cognitio quam de natura animae habemus quantum ad iudicium quo sententiamus ita esse, ut deductione praedicta apprehenderamus; sic notitia animae habetur inquantum intuemur inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte quantum possumus definimus, non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat, ut Augustinus dicit Lib. IX de Trinitate: hanc autem inviolabilem veritatem (intuemur) in sui similitudine, quae est menti nostrae impressa inquantum aliqua naturaliter cognoscimus ut per se nota, ad quae omnia alia examinamus, secundum ea de omnibus iudicantes. Sic ergo patet quod mens nostra cognoscit seipsam quodammodo per essentiam suam, ut Augustinus dicit: quodam vero modo per intentionem, sive per speciem, ut philosophus et Commentator dicunt; quodam vero intuendo inviolabilem veritatem, ut item Augustinus dicit. Unde et sic ad utrasque rationes respondendum est.

[53974] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 1

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod intellectus noster nihil actu potest intelligere antequam a phantasmatibus abstrahat; nec etiam potest habere habitualem notitiam aliorum a se, quae scilicet in ipso non sunt, ante abstractionem praedictam, eo quod species aliorum intelligibilium non sunt ei innatae. Sed essentia sua sibi innata est, ut non eam necesse habeat a phantasmatibus acquirere; sicut nec materiae essentia acquiritur ab agente naturali, sed solum eius forma, quae ita comparatur ad materiam naturalem sicut forma intelligibilis ad materiam sensibilem, ut Commentator dicit in III de anima. Et ideo mens antequam a phantasmatibus abstrahat, sui notitiam habitualem habet, qua possit percipere se esse.

[53975] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum, quod nullus unquam erravit in hoc quod non perciperet se vivere, quod pertinet ad cognitionem qua aliquis singulariter cognoscit quid in anima sua agatur; secundum quam cognitionem dictum est, quod anima per essentiam suam cognoscitur in habitu. Sed error apud multos accidit circa cognitionem naturae ipsius animae in specie; et quantum ad hoc, haec pars obiectionum verum concludit.

[53976] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 3

Et per hoc patet responsio ad tertium.

[53977] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis anima materiae coniungatur ut forma eius, non tamen materiae subditur ut materialis reddatur; ac per hoc non sit intelligibilis in actu, sed in potentia tantum per abstractionem a materia.

[53978] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum, quod obiectio illa procedit de notitia actuali, secundum quam anima non percipit se esse nisi percipiendo actum suum et obiectum, ut dictum est.

[53979] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 6

Ad sextum dicendum, quod illud verbum philosophi est intelligendum, secundum quod intellectus intelligit de se quid est, et non secundum quod habitualiter habet notitiam de se an sit.

[53980] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 7

Et similiter dicendum ad septimum.

[53981] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 8

Ad octavum dicendum, quod operatio sensitiva perficitur per actionem sensibilis in sensum, quae est actio situalis, et ideo requirit determinatam distantiam; sed operatio intellectus non determinatur ad aliquem situm; et ideo non est simile.

[53982] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 9

Ad nonum dicendum, quod dupliciter dicitur aliquid alio cognosci. Uno modo sicut ex cuius cognitione deveniatur in cognitionem ipsius, et sic dicuntur conclusiones principiis cognosci; et hoc modo non potest aliquid cognosci seipso. Alio modo dicitur aliquid alio cognosci sicut in quo cognoscitur, et sic non oportet ut id quo cognoscitur, alia cognitione cognoscatur quam id quod eo cognoscitur. Unde sic nihil prohibet quod aliquid cognoscatur seipso, sicut Deus seipso seipsum cognoscit; et sic etiam anima quodam (modo) seipsam per essentiam suam cognoscit.

[53983] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 10

Ad decimum dicendum, quod circulus quidam in cognitione animae attenditur, secundum quod ratiocinando inquirit existentium veritatem; unde hoc dicit Dionysius ut ostendat in quo animae cognitio deficiat a cognitione Angeli. Haec autem circulatio attenditur in hoc quod ratio ex principiis secundum viam inveniendi in conclusiones pervenit, et conclusiones inventas in principia resolvendo examinat secundum viam iudicandi. Et secundum hoc non est ad propositum.

[53984] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 11

Ad undecimum dicendum, quod sicut non oportet ut semper intelligatur in actu, cuius notitia habitualiter habetur per aliquas species in intellectu existentes; ita etiam non oportet quod semper intelligatur actualiter ipsa mens, cuius cognitio inest nobis habitualiter, ex hoc quod ipsa eius essentia intellectui nostro est praesens.

[53985] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 12

Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod quo intelligitur et quod intelligitur, non hoc modo se habent ad invicem sicut quo est et quod est. Esse enim est actus entis; sed intelligere non est actus eius quod intelligitur, sed intelligentis; unde quo intelligitur comparatur ad intelligentem sicut quo est ad quod est. Et ideo, sicut in anima est aliud quo est et quod est, ita aliud est quo intelligit, idest potentia intellectiva, quae est principium actus intelligendi, a sua essentia. Non autem ex hoc oportet quod species qua intelligitur, sit aliud ab eo quod intelligitur.

[53986] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 13

Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod intellectiva potentia est forma ipsius animae quantum ad actum essendi, eo quod habet esse in anima, sicut proprietas in subiecto; sed quantum ad actum intelligendi nihil prohibet esse e converso.

[53987] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 14

Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod notitia qua anima seipsam novit, non est in genere accidentis quantum ad id quo habitualiter cognoscitur, sed solum quantum ad actum cognitionis qui est accidens quoddam; unde etiam Augustinus dicit quod notitia substantialiter inest menti, in IX de Trinitate, secundum quod mens novit se ipsam.

[53988] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 15

Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod illa obiectio procedit de notitia animae prout cognoscitur quantum ad naturam speciei, in qua omnes animae communicant.

[53989] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad 16

Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod cum mens intelligit seipsam, ipsa mens non est forma mentis, quia nihil est forma sui ipsius; sed se habet per modum formae, inquantum ad se sua actio terminatur qua seipsam cognoscit. Unde non oportet quod sit seipsa simplicior; nisi forte secundum modum intelligendi, inquantum id quod intelligitur, accipitur ut simplicius ipso intellectu intelligente, sicut accipitur ut perfectio eius.

[53990] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad s. c. 1

Ad primum autem in contrarium dicendum, quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum quod mens seipsam per seipsam cognoscit, quod ex ipsa mente est ei unde possit in actum prodire, quo se actualiter cognoscat percipiendo se esse; sicut etiam ex specie habitualiter in mente retenta inest menti ut possit actualiter rem illam considerare. Sed qualis est natura ipsius mentis, mens non potest percipere nisi ex consideratione obiecti sui, ut dictum est.

[53991] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad s. c. 2

Ad secundum dicendum, quod verbum Glossae quod dicit, quod intellectualis visio eas res continet, etc., magis est referendum ad obiectum cognitionis quam ad id quo intelligitur; et hoc patet considerando ea quae de aliis visionibus dicuntur. Dicitur enim in Glossa eadem, quod per visionem corporalem videntur corpora, per visionem vero spiritualem (id est imaginariam) similitudines corporum; per intellectualem autem ea quae neque sunt corpora neque similitudines corporum. Si enim hoc referretur ad id quo intelligitur, tunc quantum ad hoc nulla esset differentia inter visionem corporalem et spiritualem sive imaginariam, quia etiam corporalis visio fit per similitudinem corporis; non enim lapis est in oculo, sed similitudo lapidis. Sed in hoc est dictarum visionum differentia, quod visio corporalis terminatur ad ipsum corpus, imaginaria vero terminatur ad imaginem corporis sicut ad obiectum; et sic etiam, cum dicitur, quod visio intellectualis eas res continet quae non habent sui similitudines, quae non sunt quod ipsae, non intelligitur quod visio intellectualis non fiat per aliquas species quae non sunt idem quod res intellectae; sed quod visio intellectualis non terminatur ad aliquam rei similitudinem, sed ad ipsam essentiam rei. Sicut enim visione corporali aliquis intuetur ipsum corpus, non ita quod inspiciat aliquam corporis similitudinem, quamvis per aliquam similitudinem corporis inspiciat: ita in visione intellectuali aliquis inspicit ipsam essentiam rei sine hoc quod inspiciat aliquam similitudinem illius rei, quamvis quandoque per aliquam similitudinem illam essentiam inspiciat; quod etiam experimento patet. Cum enim intelligimus animam, non confingimus nobis aliquod animae simulacrum quod intueamur, sicut in visione imaginaria accidebat; sed ipsam essentiam animae consideramus. Non tamen ex hoc excluditur quin ista visio sit per aliquam speciem.

[53992] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad s. c. 3

Ad tertium dicendum, quod verbum philosophi intelligendum est de intellectu qui est omnino a materia separatus, ut Commentator ibidem exponit, sicut sunt intellectus Angelorum; non autem de intellectu humano: alias sequeretur quod scientia speculativa esset idem quod res scita; quod est impossibile, ut Commentator etiam ibidem deducit.

[53993] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad s. c. 4

Ad quartum dicendum, quod anima est sibi ipsi praesens ut intelligibilis, idest ut intelligi possit; non autem ut per seipsam intelligatur, sed ex obiecto suo, ut dictum est.

[53994] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad s. c. 5

Ad quintum dicendum, quod anima non cognoscitur per aliam speciem abstractam a se, sed per speciem obiecti sui, quae etiam fit forma eius secundum quod est intelligens actu; unde ratio non sequitur.

[53995] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad s. c. 6

Ad sextum dicendum, quod quamvis anima nostra sit sibi ipsi simillima, non tamen potest esse principium cognoscendi seipsam ut species intelligibilis, sicut nec materia prima; eo quod hoc modo se habet intellectus noster in ordine intelligibilium sicut materia prima in ordine sensibilium, ut Commentator dicit in III de anima.

[53996] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad s. c. 7

Ad septimum dicendum, quod anima est causa cognoscibilitatis aliis non sicut medium cognoscendi, sed inquantum per actum animae intelligibiles efficiuntur res materiales.

[53997] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad s. c. 8

Ad octavum dicendum quod secundum hoc scientia de anima est certissima, quod unusquisque in seipso experitur se animam habere, et actus animae sibi inesse; sed cognoscere quid sit anima, difficillimum est; unde philosophus ibidem subiungit, quod omnino difficillimorum est accipere aliquam fidem de ipsa.

[53998] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad s. c. 9

Ad nonum dicendum, quod anima non cognoscitur per speciem a sensibilibus abstractam, quasi intelligatur species illa esse animae similitudo; sed quia considerando naturam speciei, quae a sensibilibus abstrahitur, invenitur natura animae in qua huiusmodi species recipitur, sicut ex forma cognoscitur materia.

[53999] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad s. c. 10

Ad decimum dicendum, quod lux corporalis non videtur per se ipsam, nisi quatenus fit ratio visibilitatis visibilium, et forma quaedam dans esse eis visibile actu. Ipsa vero lux quae est in sole, non videtur a nobis nisi per eius similitudinem in visu nostro existentem. Sicut enim species lapidis non est in oculo, sed similitudo eius, ita non potest esse quod forma lucis quae est in sole, ipsa eadem sit in oculo. Et similiter etiam lumen intellectus agentis per seipsum a nobis intelligitur, inquantum est ratio specierum intelligibilium, faciens eas intelligibiles actu.

[54000] De veritate, q. 10 a. 8 ad s. c. 11

Ad undecimum dicendum, quod verbum illud philosophi potest dupliciter exponi, secundum duas opiniones de intellectu agente. Quidam enim posuerunt intellectum agentem esse substantiam separatam, unam de aliis intelligentiis; et secundum hoc semper actu intelligit, sicut aliae intelligentiae. Quidam vero ponunt intellectum agentem esse potentiam animae; et secundum hoc dicitur, quod intellectus agens non quandoque intelligit et quandoque non, quia causa quandoque intelligendi et quandoque non, non est ex parte eius, sed ex parte intellectus possibilis. In omni enim actu quo homo intelligit, concurrit operatio intellectus agentis et intellectus possibilis. Intellectus autem agens non recipit aliquid ab extrinseco, sed solum intellectus possibilis. Unde quantum ad id quod requiritur ad nostram considerationem ex parte intellectus agentis, non deest quin semper intelligamus; sed quantum ad id quod requiritur ex parte intellectus possibilis, qui non completur nisi per species intelligibiles a sensibus abstractas.

[54001] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 tit. 1 Nono quaeritur utrum mens nostra cognoscat habitus in anima existentes per essentiam suam, vel per aliquam similitudinem

[54002] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 tit. 2 Et videtur quod per essentiam suam.

[54003] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 arg. 1

Quia II Cor., XII, 2, super illud, scio hominem, etc., dicit Glossa: dilectio non aliter videtur praesens in specie per quam est, et aliter absens in aliqua imagine sui simili; sed quantum mente cerni potest, ab alio minus, ab alio magis ipsa cernitur. Ergo dilectio, per essentiam suam, non per aliquam sui similitudinem, a mente cernitur; et eadem ratione quilibet alius habitus.

[54004] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 arg. 2

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in X de Trinitate: quid enim tam cognitioni adest quam id quod menti adest? Sed habitus animae per sui essentiam menti adsunt. Ergo per suam essentiam cognoscuntur a mente.

[54005] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 arg. 3

Praeterea, propter quod unumquodque, illud magis. Sed habitus mentis sunt causa quare alia cognoscantur quae habitibus subsunt. Ergo ipsi habitus per essentiam suam maxime cognoscuntur a mente.

[54006] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 arg. 4

Praeterea, omne quod cognoscitur a mente per sui similitudinem, prius fuit in sensu quam fiat in mente. Sed habitus mentis nunquam fit in sensu. Ergo a mente non cognoscuntur per aliquam similitudinem.

[54007] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 arg. 5

Praeterea, quanto aliquid est propinquius menti, tanto a mente magis cognoscitur. Sed habitus est propinquior potentiae intellectivae mentis quam actus, et actus quam obiectum. Ergo mens magis cognoscit habitum quam actum vel obiectum; et ita habitum cognoscit per essentiam suam, et non per actus vel obiecta.

[54008] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 arg. 6

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Genesim ad litteram, quod eodem genere visionis cognoscitur mens et ars. Sed mens cognoscitur per essentiam suam a mente. Ergo et ars per essentiam suam cognoscitur, et similiter alii habitus mentis.

[54009] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 arg. 7

Praeterea, sicut se habet bonum ad affectum, sic verum habet se ad intellectum. Sed bonum non est in affectu per aliquam sui similitudinem. Ergo nec verum cognoscitur ab intellectu per aliquam sui similitudinem; ergo quidquid intellectus cognoscit, cognoscit per essentiam, et non per similitudinem.

[54010] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 arg. 8

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit XIII de Trinitate: non sic videtur fides in corde in quo est ab eo cuius est, sicut scilicet anima alterius hominis ex motibus corporis videtur; sed eam tenet certissima scientia, clamatque conscientia. Ergo secundum hoc scientia mentis tenet fidem, secundum quod conscientia clamat. Sed conscientia clamat fidem secundum quod praesentialiter inest ei. Ergo et secundum hoc scitur fides a mente, quod per essentiam suam praesentialiter menti inest.

[54011] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 arg. 9

Praeterea, forma est maxime proportionalis ei cuius est forma. Sed habitus in mente existentes sunt quaedam formae mentis. Ergo sunt menti maxime proportionales; ergo mens nostra eos immediate cognoscit per essentiam.

[54012] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 arg. 10

Praeterea, intellectus cognoscit speciem intelligibilem quae in ipso est; non autem cognoscit eam per aliam speciem, sed per essentiam suam, quia sic esset abire in infinitum. Hoc autem non est nisi quia species ipsae intellectum informant. Cum igitur similiter intellectus per habitus informetur, videtur quod eos per essentiam mens cognoscat.

[54013] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 arg. 11

Praeterea, habitus a mente non cognoscuntur nisi visione intellectuali. Sed visio intellectualis est eorum quae per suam essentiam videntur. Igitur habitus videntur a mente per suam essentiam.

[54014] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 s. c. 1

Sed contra. Est quod Augustinus dicit X confessionum: ecce in memoriae meae campis et antris et cavernis innumerabilibus atque innumerabiliter plenis, innumerabilium generibus rerum, sive per imagines, sicut omnium corporum, sive per praesentiam, sicut artium, sive per nescio quas notiones, sicut affectionum animi, quas et cum animus non patitur, memoria tenet. Ex quo videtur quod affectiones animi cognoscantur non per sui essentiam sed per aliquas sui notiones; et eadem ratione habitus virtutum, qui circa huiusmodi affectiones consistunt.

[54015] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 s. c. 2

Praeterea, Augustinus dicit XI de civitate Dei: habemus alium sensum interioris hominis, sensu isto, scilicet corporali, praestantiorem, quo iusta et iniusta sentimus; iusta per intelligibilem speciem, iniusta per eius privationem. Iusta autem et iniusta appellat habitus virtutum et vitiorum. Ergo habitus animae per speciem, et non per suam essentiam, cognoscuntur.

[54016] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 s. c. 3

Praeterea, nihil cognoscitur ab intellectu per essentiam nisi quod praesentialiter est in intellectu. Habitus autem virtutum non sunt praesentialiter in intellectu, sed in affectu. Ergo non cognoscuntur per sui essentiam ab intellectu.

[54017] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 s. c. 4

Praeterea, visio intellectualis est praestantior quam corporalis. Ergo est cum maiori discretione. Sed in visione corporali species qua aliquid videtur, semper est aliud a re quae per ipsam videtur. Ergo et habitus qui per intellectualem visionem videntur, non videntur a mente per essentiam, sed per aliquas species alias.

[54018] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 s. c. 5

Praeterea, nihil appetitur nisi quod cognoscitur, ut Augustinus probat in Lib. de Trinit. Sed habitus animae appetuntur ab aliquibus qui ipsos non habent. Ergo habitus illi cognoscuntur ab eis. Non autem per sui essentiam cum eos non habeant. Ergo per sui speciem.

[54019] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 s. c. 6

Praeterea, Hugo de sancto Victore, distinguit in homine triplicem oculum, scilicet oculum rationis, oculum intelligentiae et oculum carnis. Oculus intelligentiae est quo Deus inspicitur; et hunc dicit erutum post peccatum. Oculus carnis est quo ista corporalia videntur; et hic post peccatum integer mansit. Oculus rationis est quo intelligibilia creata cognoscuntur; et hic post peccatum factus est lippus, quia in parte, non totaliter, intelligibilia cognoscimus. Sed omne quod videtur tantum in parte, non cognoscitur per essentiam. Ergo cum habitus mentis sint intelligibiles, videtur quod mens non videat eos per essentiam.

[54020] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 s. c. 7

Praeterea, multo praesentior est Deus per essentiam suam menti quam habitus, cum ipse sit cuilibet rei intimus. Sed praesentia Dei in mente non facit quod mens nostra Deum per essentiam videat. Ergo nec habitus per essentiam videntur a mente, quamvis sint in ea praesentes.

[54021] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 s. c. 8

Praeterea, intellectus qui est potentia intelligens, ad hoc quod actu intelligat, requiritur quod per aliquid reducatur in actum: et id est quo intellectus intelligit actu. Sed habitus essentia, inquantum praesens menti est, non reducit intellectum de potentia in actum, quia sic oporteret quod quamdiu habitus sunt praesentes in anima actu intelligerentur. Ergo habituum essentia non est id quo habitus intelliguntur.

[54022] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 co.

Responsio. Dicendum, quod sicut animae, ita et habitus est duplex cognitio: una qua quis cognoscit an habitus sibi insit; alia qua cognoscitur quid sit habitus. Hae tamen duae cognitiones circa habitus aliter ordinantur quam circa animam. Cognitio enim qua quis novit se habere aliquem habitum, praesupponit notitiam qua cognoscat quid est habitus ille: non enim possum scire me habere castitatem, nisi sciam quid est castitas. Sed ex parte animae non est sic. Multi enim sciunt se animam habere qui nesciunt quid est anima. Cuius diversitatis haec est ratio, quia tam habitus quam animam non percipimus in nobis esse, nisi percipiendo actus quorum anima et habitus sunt principia. Habitus autem per essentiam suam est principium talis actus, unde si cognoscitur habitus prout est principium talis actus, cognoscitur de eo quid est; ut si sciam quod castitas est per quam quis se cohibet ab illicitis delectationibus in venereis existentibus, scio de castitate quid est. Sed anima non est principium actuum per essentiam suam, sed per suas vires; unde perceptis actibus animae, percipitur inesse principium talium actuum, utpote motus et sensus; non tamen ex hoc natura animae scitur. Loquendo igitur de habitibus prout de eis scimus quid sunt, duo in eorum cognitione oportet attendere; scilicet apprehensionem et iudicium. Secundum apprehensionem quidem eorum notitia oportet quod obiectis et actibus capiatur; nec ipsi possunt per essentiam suam apprehendi. Cuius ratio est, quia cuiuslibet potentiae animae virtus est determinata ad obiectum suum; unde et eius actio primo et principaliter in obiectum tendit. In ea vero quibus in obiectum dirigitur, non potest nisi per quamdam reditionem, sicut videmus, quod visus primo dirigitur in colorem; sed in actum visionis suae non dirigitur nisi per quamdam reditionem, dum videndo colorem videt se videre. Sed ista reditio incomplete quidem est in sensu, complete autem in intellectu, qui reditione completa redit ad sciendum essentiam suam. Intellectus autem noster in statu viae hoc modo comparatur ad phantasmata sicut visus ad colores, ut dicitur in III de anima: non quidem ut cognoscat ipsa phantasmata ut visus cognoscit colores, sed ut cognoscat ea quorum sunt phantasmata. Unde actio intellectus nostri primo tendit in ea quae per phantasmata apprehenduntur, et deinde redit ad actum suum cognoscendum; et ulterius in species et habitus et potentias et essentiam ipsius mentis. Non enim comparantur ad intellectum ut obiecta prima, sed ut ea quibus in obiectum feratur. Iudicium autem de unoquoque habetur secundum id quod est mensura illius. Cuiuslibet autem habitus mensura quaedam est id ad quod habitus ordinatur: quod quidem ad nostram cognitionem se habet tripliciter. Quandoque enim est a sensu acceptum, vel visu vel auditu; sicut cum videmus utilitatem grammaticae vel medicinae, aut eam ab aliis audimus, et ex hac utilitate scimus quid est grammatica vel medicina. Quandoque vero est naturali cognitioni inditum; quod maxime patet in habitibus virtutum, quarum fines naturalis ratio dictat. Quandoque vero est divinitus infusum, sicut patet in fide et spe, et aliis huiusmodi habitibus infusis. Et quia etiam naturalis cognitio in nobis ex illustratione divina oritur, in utroque veritas increata consulitur. Unde iudicium in quo completur cognitio de natura habitus, vel est secundum id quod sensu accipimus, vel secundum quod increatam consulimus veritatem. In cognitione vero qua cognoscimus an habitus nobis insint, duo sunt consideranda; scilicet habitualis cognitio, et actualis. Actualiter quidem percipimus habitus nos habere, ex actibus habituum quos in nobis sentimus; unde etiam philosophus dicit in II Ethicorum, quod signum oportet accipere habituum fientem in opere delectationem. Sed quantum ad habitualem cognitionem, habitus mentis per seipsos cognosci dicuntur. Illud enim facit habitualiter cognosci aliquid, ex quo aliquis efficitur potens progredi in actum cognitionis eius rei quae habitualiter cognosci dicitur. Ex hoc autem ipso quod habitus per essentiam suam sunt in mente, mens potest progredi ad actualiter percipiendum habitus in se esse, inquantum per habitus quos habet, potest prodire in actus, in quibus habitus actualiter percipiuntur. Sed quantum ad hoc differentia est inter habitus cognitivae partis et affectivae. Habitus enim cognitivae partis est principium et ipsius actus quo percipitur habitus, et etiam cognitionis qua percipitur, quia ipsa actualis cognitio ex habitu cognitivo procedit: sed habitus affectivae partis est quidem principium illius actus ex quo potest habitus percipi, non tamen cognitionis qua percipitur. Et sic patet quod habitus cognitivae, ex hoc quod per essentiam suam in mente existit, est proximum principium suae cognitionis; habitus autem affectivae partis est principium quasi remotum, in quantum non est causa cognitionis, sed eius unde cognitio accipitur; et ideo Augustinus dixit in X confessionum, quod artes cognoscuntur per sui praesentiam, sed affectiones animae per quasdam notiones.

[54023] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad 1

Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod verbum illud Glossae est referendum ad obiectum cognitionis, et non ad medium cognoscendi; quia, scilicet, cum dilectionem cognoscimus, ipsam dilectionis essentiam consideramus, non aliquam eius similitudinem, ut in imaginaria visione accidit.

[54024] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad 2

Ad secundum dicendum, quod pro tanto dicitur quod mens nihil melius novit eo quod in ipsa est, quia eorum quae sunt extra ipsam non est necesse quod in se habeat aliquid unde in eorum notitiam devenire possit. Sed in eorum quae in ipsa sunt actualem cognitionem devenire potest ex his quae penes se habet, quamvis etiam per aliqua alia cognoscantur.

[54025] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad 3

Ad tertium dicendum, quod habitus non est causa cognoscendi alia sicut quo cognito alia cognoscantur, prout principia sunt causa cognoscendi conclusiones; sed quia ex habitu perficitur anima ad aliquid cognoscendum. Et sic non est causa cognitorum quasi univoca, prout unum cognitum est causa cognitionis alterius cogniti; sed quasi causa aequivoca, quae eamdem nominationem non recipit; sicut albedo facit album, quamvis ipsa non sit alba, sed est quo aliquid est album. Similiter etiam habitus, inquantum huiusmodi, non est causa cognitionis ut quod est cognitum, sed ut quo aliquid est cognitum; et ideo non oportet quod sit magis cognitum quam ea quae per habitum cognoscuntur.

[54026] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad 4

Ad quartum dicendum, quod habitus non cognoscitur ab anima per aliquam eius speciem a sensu abstractam, sed per species eorum quae per habitum cognoscuntur; in hoc ipso quod alia cognoscuntur, et habitus cognoscitur ut principium cognitionis eorum.

[54027] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad 5

Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis habitus sit propinquior potentiae quam actus, tamen actus est propinquior obiecto, quod habet rationem cogniti; potentia vero habet rationem principii cognoscendi: et ideo actus per prius cognoscitur quam habitus; sed habitus est magis cognitionis principium.

[54028] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad 6

Ad sextum dicendum, quod ars est habitus intellectivae partis, et quantum ad habitualem notitiam percipitur eodem modo ab habente sicut et mens, scilicet per sui praesentiam.

[54029] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad 7

Ad septimum dicendum, quod motus vel operatio cognitivae partis, perficitur in ipsa mente: et ideo oportet ad hoc quod aliquid cognoscatur, esse aliquam similitudinem eius in mente; maxime si per essentiam suam non coniungatur menti ut cognitionis obiectum. Sed motus vel operatio affectivae partis incipit ab anima, et terminatur ad res; et ideo non requiritur in affectu aliqua similitudo rei qua informetur, sicut in intellectu.

[54030] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad 8

Ad octavum dicendum, quod fides est habitus intellectivae partis, unde ex hoc ipso quod menti inest, inclinat mentem ad actum intellectus, in quo ipsa fides videtur; secus autem est de aliis habitibus qui sunt in parte affectiva.

[54031] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad 9

Ad nonum dicendum, quod habitus mentis sunt ei maxime proportionales, sicut forma proportionatur ad subiectum, et perfectio ad perfectibile; non autem sicut obiectum ad potentiam.

[54032] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad 10

Ad decimum dicendum, quod intellectus cognoscit speciem intelligibilem non per essentiam suam, neque per aliquam speciem speciei, sed cognoscendo obiectum cuius est species, per quamdam reflexionem, ut dictum est.

[54033] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad 11

Ad undecimum patet responsio ex his quae in praecedenti quaestione sunt dicta.

[54034] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad s. c. 1

Ad primum vero in contrarium dicendum, quod in auctoritate illa Augustinus distinguit triplicem modum cognoscendi. Quorum unus est eorum quae sunt extra animam, de quibus cognitionem habere non possumus ex his quae in nobis sunt; sed oportet, ad ea cognoscenda, ut eorum imagines vel similitudines in nobis fiant. Alius est eorum quae sunt in parte intellectiva; quae quidem per sui praesentiam dicit cognosci, quia ex eis est ut in actum intelligendi exeamus, in quo actu ea quae sunt intelligendi principia, cognoscuntur: et ideo dicit, quod artes per sui praesentiam cognoscuntur. Tertius modus est eorum quae pertinent ad partem affectivam, quorum ratio cognoscendi non est in intellectu, sed in affectu: et ideo non per sui praesentiam, quae in affectu, sed per eius notitiam vel rationem, quae est in intellectu cognoscuntur, sicut per immediatum principium; quamvis etiam habitus affectivae partis per sui praesentiam sint quoddam remotum principium cognitionis inquantum eliciunt actus in quibus eos intellectus cognoscit; ut sic etiam possit dici quod quodammodo, per sui praesentiam cognoscuntur.

[54035] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad s. c. 2

Ad secundum dicendum, quod species illa per quam iustitia cognoscitur, nihil est aliud quam ratio ipsa iustitiae, per cuius privationem iniustitia cognoscitur. Haec autem species vel ratio non est aliquid a iustitia abstractum, sed id quod est complementum esse ipsius ut specifica differentia.

[54036] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad s. c. 3

Ad tertium dicendum, quod intelligere, proprie loquendo, non est intellectus, sed animae per intellectum; sicut nec calefacere est caloris, sed ignis per calorem. Nec istae duae partes, scilicet intellectus et affectus, sunt cogitandae in anima ut situaliter distinctae, sicut visus et auditus, qui sunt actus organorum; et ideo illud quod est in affectu, est etiam praesens animae intelligenti. Unde anima per intellectum non solum redit ad cognoscendum actum intellectus, sed etiam actum affectus; sicut etiam per affectum redit ad appetendum et diligendum non solum actum affectus, sed etiam actum intellectus.

[54037] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad s. c. 4

Ad quartum dicendum, quod discretio quae pertinet ad perfectionem cognitionis, non est discretio qua distinguuntur quod intelligitur et quo intelligitur, quia sic divina cognitio qua se cognoscit, esset imperfectissima; sed est discretio qua id quod cognoscitur, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis.

[54038] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad s. c. 5

Ad quintum dicendum, quod a non habentibus habitus mentis cognoscuntur, non quidem illa cognitione qua percipiuntur sibi inesse, sed qua cognoscuntur quid sunt, vel qua percipiuntur aliis inesse; quod non est per praesentiam, sed alio modo, ut dictum est.

[54039] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad s. c. 6

Ad sextum dicendum, quod oculus rationis pro tanto dicitur lippus esse respectu intelligibilium creatorum, quia nihil intelligit actu nisi accipiendo a sensibilibus, quibus intelligibilia sunt excellentiora; et ideo deficiens invenitur ad intelligibilia cognoscenda. Tamen ea quae sunt in ratione, nihil prohibet quin immediate inclinent per essentiam suam ad actus in quibus intelliguntur, ut dictum est.

[54040] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad s. c. 7

Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis Deus sit magis praesens nostrae menti quam habitus, tamen ex obiectis quae naturaliter cognoscimus non ita perfecte essentiam divinam videre possumus sicut essentiam habituum; quia habitus sunt proportionati ipsis obiectis et actibus, et sunt proxima eorum principia; quod de Deo dici non potest.

[54041] De veritate, q. 10 a. 9 ad s. c. 8

Ad octavum dicendum, quod quamvis praesentia habitus in mente non faciat eam actualiter cognoscentem ipsum habitum, facit tamen eam actu perfectam per habitum quo actus eliciatur, unde habitus cognoscatur.