English translations of Latin passages in Joseph Owens, “Thomistic Common Nature and Platonic Idea, ”Mediaeval Studies 21 (1959) 211-223.

First draft 2/11/08  Richard C. Taylor, Marquette University

p. 211: first text at note 1:

“It seems, however, that Plato deviated from the truth, because, since he thought that every cognition is through the mode of some likeness, he believed that the form of the thing known of necessity is in the knower in the same way by which it is in the thing known. However, he considered that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect universally, immaterially, and in an immobile way, which is apparent in the very operation of the intellect which understands universally and through a mode of a certain necessity . . . .”

p.211, second text:

“But Plato, attending only to the immateriality of the human intellect, not to the fact that it is united to the body in some way, asserted the object of the intellect to be separate ideas. [He also asserted] that we understand, not by abstracting, but rather by participating abstract things, as was said above.”

p.212, first text:

“And in this way the Platonists asserted animal and human being to be substances in their own universality. Aristotle in this chapter intends to refute that showing that common animal or common human being is not some substance in the natural world.  But the animal or human form has this community insofar as it is in the intellect which takes one form as common to many insofar as it abstracts it from all individuating [conditions].”

p.212, second text:

“It is evident, however, to one diligently considering the arguments of Plato that on the basis of this he erred in his position, because he believed that the mode of the thing understood in its being is as the mode of the one understanding the thing itself . . . However, this is not necessary.  For even if the intellect understands things through the fact that it is like these with respect to the intelligible species through which it comes to be in act, nevertheless it is not necessary that that species in the intellect by which the thing is understood be in that way.  For everything which is in something exists through the mode of this in which it is.”

p.213, first text:

“And nothing differs with respect to the truth of consideration, whether it be considered in this or that way.  For, although they are not abstract / separate in being, the mathematicians abstracting these according to intellect are not lying, because they do not assert these to exist outside sensible matter.”

P.213, second text:

“ . . . he excludes from the aforementioned the error of Plato. For, because it was not known to him how the intellect truly is able to abstract these things which are not abstract according to [their] being, he asserted those to be natural abstract things, on account of the fact that natural science is about universals, not singulars. Hence, he asserted that human being is separate and horse, stone and the like. These separate things he said to be ideas . . . .

p.213, third text:

“And for this reason from the nature of intellect which is different from the nature of a thing understood, it is necessary that there be one mode of understanding by which intellect understands and another mode of being by which the thing exists. For, although it is necessary that that which is in the thing be what the intellect understands, nevertheless [it does] not [do so] in the same mode.  Hence, although the intellect understands mathmaticals without at the same time understanding sensible things, and universals without particulars, nevertheless it is not necessary that mathematicals exist beyond sensible things and universals beyond particular things.”

p.219, first text:

“However, this material has been shown as receiving that common nature. And for this reason ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ is signified in a twofold way. [It is signified] as part, insofar as the common nature is taken with precision of anything not pertaining to that common nature. For in this way determinate matter comes into composition with the determinate singular, as this name ‘humanity,’ and so it not predicated, and is neither genus nor species, but by this a human being is formally denominated. Or [it is signified] as whole, insofar as these things which pertain to the common nature, are understood without precision. For in this way there is included in potency also determinate matter in the common nature, and so it is signified by this name, ‘human being,’ and it is signified as what is. By each mode this name ‘essence’ is found.”

p.219, second text:

“. . . and thus it is that this which belongs to the nature according to absolute consideration is the ratio by which it belongs to some nature according to the being which it has in the singular, and not the converse.  For in this way Socrates is rational because human being is rational and not the converse. Hence, given that Socrates and Plato do not exist, still rationality would belong to human nature.”

p.220, first text:

“. . . because if all creatures lacked being, there would still remain the nature of six to the extent that it abstracts from any given being of this sort (i.e., created being), which belongs to its perfection, as also human nature will remain such that rationality belongs to it.”

p.220, second text, at “Vnde si queratur. . . . ”

“Whence, if it is asked whether that nature so considered can be said to be one nor many, neither should be conceded, because each is outside the concept of humanity and each is able to occur for it.”

p.223, first text:

“Likewise also the divine intellect is the ratio of the nature absolutely considered.  The very nature absolutely considered and in singulars is the ratio of the human intellect and in some way its measure.”

p. 223, second text:

“However, in this way six will not be a creature, but a ratio of the creature in the Creator, which is the idea of six.  And it is the same in reality as the divine essence, although different by ratio.”

p.223, third text:

“. . . it is not said that the perfection remains in the number six as if the number six has some being in reality with no creature existing.  When all created being has been removed, absolute consideration of the number six remains, insofar as it abstracts from any being, and in this way perfection is attributed to it.  [This is] just as with all singular human beings having been removed, there would still remain rationality attributable to human nature.”