For a review of this Latin edition, see

Lisa Devriese, SIGER OF BRABANT, AUTHOR OF THE ANONYMOUS QUESTIO DE CREATIONE EX NIHILO Mediterranea. International Journal on the Transfer of Knowledge 2 (2017)

Tr. Richard C. Taylor with Andrea Robiglio (c) 12 November 2015

Siger of Brabant (ca. 1240-1284) was a famous rationalist Averroist opponent who knew the writings of Thomas Aquinas and several times challenged the reasoning of Aquinas. This question was one of the occasions on which he challenged Aquinas.

The following translation is made from the edition by Andrea Aiello in

Sigeri de Brabante. Questio de creatione ex nihilo. Paris BnF lat. 16297, f. 116fb-vb, with edition, translation and study by Andrea Aiello. Firenze: SISMEL. Edizione del Galluzzo, 2015.

<Question on Creation Ex Nihilo>

Whether something can be generated or made from nothing, or not from something.

It seems that <the answer is yes> because form is generated when it receives being after after not being (post non esse) and is not generated from something. For then it would be composed, as is taught in Metaphysics 7.

<2.> Again, the reason why something generated must be from something seems to be because in generation there must be as subject something which comes to be that which comes to be. But there are certain things generated which begin to be without coming to be, as is said in the De sensu. Therefore, at least things such as these could have been able to be generated from nothing.

<3.> Again, because what generates requires something from which it generates, the reason seems to be a defect on the part of what generates because it has a particular potency or power not potent enough in regard to the whole substance of the thing generated.  Since, therefore, the first generator is without diminution, having a universal power potent enough in regard to the whole substance of any thing whatsoever, presuposing nothing, it seems that at least an agent such as this is able to make something completely from nothing.

<4.> Again, it is evident that the heavens have been made even according to the opinion of all the philosophers, since it has the cause of its being. The Commentator also expressly says in the De substantia orbis that the heavens were made and that their mover is their maker and they are not made out of something, for in that way they would be generated; therefore they are from nothing.  Also in his commentary on De Caelo book 1, the Commentary, providing an explanation of the text in which Aristotle says that the heavens are not made from something,  says that Aristotle says well that the heavens were not made out of something because they were made from nothing and in no time.

<5.> Again, the making which is the production of the whole being, since it comes to be with nothing presupposed, is from nothing; but the universe was made in this way.

Contra <1.> Before it was generated and has been generated, everything generated has potency to be. However, that is nothing but matter. Therefore, every generated thing has matter from which it is generated.

<2.> Again, nothing has causality over the heavens or over something else; therefore some thing cannot be made from nothing in such a way that the term ‘from’ denotes causality. Also the non-being of the heavens according to Aristotle does not have an order of duration in regard to the heavens themselves. Therefore it also cannot be said that it is made from nothing in such a way that by “from” the order of duration is denoted, nor also in such a way that by “from” there is denoted the order of nature by which the non-being of the heavens precedes its being according to what Avicenna seems to say, because, if were so, the non-being of the heavens and its being would be two things existing simultaneously in duration, which is impossible.

<Solution.> If by “generated” one understands what at first not existing and later existing,  proceeds to being through a change from non-being to its being, something such as this must be produced out of something. [This is] because every change necessarily requires a changeable thing. However, this should be understood regarding what has being per se, for such a thing also has coming into being (fieri) when it is not.

Since, however, form does not have being per se,  it is also not generated per se but per accidens, namely, by the generation of the composite. The composite, however, is generated per se, namely, from something of its own (scilicet ex aliquo sui). What is supposed prior to generation does not also come to be in its substance.

Here it is also on the basis of this that immaterial forms do not have generation, neither per se nor per accidens. It is also legitimate [to think] that certain things begin to be without a coming to be which belongs to them in their own right and which is also in their matter or subject, nevertheless not without the coming to be of something in an absolute way, and not without a coming to be of these according to that, as air begins to be illuminated not through a coming to be which is of the light in its own right and also not through a coming to be which is in the subject of light as in air according to something else, but through a local change on the part of what is doing the illuminating. And in regard to such things it should be said that they are also generated from something, both because they are not things generated without some [sort of] coming to be and also because, as change implies a changeable thing which is changed, so too changed being implies something that has been changed. In this way such things are generated from something and they have been generated from something.

If by “generated” one understands what, not having being in act of itself, nevertheless has it from another in some way by an efficient cause, so that it is also without change, as according to the Philosopher the heavens are held to be eternal and yet made or having a cause of their being — for in the case of certain eternal things nothing prevents [them from] having a cause as is said in Physics 7 and Metaphysics 5 — in this way, I say, something can be made, as [are] the heavens and other things which according to the Philosopher are eternal, yet not as generated through a change.  Rather, it should be understood only by this sort of making a relation of the thing made in the notion (ratione) of effect in reference to that as to its cause. Such a thing can therefore properly (bene) called a thing made or an effect, yet it cannot be said to be made from nothing, whether the “from” indicates the circumstance of causality or of order in duration.

For what Avicenna says — that the heavens have been made from nothing in such a way that there is indicated by this a certain order of nature itself of the non-being of the heavens to their being so that those two are simultaneously existing by duration in the heavens and regarding these, yet one naturally precedes the other not in an absolute way, but in such a way that the non-being of the heavens, insofar as it is in its own right, is simultaneous in duration with the being of the heavens through another, and yet by the order of nature the non-being of the heavens precedes its being because what belongs to one thing per se belongs to it in a prior way than that which is from another — cannot stand, because it is false to say that the heavens of themselves are non-being or nothing.  For non-being neither is in the principle (ratio) of the heavens nor do the heavens of themselves have a cause on the basis of which they might not be. For whatever way they are existing, it would not be from another. It is also false that the heavens of themselves are able not to be; rather, of themselves it is impossible for them not to be. Nevertheless, it is true that they do not exist of themselves as by an efficient principle, and it is true that heavens are something by another thing.  And for this reason the heavens of themselves are something and sempiternal, yet by another thing.

Therefore, there is a difference between saying the heavens are not made from something and that they are made from nothing. For by the first it is negated that something has the nature (ratio) of a material cause for the heavens themselves which [cause] an agent will have presupposed. By the second it is affirmed that nothing or non-being has causality and order, or at least order.

The first is true because the heavens, with regard to all that is in them, are from their own agent and for this reason it is not made from something. However, that they were made from nothing is false unless by “the heavens are made from nothing” one understands that the heavens were not made out of something. Still, it does not follow, if the heavens are not made out of something, that they are made from nothing (ex nihilo).

It is true, therefore, that, in regard to the making which is the production of the whole being, something is not presupposed. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that such making in which nothing is presupposed is from nothing, but it is necessary that it not be from something.

Nevertheless, this production cannot be through some change of something from non-being to being because such [a change] requires a substrate from which what is produced is produced. But in this sort of production there is only the understanding that the whole being is from another as from its cause.

Still, according to the intention of Aristotle, such a production cannot be new; rather, according to him, it is necessary that everything newly made come to be from something. [This is because] also according to him everything newly made comes to be through change. For the effect is not distinguished in posteriority with respect to its cause and in newness, not immediately a being with its cause, except because it proceeds from its cause according to the order of a certain change. For change causes priority and posteriority in duration.

Again, what of its own nature (ratio) is such that it is impossible for it to be, totally lacking potency to being, can receive from nothing that it be a being. The pure non-being of some thing is of such a sort because it has no potency for being, neither per se nor per accidens; rather, of its own nature (ratio) it has impotence in regard to this in such a way that not only is it unable by its own nature to be but of its very nature (ratio) it is prevented to/ may not be.

Again, what of its very nature (ratio) is a non-being never has from another that it is a being; pure non-being without a subject is of this sort; therefore, etc. For it is reasonable that matter of itself is not a being in act, yet it is not of itself non-being in act because it never would come to be in act by an agent.

If it may be said that Socrates of his own nature (ratio) is a being and nevertheless from another he has it that at sometime he is a non-being, it should be noted that Socrates of his own nature (ratio) is a being in potency to non-being and for this reason of his own nature (ratio) he is not absolute being and for all time, but only for some determinate time. But pure non-being and nothing of its very nature is absolute non-being, not having potency for being; therefore he will not have from another that he is a being.

Some say regarding these things that pure non-being without a subject does not receive being or is changed in being, but to such a non-being itself there follows being by an emanating agent.

But, on the contrary, the necessary not only does not change into the opposite but neither also does the opposite follow necessarily. But pure non-being in its non-beingness is necessary since it does not have the potency of being disposed otherwise, neither per se nor per accidens since it is without subject. Therefore, being does not follow upon such non-being.

If it would be said that such non-being does not have potency for being which is its own or of itself, nevertheless it can be by the potency of an agent, in such a way that, even though such non-being in its non-beingness would be necessary insofar as it is of itself, yet it is possible for the opposite on the part of the agent. Against that it is said in the On the cause of the motion of animals that that which is immobile of itself no one can move; therefore, what is of itself impossible, no one is able to bring about.

Again, since an impossible being is a non-being, it is impossible for any agent to make such a non-being; therefore, since a non-being is impossible to be, it is not possible for any agent to make that a being.

Again, as what is a pure being (purum ens) or pure to be (purum esse) in no way can not be, so too it seems that that which is pure non-being can in no way be.

Again, if something can come to be from nothing by any agent, prime matter would not be something attested; for in no <process of> making, neither more easily in one case rather than in another, is matter apprehended to exist by the senses. But matter is comprehended from the fact that an agent does not have the ability to make something when it is not yet, unless there is the possibility of that thing for being; however, that through which something is a being in potency is called matter. If, therefore, that very nature of the thing which comes to be by an agent through which it is possible to be is no longer dependent on one making than on another, unless it is universally true that no agent makes that which is of itself impossible, but only that which in this way is of itself possible to come to be, then it does not happen that prime matter is known.

On account of this it seems that it should be said that some agent is able to make that which is impossible for another agent, but no agent is able to do but what is possible absolutely. However, it is said that something is possible, from the term’s relation, when the predicate is not repugnant to the subject in such a way that everything which can have the concept (ratio) of being has the nature of absolute possibility.

Therefore, that what of its very nature lacks the potency to be, and in this way of its notion (ratio) is a non-being, comes to be or to have being implies a contradiction.  The contradiction, nevertheless, is not seen to be implied by certain thinkers [i.e. Aquinas], because they consider only the fact that the being of that is found from the agent which is pure act and potent  with an infinite potency for the whole substance of the thing. But if one pays attention to the fact that that thing of its very principle (ratio) lacks potency to being, and in this way of its very notion (ratio) is a non-being, then it is repugnant to the concept (ratio) of being which it is said to be able to have also from the agent.