Student Questions

 20 November 2014

Student A:

1. 1.Aquinas makes a division between the rational knowledge and the intellectual knowledge (ST. I-II,  Q. , art. 1). For me, this distinction is not a convincing one. At times, he uses “intellect or reason” as if those terms were interchangeable. Why he makes such a distinction?
   

2. 2.. Aquinas says that each one tastes happiness (God) in different way. This shows that in heaven also a disparity exists. Why does God not provide with grace to those who are not able ‘taste’ him in its pinnacle?
   

Student B:

1. What does Aquinas mean by “delight” (“delectatio”) in question 4? He takes great pains to note that delight is necessary for the beatitude of post-mortem happiness (in the sense that it is necessarily attendant on such happiness, not that it is a necessary precondition of attaining that happiness), but it is not at all clear in what this delight is supposed to consist or how it is to be distinguished from happiness as such. It seems clear that delight cannot be a merely emotional response to the presence of beatific happiness, since this sort of response seems intrinsically bound up with the earthy body, and thus inappropriate for the soul in patria. Aquinas identifies delight as a condition in which the “will of him who deserves it is at rest,” and later as the “repose of the lover in the object beloved” but it's not immediately apparent how such a restfulness of the will could be considered delight (Q4, Article 1, Reply to Objection 1; Q4, Article 3, Answer). This question is vital for a full understanding of Aquinas' position here, since delight forms an important part (albeit not the most central part, since it is subordinate to the vision of God, as its cause) of the soul's happiness after death.

2. 2.To what degree are individual souls in complete beatitude distinguished as particulars, for Aquinas? That is, in the second article of question 5, Aquinas argues for the notion that there can be different degrees of happiness in patria. Of course, these different degrees are not variations in the object of that happiness, since the beatific vision of God is always the perfect good, and so is not susceptible to variation, but rather these differences come into play insofar as the individual souls experiencing that vision are more or less disposed towards the enjoyment of God: “the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is.” But it is not clear to me how these different dispositions are to be thought of, once the individual souls are resting in the beatific vision, rather than, for instance, being instantiated in earthly bodies. It seems at least odd, and in need of further discussion, to think about individual souls having different sorts of participation in what Aquinas calls the Infinite Good once they have been brought to the point of being able to have a vision of that good, which is granted by God and not something they have attained on their own. In what way do differences of disposition persist once God's own power has lifted up the individual souls to the level of the beatific vision?
   

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What role do the affections play in the attainment of happiness?  

1. Where does Thomas see affection in friendship?  

Question 4, article 8 (“I answer that”) says, “If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends…for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work.”

Friendship is a kind of love, which involves no doubt some kind of intellection (I have to know who my friends are and who is worthy of friendship), but really I enjoy my friends because of an affection, not so much “delight[ing] in seeing them do good” (unless that is considered an affection).

2. Question 5, article 6 (“I answer that”) says, “If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose act it consists.”  Aristotle’s conception of happiness involves forming good habits through our actions.  These actions allow us to acquire or grasp something such that the more we acquire it, the more we enjoy it, which brings about pleasure (e.g. playing the piano).  But where do the affections fit in?  

When most of us started doing philosophy, we were poor at it.  Why would we want to cultivate something that made us miserable?  (If anything, I would be repulsed by it enough to run from it.)  It seems because we have an affinity for it.  The affection guides our action, not pleasure.