Aquinas in Context Fall 2015: Aquinas and Bonaventure
Translations: Bonaventure Commentary on the Sentences (selected)
Translations
Translations Bonaventure Comm on Sentences (selected)
Selected Texts from
Bonaventure's COMMENTARY ON BOOK 2 OF THE SENTENCES
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
PRELIMINARY DRAFT
Translated by Richard C. Taylor
Philosophy Dept.
Marquette University
Spring 1985; Fall 2015
Contents
(1) Dist. 1, Pt.1, Art.1: On the Being of the Principle
(De entitate principii)
Question 1: Whether things have a causal principle.
pp.1-8.
(2) Dist. 1, PT.1, Art.2: On the Unity of the Principle
Question 1: Whether Things Have Been Produced in Being
(in esse) By Many Principles (a pluribus principiis) pp.9-13
(3) Dist. 1, Pt.1, Art.2: On the Unity of the Principle
Question 2: Whether the First Principle Produced All
Things By Himself or Through the Mediation of Another.
pp.14-17
(4) Dist. 1, Pt.1, Art.3: On Production Itself or Creation
Question 1: Whether Creation Means a Change.
(Utrum creatio mutationem dicat.) pp.18-22
(5) Dist. 1, Pt.1, Art.3: On Production Itself or Creation
Question 2: Whether Creation Indicates Something Mediate
Between the Creator and the Creature pp.23-27
(6) Dist. 1, Pt.2, Art.1: On the Distinction of Things
Question 1: Whether the Multitude of Things Was Owing To
or Able to Be By the First Efficient Cause pp.28-29
(Note: objections, contraries and responses omitted.)
(7) Dist. 1, Pt.2, Art.1: On the Distinction of Things
Question 2: Whether the Universe (universitas: totality)
of Things is Distinguished by a Threefold Difference,
Namely of Spiritual Substance, Corporeal [Substance]
and a [Substance] Composed of Each.
pp.30-31
(Note: objections, contraries and responses omitted.)
2
(8) Dist. 2, Pt.1, Art.1: On the Measure of the Angelic Nature in Itself
Question 1: Whether Spiritual Things Have a Proper Measure
pp.32-36
(9) Dist. 2, Pt.1, Art.1: On the Measure of the Angelic, etc.
Question 2: Whether There is One Aevum for All Aeviternal Things
pp.37-41
(10) Dist. 2, Pt.1, Art.1: On the Measure of the Angelic, etc.
Question 3: Whether Spiritual Things Have a Permanent or a Successive
Measure pp.42-46
(11)Dist. 2, Pt.1, Art.2: On the Measure of the Angelic Nature in
Comparison to the Measure of the Corporeal Thing
Question 1: Whether the Aevum Precedes Time in Some Way
pp.47-50
(12) Dist. 2, Pt.1, Art.2: On the Measure of the Angelic, etc.
Question 2: Whether There is Some Mediate Measure Between Time and
the Aevum pp.51-53
(13) Dist. 2, Pt.1, Art.2: On the Measure of the Angelic, etc.
Question 3: Whether Spiritual and Corporeal Substances
Were Created at One and the Same Time (simul) pp.54-56
(14) Dist. 3, Pt.1, Art.1: On Simplicity of Essence in Angels
Question 1: Whether Angels Are Composed of Matter and Form
pp.57-62
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 3
Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction I, Part I:
Article 1: On the Being of the Principle (De entitate
principii)
Question 1: Whether things have a causal principle.
With respect to the first one proceeds in this way.
Since it is clear according to the saints and the
philosophers that all worldly things have had a productive
principle on account of the variety of things, on account of
the mutability of things, on account of the order of things
and even on account of imperfection --- for plurality
(multitudo) has <its> origin from unity and motion or the
changeable from the immutable, and order is reduced to a
first and the imperfect is reduced to the perfect as to an
origin (originaliter) --- for this reason with this
supposed, namely that things have a causal principle in some
way, there is a question whether things are produced
completely (omnino), that is with respect to the material
principle and the formal principle, or only with respect to
one of the principles. And it seems to be that it is
according to both:
1.First, on the part of the producer in this way. The
more the producer is prior and more perfect, the more does
it pour forth into the thing (plus influit in rem):
therefore the first and most perfect pours forth the whole
and into the whole; and if this is so, it therefore produces
the whole. But the first agent is of this sort: therefore
etc.
2. Again, the agent is more noble and more perfect to
the extent that it needs fewer things to act (ad agendum),
therefore the most noble agent is in need of nothing outside
itself: therefore if it itself existed alone (si ipsum solum
esset), still it would produce things; but not from itself,
since it itself is not a part of any thing: therefore from
nothing (ex nihilo): it is clear therefore that God is able
<to bring about> the whole substance of the creature.
3. Again, the agent <which acts> according to form is
able to produce a form: therefore, by the same reasoning,
the agent <which acts> according to its whole self (secundum
se totum) is able to produce a whole; but God acts by his
whole self (se toto), since he is altogether simple:
therefore he produces the whole.
4. Again, this is itself shown on the part of the thing
created (conditae): what is not from another (ab alio), is
from itself (a se ipso); but nothing <which is> such that it
is from itself needs another so that it be (ut sit); but
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every intrinsic principle of a thing needs something else
(indiget alio) in order to be (ut sit), for form needs
matter, and the converse: therefore etc.
5. Again, the efficient and final are correlative
causes, therefore what is not from another (ab alio), is not
toward another (ad aliud) <as toward a final cause>; but all
things are toward another (ad aliud) with respect to
everything that they are, because according to everything
that they are they desire the good; and a termination is not
reached except in the highest good. And that that argument
is good is shown <in this way>. For if good and being are
convertible, then what is a being in itself (se ipso), is
good in itself; but what is good in itself, is not <so> on
account of something else; therefore, what is not from
another is not on account of another. Therefore if all
worldly things according to their totality (secundum se
tota) are on account of another (propter aliud), they are
therefore from another (ab alio).
6. Again, if the thing is not completely from another,
this is by reason of the form or by reason of the matter.
It is clear that it is not by reason of the form, because we
see that forms are produced and if forms were not produced,
then nothing at all would be produced. If by reason of the
matter; but on the contrary: as the Philosopher says in
First Philosophy (=the Metaphysics), "act is prior to
potency"; <but> it clear that it is not said of active
potency but of passive potency: therefore since the act of
the thing is from another, similarly also is the matter. If
you say that it is understood not with regard to act which
is the form but with regard to the efficient cause, the same
conclusion is reached.---And again, I ask why matter is not
from another (ab alio). If because it is a principle from
which the rest come to be and does not have <something> from
which it comes to be, then I ask concerning the form whether
it comes to be from something or from nothing. If from
nothing, by the same reasoning also is matter from nothing.
If from something, I ask what that is. <It is> not the
essence of matter; this is clear because form is simple:
therefore form does not come to be from matter in such a way
that matter is its constitutive principle. Nor does it come
to be from matter in such a way that matter comes to be
form: therefore it comes to be from something which is in
matter. Then I ask: from what is that? And it is clear that
it is not from matter by the same reasoning: therefore
either the argument will go to infinity in causation or it
is necessary to posit the essences of forms as produced from
nothing by the first artisan: therefore by the same
reasoning also matter.
1. Toward the opposite conclusion are arguments first
on the part of the efficient <cause>. The first is this:
every effect bears similarity in some way to its cause; but
the first principle is pure act, having no trace of the
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possible, <while> the matter of things however is a pure
possible through its essence, having no trace of act:
therefore since matter bears no similarity whatsoever to the
artisan, it is not from him.
2. Again, from an agent most beautiful and most
luminous the base and dark does not proceed; but God is
beauty itself and light itself, <while> the material
principle is base and dark: therefore etc.
3. From the part of things it is shown concerning the
formal principle: "For everything which is produced and
comes to be, comes to be from something similar to itself in
name and species, as man from man", according to what the
Philosopher says in the 7th Book of First Philosophy. If
therefore the forms of things are the principles of the
producer, and the principle of the producer precedes the
production of things, the things therefore are not produced
with respect to a formal principle.
4. Again, the artisan is not able to produce unless he
has foreknowledge; he cannot have foreknowledge except
through forms; he cannot have knowledge through forms which
in no way are <existing>: therefore it was impossible that
the highest artisan shape the world unless there existed
beforehand the forms through which he has knowledge; and
those could not have been similarly produced except through
forms: therefore if it is not to go into infinity, one must
posit that the forms of things are not produced.
5. Again, this is itself shown with respect to the
material principle. "Everything which is produced, is
produced from another or from nothing; but nothing is from
nothing: therefore all things are from something"; but that
is matter: therefore if one is to come to a stop and not
proceed into infinity, that is not produced. That nothing
comes from nothing seems to be the case. For the production
of a thing is an action; but every action requires
<something> on which it acts, therefore also <does> every
production: therefore for every production there must be
something as subject; <this is> nothing but matter;
therefore etc.
6. Again, I ask concerning the production or passive
creation, whether that is a substance or an accident; not a
substance, therefore an accident. But every accident is
founded in something; but this cannot be something created,
since this would naturally follow creation itself: therefore
it is necessary that it be uncreated and other than God,
because creation-passion (creatio-passio) is in another:
therefore it is necessary that everything which is produced
be produced from something; and for this reason the
Philosopher says in the first book of the Physics that
matter is ungenerated (ingenita).
Conclusion
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The world is produced from nothing, both according to its
totality and according to its intrinsic principles.
I respond: It should be said that this is true: the
world was produced in being, and not only according to its
totality but also according to its intrinsic principles
which are not from others but were produced from nothing. --
-This truth, however, even if now it is open and clear to
each of the faithful, was unknown to the prudence of the
philosophers which in the study of this question wandered
for a long time through devious paths. For there were
certain ancient philosophers who said that the world was
made by God and from his own essence, because they did not
see how something could come to be from nothing; and God
alone was in the beginning and for that reason they said
that he made all things from himself.--- But this position
appeared improbable not only to the faithful but also to the
subsequent philosophers, because the altogether invariable
and most noble essence of God would become the matter of
corporeal and variable things, which <matter> is imperfect
of itself (de se) unless perfected through form.
There were also others who said that the world was made
from preexisting principles, namely from matter and form;
but the forms were latent in matter before intellect
distinguished them. And this Anaxagoras put forth.--- But
that all forms are together in matter right reason does not
accept, for which reason that position was rejected by
subsequent philosophers.
There was a third group who held that the world was
made from preexisting principles, namely matter and form;
but they posited matter per se, the forms separate and that
after some time they were conjoined by the highest artisan.
And these were the Platonists.--- But because that seemed
irrational because matter would have been imperfect from
eternity and because this same form would be at once
separate and conjoined, and it seemed absurd to posit a
third man, namely the natural, the mathematical and the
divine, for this reason this position was also rejected by
subsequent philosophers.
There was also a fourth group, namely the Peripatetics,
the chief and leader of which was Aristotle, who (plural)
approaching closer to truth said that the world was made, as
it is read in the Meteorology: "Therefore I say that the sea
was made", and in the beginning of the On the Heavens; and
it is able to be elicited from many other texts. But they
said that it was not made from preexisting principles. For
as he indicates in the first book of the On Plants, the
world was always (semper) full of plants and animals, where
he speaks against Abrucalem (=Empedocles). However, whether
he posited matter and form to have been made form nothing,
this I do not know; nevertheless I believe that he did not
reach this, as will be seen better in the second problem:
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and for this reason he also failed, although less than the
others.
Where, however, the skill of the philosophers fails, to
our assistance comes Holy Scripture which says that all
things were created and produced in being according to
everything that they are. And the argument from faith
however is not discordant, as was shown above in the
opposing section.
1. What therefore is objected concerning similitude,
that matter is a being altogether in potency, <to that> it
should be said that matter was not made on account of itself
(propter se) but on account of the forbearance of form,
which is its act; although therefore matter is not similar
to God in act, nevertheless it is able to be assimilated <to
him> through form. Whence Augustine says that matter
itself, even if it does not have of itself and in itself the
act of the form, nevertheless that very capacity for form
belongs to it in the place of form (ipsa tamen capacitas
formae est ei pro forma). For this reason that is clear.
2. What is objected, that base etc., <to that> it
should be said that it is not called base or dark except
comparatively. For matter is no pure privation, but rather
of its essence it has something of beauty and something of
light. Whence Augustine says that it has mode, species and
order (modum, speciem et ordinem), although imperfectly.
However it is not necessary that God produce all things
equally similar to himself, but rather according to grade.
And for this reason for this--that there are perfect grades-
-it is necessary to posit something near to God and this is
most similar; and something near to nothing, and this is in
some way similar, although not altogether nor perfectly,
because, although it has in itself the least of good,
nevertheless it has been ordered for the best.
3.4. To the objection that everything which is produced
is produced through something similar in form, and is known
similarly, it should be said that there is the agent
according to nature and the agent according to intellect.
The agent according to nature produces through forms, which
are true natures (vere naturae), as man <through> man, and
ass <through> ass; the agent through intellect produces
through forms which are not something of the thing, but
ideas in the mind, as the artisan produces the box; and in
this way things have been produced and in this way the forms
of things are eternal, because they are God. And if Plato
held this, he should be commended, and in this way Augustine
understands him. If however he proceeded further, as
Aristotle understands him, without doubt he erred and his
argument which was given above, makes no sense at all
(omnino nihil cogit). For as the Philosophers shows, the
forms of things outside of God <and> separate from singulars
serve no purpose at all whether with respect to operation or
with respect to cognition.
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5. To the last objection concerning matter, namely that
matter cannot come to be because either it is from something
or from nothing, it should be said that it is from nothing
(ex nihilo) and this is through creation.--- To the
objection that action is on something, it should be said
that to create is not to act (creare non est agere), but to
make (facere) and this is how to act and to make differ (et
hoc refert inter agere et facere); for [nam agere in quid,
non quid agat exigit; facere autem e converso: NOTE: I seem
to be a bit confused on the translation of this, but the
sense is that what acts (agere) on a thing requires that the
subject already be there, while what makes (facere) a thing
does not.]
6. To what is asked in the last place in which there is
creation-passion (creatio-passio), one responds in two ways.
Some say that it is neither a substance nor an accident, but
a way toward both; and such precedes that for which it is
naturally, although it has being in it.--- On the other
hand, others say that for something to be created is nothing
but for it now first to be; and creation doe not mean some
nature mediate between God and creature, but only indicates
the being of the thing (esse rei), in connoting an order to
the first efficient cause from which <it is> and <an order>
to non-being, in such a way nevertheless that that order is
completely in the created thing, and not in nothing. Whence
when it is said that something comes to be from nothing, it
can be understood in three ways: materially, as a knife from
iron; or causally as son from father; or in terms of order
(ordinaliter), as noon from the morning. It is true with the
first two modes that nothing comes to be from nothing; but
in the third mode it is true according to nature (secundum
naturam), but false above nature (supra naturam). For
through infinite power which does not need the support of
matter, something is as easily able to be produced from
nothing, as from something; otherwise the power of the first
principle would not be infinite, but would require the
foundation of matter; and for this reason to that power
alone should this be necessarily attributed, although
nothing similar can be found in any created thing. For this
is peculiar to him, as also <is> his omnipotence.
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Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction I, Part I
Article 2: On the Unity of the Principle
Consequently it is asked about the unity of the
principle. Concerning which two things are asked. First,
whether things have been produced in being by many
principles.
Secondly, given that <they have been produced in being> by
one principle, whether that <principle> produced all things
by itself (a se ipso) or through the mediation of another
(an mediante alio).
Question 1
Whether Things Have Been Produced in Being (in esse) by many
principles (a pluribus principiis)
That things have been produced by many principles say
the Manicheans who posited that there is one principle of
spiritual and incorporeal or invisible things and another of
corporeal and corruptible or visible things; and they call
the first the God of light <and> the second they call the
God of darkness. And it seems that their position is
correct and Catholic (vera et catholica):
Through sacred Scripture. John 18 <,36>: My kingdom
is not of this world, says the very King of glory and the
God of light: therefore that visible world does not concern
(pertain to: spectat) the God of light: therefore it was not
fashioned by him.
2. Again, John 14 <,30>: The prince of this world
comes. Moreover, John in 12 <,4> calls the devil prince of
this world; and that one is the God of darkness: therefore
it seems etc.
3. Again, the apostle in 2nd Corinthians 4 and To the
Ephesians 2 calls the devil the God of this world; but no
one merits to be called the God of something unless of that
which he fashioned: therefore etc. They adduce many other
authorities from Scripture; but with these solved others
also are solved.
4. Again, by arguments they prove that very thing in
this way: "causes are opposites of opposites"; but spiritual
and corporeal things have repugnance <with respect to one
another>. Whence <we find in> To the Romans 7 <,23>: I see
another law in my members repugnant to the law of my mind,
and To the Galatians 5 <,17>: The flesh is covetous against
the spirit etc. Again, the new and old Testament<s> are at
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odds, as is clear in Matthew 5 <,21>, because there things
directly contrary are taught, as to judge and not to judge,
to kill and not to kill. Therefore it is necessary to posit
two first principles, one spiritual and the other corporeal,
one of the old Testament, the other of the new.
5. Again, "what is always the same in disposition is
naturally constituted to as to act in the same way."
Therefore, since God is uniformly disposed so as to be good,
he similarly always acts in the same fashion. Therefore,
since he is the cause of production, he will not be the
cause of destruction or corruption: therefore corruptible
things are from another principle.
6. The third argument is: everything which the good God
makes is good; everything which is good should be loved and
nothing at all which he makes should be detested; but this
world should be detested and spurned; similarly also the
carnal life, according to 1 John 2 <,15>: Do not wish to
love the world; and again John 12 <,25>: He who loves his
life loses it: therefore etc.
To the contrary however are arguments and authorities.
1. In John 1 <,3> it is said concerning the Word: All
things have been made through him; but the Word is the good
God: therefore etc. If you say that he does not apportion
all things for the visible things; <I say> on the contrary:
there follows immediately after: the world was made
through him and the world did not know him. It is clear
<then> that concerning this world it is said etc.
2. Again, in the last chapter of Matthew <verse 18>:
All power in heaven and on the earth was given to me, says
the good God: therefore it was given either justly or
unjustly. If justly, then they are his heaven and earth and
he made <them>. If unjustly, then it seems that the good God
himself unjustly usurped something foreign to himself and
thus that he has been unjust.
3. Again, that the fashioner (conditor: creator) of
visible things was the one who gave the old Testament. The
proof: in Acts 13 Paul says: Men, brothers, the God of our
people chose our ancestors. And later: The rulers who
inhabit Jerusalem, while ignorant and passing judgment,
implemented this. But that was the God of light: therefore
etc.
4. Again, it is shown by arguments: Everything good and
beautiful is from the good God; but all visible things are
good and beautiful: therefore etc. The proof: they are
either good or evil. If good, <then> I have the proposition
<here put forth>; if evil, then the corruption of these is
good: therefore the corruption is from the good God since
every good thing is form him: therefore etc.
5. Again, whatever things are conjoined must be
conjoined through something they have in common (in quo
communicant); but what differ with regard to <their> first
principles have nothing in common: if therefore the soul and
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the body are conjoined, it is necessary that they be
produced by the same God; but the soul is from the God of
light: therefore etc.
6. Again, I ask about those two principles how they are
related to one another: for they have either peace or war --
- for I do not see how it can be otherwise --- but the God
of light cannot be at war, since in him is the highest peace
and quiescence: the God of darkness, since in him there is
omnifaceted wickedness, cannot be quiescent: therefore it
seems that they are neither at war nor quiescent.
Conclusion
The error of the Manicheans, that the first principles of
things are two is rejected both by faith and by reason (a
ratione)
I respond: It should be said that the question of a
plurality of principles can be understood in three ways and
it should be handled in different places according to this.
For it can be asked whether there are many principles each
of which is good; and that has its determination in the
first book where it was asked concerning the unity of the
divine essence. Nevertheless it can be asked whether there
are many principles in such a way that one is good to the
highest degree and another evil to the ultimate degree, such
that from one is all that is good and from the other all
that is evil; and that has its determination in the tractate
on evil; for <the answer to> this question cannot be known
unless first it is known what evil is. It can also be asked
whether there are many principles one of which is the
principle of incorruptible and spiritual things and the
other is the principle of corruptible and visible things;
and this has its determination now where it is asked
concerning the going out of things into being (de exitu
rerum in esse).
To this question, however, it should be said that that
error about the positing of two principles not only is
against the faith but also is against reason to the extent
that I <can> hardly believe that a man who knew anything of
philosophy either would either put forth or defend this
error. --- Nevertheless that error is the worst because it
simulates some kind of piety. For it seems to attribute to
the good God things good, beautiful and noble, and to
another principle other things. For this reason it more
secretly steals into and more disgraces the church of God
and because it is also more able to be grasped by the simple
folk and to be conceived by false imagination. --- And on
that worst error concerning the multitude of principles
there follow errors innumerable and most vain, as is known
to those who are familiar with the sect of the Manicheans,
as concerning oath-taking, matrimony, homicide and many
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other things, which all have their condemnations through
Scripture.
However, all philosophy condemns the head and chief
error, that there are two first principles: because the
order of the universe is destroyed when this is posited,
also because divine power is limited from this so that it
cannot produce corporeal things, and also because from this
the divine essence is posited as able to be circumscribed
(:limited) so that it is only in the region of light; and if
these things are true God is not God and there is nothing
good.
1.2.3. To the authorities which they adduce it should
be said that the world is taken in a twofold fashion in
Scripture, namely for worldly devotion to this life (pro
mundana conversatione) which is vane and worldly, and for
the worldly creature. According to the first way it is
condemned as evil in Scripture and is not said to be from
God, because sin is not from God, as will be clear
elsewhere; according to the second way it is commended as
good and beautiful, as it is said in Genesis 1 <,31>: God
saw all the things which he had made and they were
altogether good, and according to this way it is from God.
According to this distinction the things objected are
solved. For when it is said that the kingdom of Christ is
not of this world it is understood concerning worldly
devotion to this life (de mundana conversatione), because he
does not govern in evils but in good things the pursuit
(conversatio) of which is in heaven. Similarly, when it is
said that the devil is the prince and God of the world,
it is understood concerning those living in a worldly and
secular way. --- Therefore it is clear that the foolish and
impius Manichean was deceived because he did not know how to
make <appropriate> distinctions. And again, he erred in the
inference of conclusions; for it does not follow: he is the
leader (princeps), therefore <also> creator (conditor); for
if it were to follow, since the king of France is the leader
of France, he therefore made it (:France). One who argues
thus is judged foolish; <and> certainly the Manichean argued
much more foolishly. Again, it does not follow: he is God,
therefore creator. For if so, when it is said in To the
Philippians 3 <,19>: Whose God is the belly, therefore the
belly created those. Therefore this reasoning is foolish,
wherefore also the Manicheans.
4. To the objection that the contraries of contraries
are causes, that is understand concerning proximate
intrinsic causes --- for concerning the extrinsic cause it
is not true --- and for this reason, because he does not
know enough to make the distinction, the worst Manichean was
deceived. And that it is so is clear. For if the
contraries of contraries are the first producing causes, as
were the principles so too are the genera of contrarieties:
therefore one God made the warm and another the cold, and
thus concerning other contrarieties. If someone were to
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argue in this fashion, he would be one who should be derided
by all; how much more <then> the most foolish Manichean!
Nevertheless when it is said that the flesh is contrary
to the spirit, it should be said that the name of flesh
sometimes is taken for nature, as in To the Ephesians 5
<,29>: No one ever had hatred for his own flesh; and thus
it is not contrary, but rather they are bound by an
extraordinary love. It is also taken for vice and
corruption; nevertheless he does not have a contrary cause
because it does not have an efficient cause, but rather a
deficient one.
5. To the objection that the same is similarly related
etc., it should be said that something is an agent which
acts by itself (se ipso); and that which is diversified by
producing diverse things is impossible; rather it produces
many things at one and the same time. The agent which acts
through something other than itself is one thing and that
which is diversified (variatur) in bringing about diverse
things is another. God however is an agent in the first way
and not in the second. And because the Manichean did not
understand this, he posited diverse principles and diverse
law-givers, since he sees diversity in the laws and in
things. --- And that he was foolishly moved is clear through
a sensible example (sensibiliter). For we see that the same
artisan through the same art of housebuilding makes the
court yard and the drain; is it necessary to find two
artisans to make these? Again, the same physician according
to the same art of medicine applies diverse treatments for
the same illness according to different states and he gives
diverse and contrary orders according to the diversities of
those ill; but that physician would be foolish who were to
give and order always the same treatments. If therefore the
state were diverse of people making a beginning
(incipientium), as the Jews, and of men of the Gospel, what
prohibits that diverse and contrary things be taught at the
same time? Nevertheless contraries are not understood in a
spiritual way.
6. To the last objection there has already been a
solution because the vice of the worldly should be hated but
the creature loved, and in this God should be praised; and
all creatures praise God and are good. And these are
sufficient.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 14
Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction I, Part I
Article 2: On the Unity of the Principle
Question 2
Whether the First Principle Produced All Things
by Himself or through the Mediation of Another
Secondly, on the supposition that all things are from
one principle, it is asked whether that <principle> produced
all things by himself or through the mediation of another.
1. And that <it is> through the mediation of another
seems to make good sense (videtur congruum). For it is of
the liberality of the agent that it not only communicate act
to another but also the potency (power: potentia) for
multiplying and diffusing; but God is the most liberal of
agents: therefore it seems that to the first creature which
he made he will have given the power of making another, and
that gives to another, and thus with a procession up to the
last. If you say that the creature is not capable of such
potency, <I say> on the contrary: it is greater to make
something when there is resistence than where there is none;
but the creature has resistence in making from a contrary,
while in making from nothing there is no resistence:
therefore if it is capable of the first potency, <it is>
also <capable> of the second.
2. Again, it is of the nobility of the agent to do
works more noble through himself and less noble things
through a minister, as is clear --- for it is fit for the
king to judge but not fit for him to do the cooking ---
therefore if the first king is the most noble and produces
things, according as is fit for his nobility, it seems that
he ought to produce one and through that <to produce> the
less noble things, and thus in a way proceeding up to the
last. If you say that is not similar concerning God and
some created agent because God is not perfected by some
work, it is objected that the work of ruling, propagation
and governing is divine <in character> and nevertheless God
rules and governs one creature through another; and this is
to evidence his nobility: why <then> does he not similarly
create?
3. Again, it is objected that it is necessary that it
be thus: every effect which goes out (:proceeds) from a some
universal cause, goes out from it either through another
proper cause or through itself as the appropriated <cause>;
but God is the most universal cause, not able to be limited
or appropriated, since no addition to him can come to be:
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 15
therefore since he produces many things, he produces through
another proper cause.
4. Again, I see that the power (virtus) of unity is
<applicable> to infinite numbers; nevertheless unity
produces no number unless it is equally produced by a number
which immediately follows it, namely by duality --- whence
in no way does unity make a number containing three except
through duality, and thus does it proceed in others ---
therefore it seems similar<ly the case> that a multitude of
things not proceed from God since he is one to the highest
degree, unless through the things themselves.
But on the contrary: 1. It seems that that does not
make good sense (non sit congruum). To the extent that a
man receives from another, to that extent is he bound to him
(ei tenetur); but to God alone is the creature totally bound
--- for man ought to love God alone with his whole heart,
and nothing else equally --- therefore God alone gives the
totality. But creation is an action in which the totality is
produced: therefore etc.
2. Again, it is greater to produce a thing from non-
being to being than to conserve and perfect <it>: therefore
if God were to produce things by the mediation of another,
it would seem that he conserves and perfects by the
mediation of another: therefore in no way would things need
God nor would they therefore tend toward God. But all things
are good because they tend toward him and are ordered:
therefore nothing would be good or ordered; for in that in
which there is chiefly the notion of the end there is the
notion of the good.
3. Again, it seems that it is impossible. It is
impossible that the creature act according to its whole self
(agere se tota), since it is not altogether simple;
therefore it is impossible that it act as a whole, therefore
<it acts> as a part only.
4. Again, it impossible that the creature act through
an infinite power; but between what is altogether nothing
and what is something there is infinite distance: therefore
it can be reduced <to actuality> only by an agent of
infinite power: such however is God alone: therefore etc.
Conclusion
God immediately produced all things.
I respond: It should be said that to posit that God
produced things through another agent is against truth and
faith, but only <correct when one understands it> through
his Son: For he spoke and they were made; not only is it
against faith but it is also truly against reason.
And for one positing all things to have been produced
from nothing it is altogether against reason so much so that
it cannot be grasped how an agent of finite power produces
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 16
anything from nothing. Nor do I believe that any of the
philosophers posited this.
But on the supposition of a potential or material
principle, there were many philosophers who posited order in
the production with a descending gradation in this way: God,
since he is altogether simple, [and] whose act is to
understand, produced only a first and unique intelligence.
But that, on account of its being distant from the first
understood itself and the first, and thus in some way was
composed and thus produced its sphere and the intelligence
of the second sphere; and as there is order in the
production so too in the illumination. --- But that error
has a false foundation, namely that the material principle
has not been produced, as was proven above (art.1,q.1).
Again, it has a false argument. For he says that, because
God is most simple, he produces only one thing; but this is
rather indicative of the opposite, because the more simple a
thing is, the more powerful it is, and the more powerful,
the more is it able to bring about a plurality: therefore if
God is the most simple, then he is able to act by himself
alone without mediary. Moreover, this argument is repugnant
to them. For it on account of simplicity he produces only
one, since the second intelligence is the more simple among
all the rest, whence come in its sphere the greater variety
of stars than in some one of the inferior spheres? Because
it seems through their argument that they would be uniform;
and thus the argument of the position contradicts the
position.
Owing to this it should be said, as our faith says,
that all things have been produced immediately by God in the
first <moment of> creation (in prima conditione). For that
creation is of the whole substance according to the whole,
for this reason it was fitting to belong to God alone and
was not able to be characteristic of another or through
another, as the arguments brought forth for this part prove.
1.2. To the objection concerning liberality and
nobility it should be said that as liberality so too does
nobility suppose an order and possibility in act. However,
in the act of creation order is not relevant; for it is of
equal power and dignity to produce an ass from nothing and
an angel <from nothing>, because each is of infinite
potency. For there is not even the possibility of a
creature in this act, as was seen, on account of infinity.
It is not so concerning the act of ordering and propagation;
for this reason it is clear that it is not similar.
To the objection that the creature is capable because
it does not a resisting <force>, it should be said that (in
contrariis resistentia confert ad operationem) .........
............ ......... .......
Moreover, it will be the case that what impedes
nevertheless has provided help, namely the foundation and
the desire of matter; but in creation it has no help; for
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 17
this reason it is more difficult; for this reason there is
no ground for the minor (ideo non est locus a minori) as it
clear.
3. To the objection that the universal cause is not
able to bring about proper (:particular) effects, it should
be said that the universal cause which is not pure act
requires the actuality of a particular cause; but that which
is altogether act has at once in itself the notion of the
universal cause and of the particular <cause>, because it
has at once primacy and actuality: for this reason it is
able to bring about many things and is able to bring those
about in totality (secundum totum).
4. To the last objection that unity cannot come about
for posterior numbers without prior <numbers>, it should be
said that in the point is there neither in any way at all
potency active and sufficient for <creating> the line nor in
unity for number. For unity itself is a potency for all
number, not a potency sufficient per se, and for this reason
<it is> in no way at all actual, but rather in some way
passive since it is part of number. God however is able to
bring about all things by a potency altogether active and
for this reason he is able to create all things without any
mediate thing.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 18
Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction I, Part I
Article 3: On Production itself or Creation.
With the completion of the discussion of the being and
quiddity of the producing principle (Viso de entitate et
quidditate principii producentis), this third <article> asks
about the very production which is called creation.
Concerning this two things are asked. The first is, whether
it means (indicates: dicat) some change (mutationem
aliquam). The second is, whether it indicates some mediate
thing between the Creator and the creature.
Question 1
Whether Creation Means Change
(Utrum creatio mutationem dicat).
It seems that it means a change:
1. First by the authority of Augustine, in the 20th
Book of the City of God: "All things which have been created
are mutable because they were made from nothing"; if
therefore what is able to be created is mutable, then what
has been created is something that has changed, and creation
is a change. If you say that it is mutable because it is
able to fall into nothingness, and not because it has been
produced, <then one can say> on the contrary: as to be
destroyed means the way (viam) of falling into non-being
(non-esse), so to be created <means the way of falling> into
being (esse): if therefore destruction involves the positing
of a change, therefore by similar reasoning production also
<does>.
2. Again, creation is an action (creatio est actio);
but "every action is in a motion, and every motion in an
action (omnis actio est in motu, et omnis motus in actu)":
therefore he who creates truly acts: therefore he truly
moves (causes motion: movet). If you say that divine action
is the substance rather than an action, and such is
creation; there is an objection concerning passion (being
acted upon: passione), because to be created belongs to the
creature itself. If therefore the creature is truly
susceptible of passion and change, then creation-passion
(creatio-passio) is a change.
3. Again, by John Damascene, who is a philosopher and a
theologian, "Everything which begins to be by a change has a
tendency toward change" (NOTE: This is a paraphrasing
translation of: "Omne quod a versione incipit, in versionem
tendit."), is said concerning creation, therefore according
to him creation is a change (creatio est versio); but every
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 19
change (versio) is a change (mutatio), as he himself says in
the same place: created things are mutable (mutabilia)
because they are changeable (vertibilia): therefore creation
is a change.
4. Again, to the extent that some things are more
distant, to that extent is the change and variation in
traveling (in perveniendo) from one to the other; but being
and non-being are distant to the highest degree: therefore
since in creation being comes to be from non-being, creation
is most truly a change.
5. Again, a thing is changed more when it takes up a
new form than when it acquires a new place; and again still
more when it acquires a substantial form than when it
acquires an accidental disposition: therefore when the whole
is received and accepted de novo, then it is changed to the
maximal degree. But this is <what happens> in creation:
therefore there there truly is change (mutatio).
6. Again, if creation means an action free of all
change (si creatio dicat actionem absque omni mutatione),
<it is> therefore free of all time; and such things be
present and are present in God from eternity; therefore it
seems that God has produced things from eternity.
1. In opposition <to this> the Master says, and it is
said in the Scripture: "When we say that God makes
something, we do not understand there to be some motion
present in <his> operation". If you say that creation-action
(creatio-actio) does not mean (or:indicate) motion, but only
creation-passion, <it is stated> on the contrary that the
same thing remains signified in the active and the passive,
as the grammarian says, as of the direct and indirect: if
therefore in action motion is not indicated then neither is
it in passion.
2. Again, to be changed is to be disposed otherwise now
than before; but what is created is not disposed otherwise
now than before, because it never was disposed otherwise
than as it is disposed in creation --- for it never was in
any way nor was it disposed in any fashion, nor therefore
<was it> otherwise than now -- therefore it does not change
when it is created: therefore creation is not a change.
3. Again, the unchangeable is what is disposed (se
habet) in the same way now and before: therefore the mutable
<is> what is disposed otherwise, since it is its opposite;
but the created is not disposed otherwise now than before,
because before it was disposed in no way whatsoever:
therefore it has not been changed: therefore creation is not
a change.
4. Again, every motion and change is a perfection of
being in potency"; but creation is in no way <the
perfection> of a being: therefore creation is neither a
motion nor a change. The first is clear from the
Philosopher, the second from the Master.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 20
5. Again, every change is founded on something
changeable; but creation does require that there be some
prior changeable thing, because every changeable is brought
into being through creation: therefore creation is not a
change.
6. Again, if creation is a change, then either <it is>
accidental or substantial. <It is> not accidental because
then only accidents would be created; but neither is it
substantial because then it would be generation or
corruption. If you say that it is contained under neither
of these species, one objects that, not only according to
the Philosopher but also according to Augustine, "every
motion is either to a place or to a form"; but creation is
rightly and properly toward (NOTE: here: with respect to)
matter: therefore it seems that it is not a change.
7. Again, God generates from so much power as he
creates, because he does both through infinite power; but
God is able to generate with any change on his part or even
on the part of the generated person: therefore by the same
reasoning he is able to create without any change on his
part or on the part of the creature; or, if not, I ask, why
not?
Conclusion
Creation is a change, but one distinct from natural change.
I respond: It should be said that there is one
production in which the product is otherwise disposed now
and before, because according to something of itself it was
before under one disposition and now it is under another;
and such is the production which is from a material
principle, as natural generation. There is another sort of
production in which the product is in every way disposed now
and in no way before; and such is the production which is
from nothing. There is a third production in which the
product is altogether equally disposed now and before, if
nevertheless there is the ability to say before in this
case; and such is the generation of the Son from eternity.
For he proceeds thus from eternity as now. --- The first has
the sense (rationem) of motion and change and production: of
motion by reason of the preparation of matter which comes to
be through accidental dispositions, and this requires
succession and time; of change by reason of of a going out
into being or of the reception of substantial form which
comes to be in an instant; of production by reason of the
fact that it does not have that form from itself but from
another efficient cause (ab alio effectivo). ---The second
lacks the notion of motion, but nevertheless has the notion
of change and production. It lacks the notion of motion
because, since it does not have matter, no disposition is
able to precede <it>. --- The third lacks the notion of
motion and change, but nevertheless has the notion of
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 21
production. It lacks the notion of motion and change
because it is neither from a material principle nor from
nothing; but nevertheless it is from something and is
eternally from it.
It should therefore be conceded that production of the
creature is a change; and the arguments for this should be
conceded, although some seem sophistic.
1. Therefore to the objection that it is without motion
it should be said that that is understood without the motion
of the agent, nevertheless not without a change of the
product. For if, as the Philosopher says, the soul, when it
moves the body, remains immobile, how much more does God
when he creates and changes all things, "He himself
remaining stable, he gives change to all things ("ipse
stabilis manens dat cuncta mutari")---. If therefore one
would object that the active and the passive verb signify
the same thing, it should be said that it is false because
action and passion are diverse genera; nevertheless in
conjugation one is placed next to the other because
according to the formation of the word one comes from the
other.
2. To the objection that to be changed is to be
disposed otherwise (i.e. differently) now and before, it
should be said that that is not the general notion of that
which is changed or of change, but of natural change alone.
3. Therefore to the objection that the immutable is
what is disposed in the same fashion and the mutable is what
is disposed otherwise, it should be said that this is a
consequent (i.e. fallacy of the consequent), because if the
mutable and the immutable are opposed, as privation and
possession[disposition:hexis] (privatio et habitus), and the
immutable is what is disposed in the same fashion, then the
mutable or the changed is what is not disposed in the same
fashion. But this has reasons for its truth: because it is
disposed in no way with respect to the prior and the
posterior, or <because it is> in no way prior and in some
way posterior and such that <it is not> in the same fashion,
or because it is altogether otherwise disposed before and
otherwise after: and for this reason, since <one arguing in
this way> proceeds from many causes of truth to one, he errs
according to the consequent.
4.5.6. The response to the next three arguments is
clear because all proceed from natural change which requires
the preexistence of matter and being in potency, and which
is generation; however, creation in such a fashion is not a
change, but rather <is> above this change; whence it is able
to be called a supernatural change (supernaturalis mutatio).
And if you ask whether there is a change toward form or
toward place, I say that it is to the complete substance of
the thing, and thus toward the form and through this under
<the notion of> change to(ward) form it can be comprehended.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 22
7. Regarding what is asked concerning the generation of
the Son it should be said that it is not similar: for
although each is from an equal power, nevertheless creation
is from nothing. But "from" (ex) cannot mean identity or
causality, therefore <it must mean> order: therefore what
comes to be from nothing has being after nothing and so
after non-being (ergo fieri ex nihilo habet esse post nihil,
et ita post non-esse): therefore it is disposed now in some
fashion in which it was not disposed before; and for this
reason change or inception (mutatio...vel inceptio) is
necessarily posited through production from nothing.
However, the Son is from the substance of the Father through
identity and it is not necessary that he have an order to
non-being: therefore he is able to be eternally and so to be
produced without beginning and change (initio et mutatione).
Whence the production of a thing does not involve the
necessary positing of a a beginning (incohationem) of the
thing, but production from nothing necessarily does posit
<it>; and for this reason creation includes change, but
generation of the Son <does> not at all.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 23
Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction I, Part I
Article 3: On Production itself or Creation.
Question 2
Whether creation indicates something mediate
between the Creator and the creature.
Secondly it is asked whether creation indicates
something mediate between Creator and creature (utrum
creatio dicat medium inter Creatorem et creaturam).
And it seems that it is so.
1. As to be generated (generari) is related to to have
been generated (generatum esse) and to be made (fieri) to to
have been made (factum esse), so too <is> to be created
(creari) <related> to to have been created (creatum esse);
but to be made (fieri) is mediate between the maker
(facientem) and the made (factum), and to be generated
(generari) <is mediate> between the generator and the
generated (inter generantem et generatum): therefore etc.
2. Again, in all created beings "what is (quod est) and
that by which it is (quo est: or, that by virtue of which it
is) differ," even formally: therefore similarly that by
which it is created (quo creatur) and what is created (quod
creatur) differ. But what is created is the creature; that
by which it is created is formally the creation: therefore
creation differs from the creature, and similarly creation-
passion (creatio-passio) differs from the Creator: therefore
it is between both.
3. Again, what passes away is not the same as what
perseveres; but the to be created of a thing is in an
instant and no more: therefore since the being of the
creature endures and remains after creation, then to be
created and to be (creari et esse) differ, therefore also
creation and creature.
4. Again, every change (mutatio) is a way (via: path)
and every way differs from the termination <of that way>,
because nothing is terminated at itself; if therefore
creation is a change and has the creature for <its>
termination point (pro termino), then it differs from the
creature as the way <differs> from the termination point.
But the way falls in the middle between the extremes:
therefore etc.
5. Again, per impossibile: if creation is the creature,
and every creature is created, then creation is created; but
everything which is created is created through a mediate
creation: therefore creation [is created] through another
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 24
creation, and thus successively up to infinity. If
therefore one is not to go to infinity, it is clear etc.
On the contrary: 1. The Philosopher <says in> the On
Causes, "The first of created things is being (Prima rerum
creatarum est esse)"; but nothing(-ness: nihil) on the part
of the creature is before to be created: therefore to be
created is nothing but to be (ergo creari non est aliud quam
esse), therefore neither is creation other than essence
(ergo nec creatio quam essentia): therefore there is no
difference between creation and the creature (ergo nulla est
differentia creationis ad creaturam).
2. Again, between being from another (ens ab alio) and
<being> not from another there is no middle; but everything
which is not from another is the Creator <himself>, while
everything which is essentially from another (ab alio
essentialiter) is a creature: therefore there is no middle
between these.
3. Again, it is shown per impossibile. The creature
bears a reference to the Creator, either by itself or
through another. If through another, it is asked concerning
that whether it is referred <only> to itself or to another,
and thus it proceeds into infinity. But if it is referred
to itself -- but is referred through creation -- then
creation is not other than the creature.
4. Again, if creation is something mediate (medium)
between Creator and creature, then either <it is> eternal or
temporal. But if eternal, then something other than God is
eternal; if temporal, then there is something temporal
before every creature. However, each of these is heretical
to say and has been condemned at the Senonens Council on
ideas which were put forth by certain people regarding
<realities> mediate between God and things.
5. Again, this can be seen to be shown by proportion.
For as the Creator is related to the creature, so <is>
creation-action (creatio-actio) <related> to creation-
passion: therefore, by converted proportion, as the Creator
is related to active creation, so too is the creature to
passive creation; but the Creator does not differ in reality
(secundum rem) from creation-action (a creatione-actione):
therefore etc.
Conclusion
Creation-action (Creatio-actio) is something mediate
(medium) between the Creator and creature only according to
the reasoning of the understanding; creation-passion
(creatio-passio) is in reality (secundum rem) nothing but
the creature, nor <is there> something mediate between it
and God according to essence, but <only> according to reason
and relation.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 25
I respond: It should be said that one can speak of
creation-action (creatione-actione) and of creation-passion
(creatione-passione). If we speak of creation-action, I say
thus that there is no medium according to reality, but only
according to the reasoning of the understanding, for the
reason that God, since he is simple in the highest degree,
is his action. If however we speak of creation-passion,
then one should make distinctions because through the name
of creation everything which is from another can be
signified and implied, such a way that it has being after
complete non-being (omnino non-esse). And in this way in the
name of the creature creation itself is encompassed, since
creature not only names the things created but also those
con-created; and thus it is not some middle thing either in
reality or according to reason. In another way creature
names the very substance of the thing produced from nothing
by something; and in this way creation holds a middle place
not according to reality and nature, but according to reason
and relation.
Nevertheless that argument does not indicate nothing,
but rather it does not indicate something diverse in essence
from the creature. For this is clear thus. For <while>
creation is said to be from nothing (de nihilo),
nevertheless creation is said to be by God; whence it
indicates its relation to preceding non-being and to what
produces its being (ad suum esse producens) from the notion
of its name. For to be created does not signify being
principally, but rather the going out from non-being into
being, and this is by something (et hoc ab aliquo).
If therefore it is asked what is the relation which is
implied in the comparison to non-being, it should be said
that that relation is called change (illa habitudo dicitur
mutatio). --- And if you ask what this change is, I say that
it is nothing but the thing itself. --- And this is clear
because there is change to being and change from being and
change in being. Change to being does not posit anything
except on the part of the term; change from being does not
posit anything except on the part of the principle; <and>
change in being posits on the part of both; and for this
reason to be changes in the first mode is nothing other than
first to be now. Change in the second mode is nothing other
than now to be at an end (nunc ultimo esse); and for this
reason it does not posit something other in reality but only
according to intention. But change in being has each
extreme and a subject which is prior by nature to the term.
For this reason such a change can be a nature preceding the
term and diverse from that according to reality, although it
is not a complete being in act. --- And for this reason thus
creation is not something mediate between Creator and
creature, as generation <is mediate> between generator and
generated. Therefore when one speaks of a comparison to non-
being, it indicates some mediate thing diverse according to
essence but according to reason.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 26
Similarly when one speaks of a comparison to the
Creator. For relation is threefold: one which is founded on
an accidental property, as some are called similar because
white; one which is founded on essential dependence, as the
comparison of matter to form; <and> one which <is founded>
on natural origin. The first relation adds something else
through the essence; the third relation <is> nothing but
being purely (pure esse), as it clear in divine matters; the
middle relation indicates something which is in some way the
same and in some way other. --- Creation however indicates a
relation according to the middle mode, since the creature
itself is essentially and totally dependent on the creature.
And for this reason it must be conceded that creation
is nothing different according to reality from the creature,
nor <is there> a mediate thing between it and God according
to essence, but rather <only> according to reason and
relation; whence to be created is prior by nature to to be
(esse), though not in duration. Nevertheless creation-
action is more the same with the creating <agent> than is
creation passion with the creature (Plus tamen est idem
creatio-actio cum creante quam creatio-passio cum creatura),
because there there is no difference except according to our
mode of receiving (secundum modum nostrum accipiendi); this
however is a difference of reason and also of relation,
which does not make for diversity through essence, because
that relation is essential. One should judge similarly
concerning essential unity, goodness <and> truth.
With these things seen, the things objected are obvious
<in their solution>. For the arguments proving that there
is no true mediate thing according to reality should be
conceded.
1. To the objection concerning to be generated and to
have been generated, it is clear <what> I respond from the
things said <above>, because generation is not according to
the whole (secundum totum), but rather something preexists
the generating, the perfection (entelichia) of which is the
generation itself preceding the form itself by nature, and
through this marks the diversity. Not so <is> creation
according to which the whole substance of the thing comes to
be immediately by the divine power, which creates the thing
by willing it first to be when it is not.
2. To the objection that what and by which differ
(differt quod et quo), it should be said that that is not a
difference through essence but rather in a certain way there
is a difference and in a certain way there is similarity
(sed quodam modo differt, quodam modo convenit). --- Or it
should be said that it is not similar because creation
comprises the whole substance of the thing which is said to
consist of that by which it is and what is (quae constare
dicitur ex quo est et quod est).
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 27
3. To the objection that it passes away (transit), it
should be said that it does not pass away by reason of the
fact that it is submitted to its signification (ratione eius
quod significationi suae substernitur: my translation is
obviously deficient), but rather by reason of what is
connoted (sed ratione connotati); this is clear. For if to
be created is now first to be (nunc primo esse), then to be
created ends not by reason of the fact that it posits, but
rather by reason of an immediate comparison to nothing(-
ness) (desinit creari non ratione eius quod ponit, sed
ratione immediatae collationis ad nihilum).
4. To the objection that change is a way, it should be
said that the change which has two extremes is that which
necessarily differs from the term, each of which is a change
in being; but the change which had only being as the
ultimate extreme cannot indicate a middle thing but by
necessity it is requisite that it hold itself with one of
the extremes.
5. To the objection that every creature is created, it
should be said that it is true concerning a creature
properly so called; if however it is said in a wider sense,
not only is the creature called what is created, but what is
con-created and what is annexed to the creature; and by this
mode it is creation. --- If therefore it is asked how it
can be, it should be said that .......... .............
.......... ............. .......... (quod in primis est
status), as was touched on earlier. Whence, as unity which
makes a subject one is not one by another unity, thus
neither is the creation by which a substance comes out into
being produced or con-created through another creation.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 28
Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction I, Part II
Article 1: On the Distinction of Things
Question 1
Whether the Multitude of Things Was Owing to or
Able to Be by the First Efficient <Cause>.
((NOTE: For the present I omit the objections, contraries
and responses to them.))
Conclusion
The multitude of things is by one principle because it is
the principle both first and uniquely one.
I respond: For the understanding of the aforementioned
it should be noted that if it is asked concerning an
intrinsic principle, whence the multitude of things comes,
chiefly according to species, it is clear that <it is> by
form. But <if it is asked> whence comes the multitude of
forms as from an efficient (effectivo) extrinsic principle,
it is clear that <it is> from one efficient <principle>. ---
But how a multitude is able to come from a principle one to
the highest and most perfect degree is difficult to
understand. And some have erred concerning this.
For certain people said that although the Creator
(Conditor) of things is one, nevertheless he makes many and
varied things on account of the multitude of ideal forms. --
- But that is disproved in the first book where it was shown
that all those are one; and there is not in God in reality
number other than that of the persons.
But some wanted to say that this was on account of a
multitude of mediate things. For God, since he is one and
simple in the highest degree, understands himself; and by
understanding himself and nothing else he produced the first
intelligence; and that intelligence understood itself and
God and thereby produced two, namely another intelligence
and its own sphere; and so forth by descending and
multiplying. --- And that opinion in the reading of the
preceding (p.I, a.2, q.2) was disproven where it is shown
that God immediately produces all things.
A third group said that the multitude of things was by
a unique principle on account of the multitude and infinity
of reflections by which the divine intellect reflects on
itself and understands itself to understand; and thus into
infinity. --- But that is nothing. First, because it is
false that in God there is a multitude of reflections, since
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 29
God is his understanding (Deus sit suum intelligere).
Again, from this nothing ever follows except diversity
according to number.
And for this reason the right position is that the
multitude in things is from one principle because it is the
first principle and uniquely one. For because it is the
principle absolutely first, for this reason it is fruitful
and powerful with infinite and boundless fruitfulness. For
if the unity which is first in the genus of number is the
principle by which infinite numbers are able to come forth,
and the point <that> by which infinite lines <are able to
come forth>, <then> what is absolutely first is so powerful
that it is altogether unbounded (immensum). Therefore on
account of <this> boundlessness (immensitatem) it can bring
about infinite things, but on account of the manifestation
of boundlessness it brings forth many things from its
treasury, not all, because the effect cannot be equal to the
power of the first cause itself. --- But because <it is>
uniquely one, for that reason <it is> the most simple, the
most spiritual and the most perfect: because the most
simple, of the greatest power; because the most spiritual,
of the greatest wisdom; because it is most perfect, of the
highest goodness; because of the greatest power it is able
to bring about many things; because of the greatest wisdom,
it knows many things; because of the highest goodness he
wishes to produce many things and to communicate himself. --
- And for this reason a multitude goes out <into being> by
one principle because <it is> the first and one.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 30
Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction I, Part II
Article 1: On the Distinction of Things
Question 2
Whether the Universe (universitas: totality) of
Things is Distinguished by a Threefold Difference,
Namely Spiritual Substance, Corporeal <Substance>
and a <Substance> Composed of Each.
((NOTE: For the present I omit the objections and responses to
them.))
On the contrary: 1. It was right that God make things in
such a way that they give manifestation of his power; but the
power manifested in the production of things much distant and in
their conjunction --- for a power is shown to be more powerful
the more it is able to act at a greater distance --- but the
first and greatest distance of substances is between the
corporeal and the incorporeal, because they are the first
differences of the genus: therefore for it to be the case that
divine power be fully manifested it was necessary to produce
spiritual and corporeal substance and further to unite the things
produced.
2. Again, it was right that God produce things in such a way
that his wisdom be manifested; but the wisdom of the artisan if
manifested in the perfection of order, but all order has of
necessity a lowest, a highest and a middle. If therefore the
lowest is the nature purely corporeal, the highest the spiritual
nature <and> the middle <a nature> composed of each; if he were
not to have made all these things, the wisdom of God would not be
perfectly shown: therefore it is necessary that all these come to
be. Whence Augustine <says> in the 12th book of the Confessions:
"Lord, you made two things, one near to yourself and the other
near to nothing."
3. Again, it was right that God produce things such that his
goodness be manifested; but goodness consists in the diffusion
and communication of itself into another; if therefore his
goodness consists in the communication of the most noble act
which is to live and to understand, it is right that he give to
another not only the power of living and understanding, but also
the power of communicating with another. If therefore there is a
living and understanding spiritual substance which however is
animated and perfected through the intellect, it is a body:
therefore it was necessary for the perfect manifestation of
goodness that there come to be spiritual and corporeal substance.
But they do not manifest this perfectly unless one communicates
with another, and this cannot be except through a union:
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 31
therefore it was necessary to make <a substance> composed of
each.
4. Again, this is seen not only by theological reasoning but
also by philosophical <reasoning>: because if one posits one
difference of a contrariety, <one posits> the other also: if
therefore the corporeal, then also the spiritual; and if one is
to posit the extremes as able to be composed, <one> therefore
also <posits> the intermediate <as such>: therefore etc.
Conclusion
That Threefold Genus of Substance is Required
on account of the Threefold Perfection of the Universe.
I respond: It should be said that for the perfection of the
universe this threefold genus of substance is required; and this
<is> on account of the threefold perfection of the universe which
is noted in the breadth of circumference, the sufficiency of
order, the influence of goodness, in which three it expresses a
threefold perfection in cause, namely of power, of wisdom and of
goodness. Whence the arguments brought forth for this ought to be
conceded.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 32
Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction II, Part I
Article 1: On the Measure of the Angelic Nature in Itself
Question 1
Whether Spiritual Things Have a Proper Measure.
[NOTE: 'proper' means 'specifically characteristic'
throughout.]
Concerning the first thus we proceed. First it seems
that they have a proper measure:
1. Through the Philosopher in the Book on Causes, in
the penultimate proposition: "Between the thing whose
substance and operation is in eternity and the thing whose
substance and operation is in time, there is a mediate thing
whose substance is in eternity and action in time"; but this
cannot be understood concerning uncreated eternity:
therefore <it is understood> concerning created <eternity>;
and he distinguishes this from time and posits a measure of
spiritual and incorruptible substances: therefore it seems
etc.
2. Again, in Ecclesiasticus 1 <,1>: All wisdom is from
the Lord God, up to, before the aevum [[Full text: All
wisdom is from the Lord God and it was with him always and
is before the aevum.]]: therefore if before the aevum means
something uncreated, then aevum means something created; not
substance; therefore measure; not of material things but of
the spiritual; and this differs from time, whence Boethius
<says> in his Consolation <of Philosophy>: "You who command
time to proceed from the aevum": therefore etc. For
everything which goes out <into being> from another thing
differs from it.
3. Again, Dionysius in the On the Divine Names in the
chapter on the aevum <says>: "Characteristic (proprietas) of
the aevum is that it be ancient, long abiding, measuring
according to the totality of being, but of time that it be
in an alternating state with respect to different relations
((paraphrase))": if therefore it is not disposed the same
thus and otherwise now and ever, the same measure is not
time and the aevum. But the aevum is the measure of things
enduring perpetually and such is the nature of the angel:
therefore.
4. Again, as unity is related to distinction, thus is
the now <related> to duration: but in spiritual things not
only does one find a distinction according to substance, but
also its measure: therefore by the same reasoning also does
the being of the angel have the measure of duration; but not
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 33
time, since it does not vary nor does it change: therefore
<it has> another proper measure.
5. Again, everything which has being limited by act has
a measure through which its limitation is able to known; but
such is the being of every creature: therefore etc.; it is
argued as the prior.
6. Again, the measure of duration bespeaks the mode of
the thing enduring; but spiritual things have a mode of
duration belonging to them different from corporeal things,
chiefly from changeable things, since they perdure
perpetually and immutably: therefore through that measure
they have the characteristic of being measured.
On the Contrary: 1. Augustine <in his> To Orosius
<says>: God moves spiritual nature through time, but
corporeal <nature> through places and times": therefore time
is the measure of spiritual nature.
2. Again, Bede <says>: "Four things were first created:
the angelic nature, prime matter, the fiery heavens and
time". If therefore time stands for measure, then either
spiritual things did not have a measure in the beginning or
they did not have one different from corporeal things or
Bede was inadequate in that enumeration.
3. Again, it is seen by argument. There is one place
which contains visible and invisible things, as the fiery
heavens (empyreum): therefore if the measure which is time
is not of a lesser appropriation than place, then it seems
that there is one time in which are spiritual and corporeal
things: they do not then have a proper measure.
4. Again, as the number is the same by which ten dogs
and ten men are measured, thus is the number the same by
which ten angels and ten men are numbered: if therefore
spiritual things do not have a measure of distinction other
than corporeal things, then neither <do they have> a
different measure of duration.
5. Again, a blessed man and <a blessed> angel are
measured by the same measure because all the blessed <are>;
but the blessed man has the same being as he had when he was
not blessed, therefore <he has> also the same measure:
therefore man as wayfarer (homo viator) is measured by the
same measure by which the angel <is measured>, therefore
also <is> any corporeal nature whatsoever: therefore it does
not have a proper measure.
6. Again, per impossible: if it has a measure, either
it is substance or it is accident; <it is> not substance:
therefore <it is> accident. If accident, in what category
(genus)? <It can> only <be> in the category of quantity; not
discrete <quantity>, therefore continuous <quantity>. But it
is not line or surface or body or place: therefore either it
is time or nothing: therefore either the angelic nature has
no measure or, if it has, it does not have one proper <to
itself>.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 34
Conclusion
Spiritual creatures according to their immutable
being have a proper measure diverse from time which
is called aeviternity.
I respond: It should be said that when it is asked
whether the angelic nature has a measure proper <to itself>
diverse from time, one should make a distinction because
either we are speaking of a measure of spiritual things
according to being (secundum esse), which does not change,
or according to affections (affectiones). If then we speak
of the measure which concerns being (esse) and which is
called the aevum, it was customary for the learned ancients
to respond in this way: either you speak of diversity in the
genus of measure or in the genus of being (in genere entis).
If in the genus of measure, it is necessary thus to posit a
difference, as authorities and arguments brought forth for
the first part show. But if you speak of diversity in the
genus of being, the opinion was thus threefold.
For some said that as place and surface are the same
through essence <but> different according to relation
(secundum comparationem: [I need to think about this.]), the
same is thus the case for the now of the aevum and of time,
differing by relation alone. For the now concerns the
substance of a thing,; however the substance of the first
movable is altogether immovable with respect to being
(esse); however related to place it is movable. And in the
first way the now of the aevum is measured <and> in the
second way the now of time, such that the now is the same
<but> related in diverse ways (diversimode comparatum), as
the same extremity (idem ultimum), related to a body as
encompassing <it> is a surface <and> related to a body as
encompassed is place. --- But that cannot stand up, because
concerning the extremity of a body those two relations are
not incapable of happening together (incompossibiles); but
the now of time and <the now> of the aevum have properties
which are incapable of occurring together with respect to
the same thing. For, as Augustine says in the Book of 83
Different Questions, this, namely the now of the aevum, is
stable, <while> that, namely the now of time, is able to
fluctuate (fluxibile); but it is impossible that one and the
same thing at once and in the same respect move and stand
still.
And for this reason the second position is that the now
itself follows <upon> the essence of prime matter.
Therefore as prime matter in all things is the same in
essence differing through being (per esse), thus the now of
time and of the aevum is the same through essence, not as
individual but the same through essence with respect to the
mode of matter, however differing only with respect to being
(quantum ad esse). And these posited that the quiddity of
each thing is measured through essence by the same measure.
--- But neither is that very intelligible. For since the
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 35
aevum bespeaks (respiciat) stable and quiescent being (esse
stabile et quietum) which indeed matter perfected by form
has, and this measure bespeaks nothing but actual being
(esse actuale) and a completed (or:perfected) mode of being
(modum essendi completum), then it seems that the aevum
cannot be taken in this way from the side of the matter,
whatever be the case concerning time (quidquid sit de
tempore). Therefore since the mode of duration differs
essentially and formally in the two cases, it is also clear
that the proper measure <differs>.
And for this reason there is a third position that
spiritual things have a measure diverse from time, not only
in the genus of measure but also in the genus of being; and
this not only by relation (comparatione) but also according
to substance and form. However, whatever be the case
concerning diversity in the genus of being, there is no one
who is able to deny the diversity according to the mode of
the measuring (mensurandi). And this suffices for the
present question in which it is asked whether spiritual
things have a measure diverse from corporeal things. For it
should be said that <it is> so.
But if you ask what that <measure> is, one should
respond according to the saints and the philosophers that it
is called created eternity or the aevum; but since eternity
properly is taken for the uncreated and the aevum frequently
is taken for time, then for this reason aeviternity
(aevernitas) is invoked as the proper name. In this way
should one respond, if one is asked about the measure which
concerns the very being (ipsum esse) of a spiritual
creature, being (esse), I say, immutable and perpetual.---
If however one is asked concerning the measure of angelic
dispositions (angelicarum affectionum), whether that is
diverse from time, this is a question which will be
considered below (art. 2, q.1 & 2). However, now it is
clear that that measure which is called aeviternity does not
measure the variation of dispositions (variationem
affectionum), as Augustine says in his To Orosius (Qq.40 &
41). For the aevum is solely the measure of unchangeable
being (esse incommutabilis).
It should therefore be conceded, as the arguments show,
that in a some way (aliquo modo) spiritual things have a
proper measure with respect to time and temporal things.
1. Therefore to the objection that the spiritual nature
is moved through time (tempora: lit., times) the response is
already clear, for this he says with respect to dispositions
(affectiones), not with respect to being (esse).
2. To the objection concerning the four things first
created, it should be said that the name of time is extended
there to the measure of every duration of which there is a
positing of a beginning; whence aevum is taken and
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 36
comprehended in a very general sense (valde large), as will
be more clear below.
3. To the objection concerning place <it should be
said> that it is not valid because corporeal place is not a
measure of spiritual things, although it does contain;
however the aevum measures and is conformed; for this reason
it is not valid: the one place is not measuring, therefore
<there is> one measuring time. [[NOTE: The Latin text seems
suspicious here: there may be some problem with manuscript
readings.]] --- If you ask of me whence this <is>, it should
be said that the angel truly has duration, but it does not
have extension; and for this reason it has a measure of
duration, but not of extension.
4. To the objection concerning number, it should be
said that it is not similar, because the mode of distinction
in spiritual and corporeal things is the same, but the mode
of duration is not the same. For this reason the measure of
distinction is the same according to species, <but> the
measure of duration <is> not the same in this way.
5. To the objection concerning the saint and the angel,
it should be said that they are measured by a similar
measure (mensura consimili), namely the aevum, because they
have a similar mode of duration (quia consimilem habent
modum durandi); but man as wayfarer (homo viator) is not
measured by a similar measure, because, although he has the
same being (esse), nevertheless he has differing modes of
being and duration; and the measure concerns not only being
but also the mode of duration (modum durandi).
6. To the question, in what genus is the measure of
angelic duration, some say that it is not a quantity unless
the quantity of power (quantitas virtutis), and for this
reason it is not properly in a genus of quantity. --- But if
it truly is a measure, how is is not a true quantity?
For this reason others say that it is in the genus of
quantity as principle (sicut principium). --- Nevertheless
if it is asked of what is it the principle, since it
indicates a measure diverse from time, as was shown, it will
be difficult to assign.
And for this reason it can more soundly be said that as
time is posited in spiritual substances with respect to
dispositions (affectiones), according to Augustine, although
the consideration of the Philosopher will not ascend to
that, thus also a measure differing in species from other
quantities is posited, although the Philosopher does not
speak concerning that, because he intended to provide
determinations concerning the measures of lower things. Nor
is there posited from this an insufficiency in him; and even
if it were posited, he would not on account of this be
departing even a little from the path of truth.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 37
Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction II, Part I
Article 1: On the Measure of the Angelic Nature in Itself
Question 2
Whether There is One Aevum for All Aeviternal Things.
Secondly it is asked whether spiritual things have one
measure by essence (per essentiam); and this is to ask,
whether there is one aevum for all aeviternal things. And
it seems that <there is> not.
1. Dionysius <says in his> On Divine Names: "He is the
aevum of aevums": therefore there are many aevums; not with
an interruption such that one is after another: therefore
through the diversity of things existing at once.
2. Again, the unity of an accident comes from the unity
of a subject; but one does not posit one subject for all
aeviternal things, since some spiritual things do not have
anything <in> common, with respect to which they would be
measured: therefore one does not posit there to be one
aevum. However it appears to be the case that they have no
such subject which contains spiritual things because that
would have excellence and influence and containment with
respect to the aeviternal things, as the first mover with
respect to temporal things; but such cannot be found with
respect to spiritual substances, as is clear to one running
through the individual instances (discurrenti per singula):
therefore etc.
3. Again, when all other things have fallen into
corruption, it is possible that there remain a sole angel,
since it is not dependent on others; and if it remains in
complete being, it has a measure following upon that being,
and this is the aevum: therefore the aevum remains when any
angel remains and it remains whole and perfect: therefore as
are the angels so too are the aevums.
4. Again, the aevum is a measure of a thing perfected
and having much of the species or form: if therefore the
aevum chiefly follows upon complete being, since that is not
one in number, but in species, it seems that the aevum is
one only according to species.
Against this: 1. it is argued from the similar. As
time is related to temporal things, so <is> the aevum to
aeviternal things; but there is one time which measures all
temporal things, as Anselm and the Philosopher say:
therefore similarly there is one aevum which measures all
aeviternal things.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 38
2. Again, this is seen from the minor. The variety and
difference in form is greater in mutable things than in
immutable things: if therefore all mutable things can be
measured by a single measure through essence, much more
strongly <is this the case for> aeviternal things.
3. Again, this is seen by a cause. For it is the
position of man that time can be one because, although it is
an accident, nevertheless there is an extrinsic measure, as
place, and because it is not a positional accident; but this
whole thing is found in the aevum: therefore etc.
4. Again, if there are many aevums, then either they
are at once or consequential (aut ergo simul, aut
consequenter). Not consequential (:one after another) since
any one whatsoever is infinite into the past (a parte post);
not at once, because what things are at once are in the same
instant, therefore if aeviternal things are at once, they
are in the same now of the aevum: therefore if there is one
now for all aeviternal things, then <there is> one aevum by
essence (per essentiam).
Conclusion
Although there is one time for all temporal things,
nevertheless there are as many aevums as there are
aeviternal things.
I respond: For the understanding of this question it
should be noted before proceeding how unity is understood in
time. It should be known, however, that some people have
tried to take the unity of time in three ways, according as
an accident has the ability to be related to a subject in
three ways. For it has there a cause, an existence and an
appearance (causam, existentiam et apparentiam).
Some therefore said that time is one by reason of a
subject in which it is first and per se, which is such that
when it is removed time also is removed. Whence they said
that time is one because it is in the first movable such
that when its movement ceases time also ceases. --- But it
is not sufficient to say that, because, as Augustine says,
if the motion of the first movable were to cease, still it
would be able to move <like> the wheel of the potter; and it
is clear that that motion would be measured: therefore not
only is it there but it is also in other movable things.
Likewise, there is time in the dispositions (affectionibus)
and thoughts of a free will which is not subject to
celestial motion, as Augustine indicates (vult).
And thus others said that time is one by reason of the
subject in which it first appears. For since time is a
number or measure of motion, and that number is in the thing
movable or moved according to essence and disposition
(habitus : hexis), in which <thing> there is the prior and
the posterior, but according to actual numeration is part of
the soul, as the Philosopher and Augustine indicate, since
the soul numbers all motions and changes by looking to the
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 39
measure of the motion of the first movable, namely through
the day, year and hour, <thus> they wanted to say that time
is one by reason of a subject in which it first appears;
because, even if all things have proper periods (proprias
periodos), nevertheless all things are numbered and measured
through the measure of motion regular and sure and most
known to us, namely the motion of the first movable. --- But
that is not sufficient, because the Philosopher says in the
On the Heavens and the Earth that if there were to first
movables, still time would be one. Then it could not be
called one by reason of a subject in which it first is not
in which it first appears, since each would be equally first
and evident, nor by reason of the soul because time is not a
number numbering, but <rather> numbered, as the Philosopher
indicates, and time is a disposition of a thing outside, not
something fashioned by the soul.
And thus a third group said more profoundly that the
unity of time arises from the unity of the subject by which
it is caused; but the subject by which it is caused is
matter as changeable, and thus as being in potency. For
matter, as it is in the acquisition of form, changes and
thus is a being in potency; and for this reason time among
all the accidents is chiefly related more with matter. As
therefore matter is one through essence <while> differing
through being (esse), one not by unity of universality not
of singularity, but in a middle way, thus also <is> time in
all temporal things.
And if you ask whence this is that time is one, since
nevertheless there are various motions, it should be said
that motion is defined through that toward which (ad quod)
it is, whence motion indicates a mover and a movable and a
term; but time indicates a duration itself varying and
successive, which comes from the potency of the movable
thing. And because the motion of a nature in the process of
duration (durantis) is similar and that nature on which it
is founded is one in number, for this reason time not only
is one in species for all temporal things, but even with
respect to essence <it is> one in number <while> differing
through being (per esse), as all wise men who spoke on this
matter have held.
If however you ask, why it is not so in other
quantities, since all indicate matter, it should be said
that all others, even if they have incomplete being in
matter --- for there are infinite dimensions in matter ---
nevertheless their incomplete being is from matter existing
under a form. Time, however, has being (esse) from the fact
that matter tends toward form owing to the fact that it is
caused by motion, which is "the entelechia [:actuality] of a
being in potency", and for this reason it is held chiefly on
the part of the matter and for this reason distinct in the
very least way. Nor do I say that time is in matter itself,
with every form circumscribed, because this would be against
Augustine in the 12th book of the Confessions, because there
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 40
is no vicissitude in matter except when there is some form
in it; but although it is in matter which is under form and
is caused by it, nevertheless it is more caused by matter,
as it tends toward form, and this is in matter by reason of
its potency.
According to this threefold mode <then is the unity of
time understood>, but (nisi) some hold unity to be in the
aevum, first by reason of the subject in which it first is.
For they posited the order in intelligences to be according
to virtual containment (secundum continentiam virtualem), as
in visible things one finds local containment. And as time
if founded in the first movable, thus the aevum <is founded>
in the first intelligence which virtually contains the rest
and pours forth upon the rest (influit in alias). --- But
that position cannot stand up. First, because all
intelligences have equality in incorruptibility, as is said
in the following distinction. Secondly, because the
conservation of the intelligences immediately depends on
God. Thirdly, because, if that intelligence were destroyed,
then the foundation for the aevum would perish; and it was
possible that that fail, <or> rather perhaps it did fail,
since the devil is believed to have been the most excellent
of the angels.
And for this reason others tried to assign the unity by
reason of the subject in which it first appears, which
indeed is the celestial fire, in which no variation occurs,
but which is altogether quiescent. --- But neither does that
suffice, since immortality and immutability exist in a prior
way in spiritual substances that in corporeal ones, since
they are more worthy and the more worthy is not such as to
be measured through reference to the less worthy.
And for this reason others tried to take the unity from
the part of the cause, who said that the duration of the
intelligences is contained and conserved through a divine
pouring forth (per divinam influentiam) which, since it is
one, there is one aevum measuring it. --- But neither is
that able to stand up, since that influence is understood
either actively or passively. If of the active, it is
nothing other than God, and thus the aevum does not have a
measure. If of the passive, they are thus as are the
recipients.
And for this reason there is no recourse to another
mode unless that through matter, as was previously said
concerning time. But many deny that the intelligences have
matter. But whatever be the case concerning that,
nevertheless the aevum indicates actual being and stable
being, but time <indicates> matter in potency. For this
reason as the unity of time is conformed to matter, thus the
unity of the aevum is conformed to form, I do not say to
form inasmuch as <it is> this or that, but inasmuch as <it
is> immutable.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 41
Whence as the line in bodies howsoever much diverse
they be is posited as the same in species, thus the aevum
has the unity of a universal, not the unity which time has.
And thus the arguments proving that there is not one
aevum for aeviternal things but many should be conceded.
1. To the objection that, as time is related to
temporal things <etc.>, it should be said that it is not
similar because since time, as it is of itself, concerns
variation and motion, it follows upon those things of which
it is the measure by reason of the principle, through which
they are beings in potency; and because that is said to be
one and no more through essence, for this reason also time
<is so said>. The aevum, however, of its very own notion
indicates being complete and stable, and for this reason it
more indicates the form; and for this reason it has no unity
except that of universality or conformity, as also the other
accidents.
2. To the argument from the minor, that temporal
things have one measure <etc.>, is already clear, because
there is not a place by the minor, because that variation,
by reason of which it is called being in potency, indicates
the material principle itself and for this reason it causes
one to draw back from the distinction; thus it is not in the
aevum.
3. To the objection that time is one because it is an
extrinsic accident, not positioned or positional (non
situatum vel situale), it should be said that it is false,
for that is not the cause, but rather that which was said
earlier.
4. To the objection: if there are many aevums, either
at once or not at once, it should be said that it is the
case at once. --- Therefore the objection: therefore <they
are> in the same now, it should be said that being at once
in duration is twofold: either through the concomitance of
the measure or through the unity and indifference of the
measure. However, since God, man and angel are said to be
at once, it should be said that this is said through the
concomitance of the measure. However since it is said:
Peter and Paul are or run at once, this can be said through
the unity and indifference of of the measure; and for this
reason it does not follow that if the aevums of aeviternal
things are at once, that they are one.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 42
Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction II, Part I
Article 1: On the Measure of the Angelic Nature in Itself
Question 3
Whether Spiritual Things Have a Permanent or a Successive
Measure.
Third it is asked whether spiritual things have a
permanent or a successive measure. And it seems first by
authority and then by argument that it is permanent, lacking
the prior and the posterior.
1. And by authority thus: Augustine <says> in the 12th
Book of the On the City of God: "The immortality of the
angels does not pass in time nor is it past and gone, as if
it already is not, nor <is it> something future as if it not
yet is": therefore it is whole and present, therefore
permanent and not successive.
2. Again, Augustine <says> in the 11th Book of the
Confessions: "If the present time were to stand still and
not pass into the past, it would be eternity"; but it is not
owing to this that eternity is uncreated (PARAPHRASE):
therefore eternity would be created; and this is the aevum:
therefore the aevum has a non-transient now: therefore etc.
3. Again, the Philosopher <says>: "In eternal things
(in perpetuis) to be and to be possible (esse et posse) do
not differ": therefore the potency is in act in its
totality, therefore it awaits nothing, therefore <it is> all
at once (totum simul): therefore there there is no
succession or priority.
4. Again, by argument: the property ought to correspond
to the substance, therefore the measure of a simple
substance ought to be simple; but a spiritual substance is
simple: therefore its measure also <is>. But its measure is
the aevum: therefore it is simple: therefore it does not
have priority and posteriority.
5. Again, everything which is successive is
<ultimately> reduced to something which is permanent,
therefore the prior and posterior in the successive <is
reduced> to the prior and posterior in the permanent; but
the prior and posterior in the permanent is in magnitude
alone: therefore what lacks the prior and the posterior in
the permanent also lacks <them> in the successive. But such
is the angel: therefore etc.
6. Again, where there is the prior and the posterior
there necessarily comes about something new, because the
prior comes to be from the posterior and through this <there
is> a sliding into the past and something into the old; but
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 43
in eternal things (in perpetuis) there is neither any change
not <any> innovation: therefore neither <is there>
succession.
7. Again, where there is the prior, there is also some
expectation with respect to this which is posterior and has
not come about yet (et nondum habitum est); but in the
saints there is absolutely no expectation because faith and
hope are altogether set aside and they have everything which
they will be having in the future: therefore in no way is
there priority and posteriority there.
On the Contrary: 1. Hieronymous in To Marcella <says>:
"It is God alone who did not know to have been or to be
going to be (fuisse vel futurum esse)": therefore every
creature in its being (esse) has a passing over
(praeteritionem) or to have been and to be going to be
(fuisse et fore): therefore it has succession in its
duration.
2. Again, Anselm in the Proslogion treating of that
word says : The Lord will reign into eternity and beyond,
which was said not because there is something after
eternity, but because the eternity of God which is all at
once (tota simul) exceeds the eternity of a creature, which
is not altogether at once; that is the opinion (ista est
sententia): therefore <we have> the same which <was said>
earlier.
3. Again, it is seen by argument: the angelic unity is
lesser than divine unity, therefore the simplicity of a
created eternity <is lesser> than the simplicity of an
uncreated eternity: if therefore this is true, then it has
composition in some way. But composition in duration posits
the prior and the posterior: therefore etc.
4. Again, this itself is seen because the measure of
angelic duration is not the angel himself but rather differs
from the angel as the measure from the measured; but the
measure according to truth is in the genus of quantity and
such is divisible, therefore having parts: therefore etc. If
you say, that it is a principle of quantity such as the
point; on the contrary: the point does not have the meaning
of measure in a complete way, but is the principle of
measure; the aevum however is truly and properly a measure:
therefore it cannot be as a principle.
5. Again the duration of an angel is infinite: if
therefore it is all at once in act (tota simul in actu),
then there is something created which is infinite in act.
But this is impossible: therefore etc.
6. Again, inasmuch as it has being whole and at once,
to have been and to be and to be going to be are the same;
but it is impossible to think that what was was not, if it
is understood to have been: therefore if in the aeviternal
thing to have been and to be going to be are the same, then
it is impossible to think that it will not be. This however
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 44
is false because this is something proper to God alone:
therefore etc.
7. Again, if the whole being is present, then to be and
to have been do not differ: therefore what now is not, never
was, and if it was, is. But God cannot make what was not to
have been: therefore he cannot make it the case that the
aeviternal was not (non esse). But this is manifestly false:
therefore etc.
8. Again, if the whole being of the aeviternal is at
once and the whole duration <is> without prior and
posterior, then there is not there a more long and a less
long: therefore the soul of Saint Peter was in glory neither
before nor for a longer time than the soul of Saint Francis.
If therefore this is manifestly false, it is clear etc.
Conclusion
In the aevum there is a certain succession which does not
imply the prior and the posterior with variation and
innovation, as in time, but only the extension of duration.
I respond: It should be said the regarding this there
was a twofold opinion.
For some said that the aevum is a simple whole, as also
that which it measures; and the being of an aeviternal
substance and its duration is whole and at once, not having
a succession of the prior and the posterior. Whence they
said that the aevum is not properly a quantity, but is only
in the genus of quantity through reduction; whence it is
simple in extension, but nevertheless it is a quantity with
respect to power (quantum virtute) and to this extent a
quantity which by its power exceeds every temporal being in
the similitude of created eternity. For as the soul is a
simple quantity in regard to the quantity of a huge mass,
nevertheless on account of its power and simplicity it is in
any part of its body whatsoever; in this way it should be
understood in regard to what is proposed. --- But, as was
touched upon in the opposing argument, if someone holds the
aevum to be altogether simple, he would posit from this that
it is not a true measure; he would also posit the created
duration to be infinite in act; he would also posit the
duration to be created to the extent that it is a being
which neither God can destroy nor can the intellect think
not to be; which all, since they are not intelligible, make
the aforementioned position neither reasonable nor
intelligible.
And for this reason, although the authorities of the
saints seem to speak otherwise, the position of the others
is more probable and more intelligible, <namely> that in the
aevum one posits a prior and a posterior, and one posits
some succession, nevertheless a succession other than in
time. For in time there is a succession with variation and
a prior and a posterior with inveterateness and renovation.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 45
But in the aevum there is the prior and the posterior which
indicates the extension of duration which nevertheless
indicates no variation or innovation. And through this
distinction it is easy to solve all the things objected to
the contrary, if one understands it.
But if it is perhaps asked how it can be prior and
posterior without newness with respect to being (sine
novitate circa esse), it should be said that as we see that
in one way a stream comes forth from a fountain and in
another a ray from the sun, thus we see <it> in what is
proposed. For the stream thus goes forth from the fountain
because new water always comes out, not the same <water>;
the ray continuously comes forth from the sum, not because
something new is always emitted, but because what was
emitted is continued; whence the influence of the sun is
nothing different from the continuation of something given.
Similarly in motion and in the being of a mobile thing some
property possessed is lost, or not possessed is acquired;
but in the being of an aeviternal thing what first was given
through the continuous influence of God is continued. For
no creature of the aevum is altogether act not is some power
of it, whence it continuously needs divine power
cooperating. For this reason, even if it has being whole
(esse totum), nevertheless it does not have the continuation
of being whole at once (totam simul), and for this reason
there is there a succession without some innovation with
respect to being or an absolute property (circa esse vel
proprietatem absolutam); nevertheless there is there a true
continuation with respect to which the creature has being in
a certain way in potency, and through this it has
succession. Therefore God alone who is pure act is infinite
in act and has whole being and the possession of his being
at once. In view of these the things objected are easily
enough solved.
1.2. To what is objected of the past and the future and
the transition, it should briefly be said that it is
understood concerning those as they intend variation.
3. To the objection that to be and to be possible do
not differ, it should be said that it is true of to be and
to be possible that they do not differ, that is, they do not
stand apart; for motion and time make things stand apart
(:distinct); however in the eternal alone is it true that
potency is altogether act, not in some creature.
4. To the objection that a property of a simple
substance cannot be composed, it should be said that it is
true, if that property has the composition of parts which
are at once beings; now however it is not so, but rather
concerning the aevum there is never anything but the now, as
it is also said of time. And thus it can indeed be so in
the simple thing, as in the composed; whence the duration of
one thousand grains has extension as great as also of one
mountain.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 46
5. To the objection that the prior and the posterior
are reduced to the permanent, it should be said that it is
true that it is reduced to the permanent; but it is not
necessary that <it be reduced> to a prior and posterior
permanent thing. For the fiery heavens has aeviternal
duration and equally is simple as the duration of the angel:
therefore the prior and the posterior in permanent parts is
not relevant here (non facit aliquid ad hoc).
6. To the objection concerning the new and the old, it
is already clear: because there is nothing of alternation
there, nevertheless there is there an increase of duration
without all alteration of an absolute property. For it is
true to say that the soul of Peter was for a longer time
than the soul of Francis, when it entered into glory, but it
is not so with respect to God; for he has not endured longer
today than before yesterday.
7. To the objection concerning expectation, it should
be said that, as there is succession not through the
acquisition of something new but through the continuation of
something given earlier, thus also there is expectation not
of having something new but of the continuation of something
possessed earlier which, because they already have and are
sure to have in the future, for this reason is rather called
holding (tentio) and comprehension than expectation. And
thus that is clear.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 47
Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction II, Part I
Article 2: On the Measure of the Angelic Nature
in Comparison to the Measure of the Corporeal Thing
Consequently it is asked concerning the measure of
spiritual substance in comparison to the measure of the
corporeal thing. Concerning this three things are asked.
The first is whether the aevum precedes time in some
genus of priority.
Second, whether between the aevum and time there falls
a measure of a mediate nature.
Third, whether things spiritual and corporeal or
aeviternal and temporal were produced at once <together>.
Question 1
Whether the Aevum Precedes Time in Some Way
Thus <we proceed> with respect to the first. That the
aevum is prior to time is shown:
1. Through that of Boethius in his Consolation of
Philosophy speaking to God:
You who order time to go
forth from the aevum;
but time cannot be understood to go forth from the aevum
except either by reason of causality or of duration or of
excellence, because it is inferior to the aevum (quia
deficit ab aevo): therefore it seems that it should be in
every way understood that the aevum is prior to time.
2. Again, every motion and change is reduced to
something immobile as to something prior: therefore <it is>
also <the case that> the measure of the mobile thing <is
reduced> to the measure of the immobile thing: therefore
time also <is reduced> to the aevum as to something prior.
The first consequence is manifestly true because everything
in the flux (of time) ( ) is reduced to something standing
stable (stans) as to a prior. And the second consequence
holds according to the notion of proportion (rationem
proportionis), because, as measured is related to measured,
so too is measure to measure: therefore etc.
3. Again, the prior and posterior in motion are caused
by the prior and posterior in magnitude, and the prior and
posterior in time are caused by the prior and posterior in
motion: therefore by nature (per naturam) magnitude and the
being of magnitude are prior to the being of time; but the
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 48
substantial being of the first body is measured by the
aevum, while motion <is measured> by time: therefore the
aevum is prior to time.
4. Again, the aevum was from the beginning of
creature<s>, as also of the angel<s>; but time began with
the motion of the first movable, which began, as it is said,
on the fourth day, or at least it could not begin before the
second day: therefore the aevum precedes time in duration.
On the Contrary: 1. Bede says that four things were
first created and among those he counts time; but the aevum
is not counted among the first created; and it was created:
therefore <it is> posterior.
2. Again, Richard of St Victor says and takes from
Augustine, that everything which began to be, began to be
from time; but the aevum began to be: therefore it began to
be from time. But what begins to be from time does not
precede time, but rather is consequent or concomitant:
therefore the aevum cannot be before time.
3. Again, time is a measure of change; but the aevum is
a measure of being stable and fixed: therefore since
creation itself, which is a change, comes before created
being, then time is before the aevum.
4. Again, what is imperfect is prior, then <there is>
what <is> perfect; but time is a measure according to
imperfect being which is being in potency, while the aevum
<is a measure> according to actual and complete being:
therefore time by nature is before the aevum. --- Therefore
one inquires about the order of time to the aevum, and the
converse.
Conclusion
With a fourfold sense of the term of time distinguished,
it is asserted that in the third sense the aevum and time
are at once in duration, but the aevum is prior in dignity;
in the fourth sense the aevum precedes time
both in duration and dignity.
I respond: It should be said that time is customarily
taken in four ways in the writings of the saints, namely
most commonly, commonly, properly and more commonly
(communissime, communiter, proprie et magis proprie). Most
commonly time indicates a measure of the duration of any
created thing whatsoever; in which fashion it is taken by
Bede, when he says that four things were first created,
among which he counts time. --- Commonly when it means thus
the measure of any change whatsoever or of that which is
from non-being into being or of something else which is from
one being into another being; and thus is taken what Richard
says, <namely> that everything which began to be, began to
be from time; and this is found in the gloss on the
beginning of Genesis: In the beginning God created the
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 49
heavens and the earth, namely <in the beginning> of time. --
- In the third way it is taken properly; and thus it
indicates a measure of successive variation whether it be
successive by regular and continuous succession or not; and
in this way Augustine means <it> in his To Orosium: "The
varying characteristics (affectiones) of the angels and
every variation of things are measured by time." --- In the
fourth way it is taken more properly; and thus is meant the
measure of motion or of successive, continuous and regulated
variation according to the rule of motion of the eighth
sphere; and thus is it customarily taken by the Philosopher;
but that way of taking time is <too> restricted.
Therefore when it is asked concerning order, it should
be said that if time is taken in the first way, then in this
way it includes the aevum; and thus there is not order of
time to the aevum; if however <it is taken> in the second
way, then in this way time precedes the aevum according to
the way of understanding (secundum rationem intelligendi),
as creation <precedes> created being. If however <it is
taken> in the third way, then the aevum and time are
simultaneous in duration (simul...duratione), but the aevum
is prior in dignity. But if <it is taken> in the fourth way,
then in this way the aevum precedes time both in duration
and in time. --- From these <considerations> then the
principal question is clear<ly solved> as are the objections
adduced for the great part.
For it is shown that the aevum precedes time; it is
understood either in the third way and thus it precedes in
dignity, or in the fourth way, and thus <it precedes> in
duration.
1.To the objection [[Note: I understand obiictur here
while the text published has ostenditur]] that it precedes
by causality, it should be said that that is not necessary;
for neither of these measures is from the other, but <rather
they are> from God who produces each as indivisible, namely
the now of the aevum and the now of time. Whence what is
said, <namely> that time comes forth from the aevum, this is
said because it is inferior to that (deficit ab illo) and
flows away with continuous loss; but in the aevum there is
fixity without loss and <without> new acquisition.
2. To the objection concerning the reduction to the
immobile, it should be said that it is true on the part of
the mover, and it is not necessary that that be created and
similarly it not necessary that the measure be created: for
this reason it is not necessary that time be reduced to the
aevum as to a prior.
3. To what is objected concerning the priority and the
posteriority of magnitude, motion and time, it should be
said that the prior and posterior in motion or time is not
caused by the prior and posterior in magnitude, except
inasmuch as that magnitude is mobile; and thus it has the
nature of being measured by the now of time, not of the
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 50
aevum; for as time measures motion, thus the now of time
measures the mobile itself inasmuch as <it is> mobile.
4. Regarding the final objection it is clear that it
proceeds on the basis of the fourth way of taking time.
The arguments to the opposite proceed from time
according to the first and second way of taking it, as is
clear to one who reflects <on it>, except for the last which
is taken from the comparison of the imperfect to the
perfect. To that one should respond: that the imperfect
precedes the perfect is true where they are concerning the
same thing (circa idem); but concerning diverse things it is
the converse. And for this reason the opposite is more
powerfully argued than what is proposed through that middle.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 51
Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction II, Part I
Article 2, Question 2:
Whether There is Some Mediate Measure
Between Time and the Aevum.
Secondly it is asked, whether there is some mediate
measure between time and the aevum. And it seems there is
not:
1. First through the Philosopher who divides measured
substances in the Book of Causes such that "between the
substance whose substance and action [:operation] are in the
moment of eternity and the substance whose substance and
action are in the moment of time, there is a mediate
substance whose substance is in the moment of eternity and
action in the moment of time." [[Liber de Causis prop. 30
(31)]] If therefore every created substance has the
characteristic of being reduced to some one of those
<substances>; and time and the aevum are sufficient for
measuring these: then etc.
2. Again, this very thing is seen through Dionysius in
the Divine Names: "The distinguishing characteristic
(proprietas) of the aevum is to be (esse) without change
(alternatione) and to be marked off (or: measured out) in
its totality (secundum totum); but <the distinguishing
characteristic> of time <is> that it be in the process of
undergoing different dispositions in change (in alternatione
aliter et aliter se habens); but the mediate among beings is
that which on the one hand (illinc) participates the aevum
and on the other hand time." Therefore all things which are
either are completely measured by the aevum or completely
measured by time or are partly measured by the aevum and
partly by time: therefore there is no third measure other
than these.
3. Again, every created thing is either stable and
incorruptible or variable and corruptible; but the first is
measured by the aevum and the second by time: therefore
there is nothing mediate between the aevum and time.
4. Again, it is characteristic of every created being
that it is either terminable or interminable. If it is
interminable, then it is thus measured by time which is the
principle of corruption, because it makes what is to be
different. But if interminable, then <it is> thus
<measured> by the aevum: therefore it does not seem that
there is some third thing measuring beyond these two.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 52
On the Contrary: 1. Before the fourth day there was no
time, because it is said to be in the formation (factione)
of lights: They were <marked off> into signs as times, days
and years; and it is clear there was not only the aevum,
since there were some corporeal things, as grasses and
trees: therefore there was another measure: therefore etc.
2. Again, after the day of judgment there will be no
time, according to what the angel promises in the Book of
the Apocalypse and there will be succession and variation in
torments which could not be measured by the aevum: therefore
it is necessary for there to posit a third measure
<different> from these.
3. Again, in the changing dispositions (affectionibus)
of the angels there is intensifying increase and variation
and those are above time, as is said in the Book of Causes:
therefore that measure of changing dispositions
(affectionum) is above time; but it cannot be the aevum,
since in the aevum no variation takes place: therefore it is
necessary that there is another measure.
4. Again, the angel when it is turned to God
(convertitur at Deum) is elevated above time: therefore that
turning (conversio) and that which it receives in that
turning (conversione) are above time; and the measure above
time ought to be measured; but the angel there thinks
something which it is able to cease thinking; therefore not
in the least is it able to be measured by the aevum which is
the measure of an interminable thing, nor by time: therefore
etc.
Conclusion
If time is taken properly, then between the aevum and time
there is no mediate thing, but something differing only by
reason; if however <it is taken> more properly, then there
is a differing mediate measure called the age (saeculum) by
the ancients.
I respond: It should be said that inasmuch as time is
divided from the aevum, namely in the two last senses put
forth earlier, then it is able to be taken in two ways,
namely as either it means a measure of any varying duration
whatsoever or <as a measure> of successive variation; and
thus between the aevum and time there is no mediate thing in
reality (re), but only according to reason (ratione); there
is no mediate thing, I say, differing from each in the genus
of measure, but <there is> a mediate thing in the genus of
the measured, participating each, as there is that substance
which is on the boundry of eternity and time. --- And thus
proceed all the arguments for the first part, as is clear
easily to one studying it (aspicienti).
But in another way time is taken as it is a measure of
variation in which there is succession having continuousness
and regulation by the motion of the first orb; and this
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 53
measure has an end and ceases to be. And between this and
the aevum it is that one posits a mediate measure in which
there is variation nor is it necessary that there be a
desisting or regulation of the first motion; of this sort
was it in the three days of the creation of things and how
it will be in hell after the last day. And this was called
the age (saeculum) by the ancient doctors. --- And this the
arguments to the opposite conclude; and so the whole is
clear.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 54
Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction II, Part I
Article 2, Question 3:
Whether Spiritual and Corporeal Substances
Were Created at One and the Same Time (simul)
Third it is asked whether spiritual and corporeal
substances were created at one and the same time (simul).
And it seems that <it is> so:
1. In Genesis <we find>: In the beginning God created
etc.; the Gloss <is>: "that is spiritual and corporeal
nature".
2. Again, in the 12th Book of the Confessions
<Augustine says>: "I find two things which you made devoid
of time (carentia temporibus): one, which enjoys your
immutability to the fullest and another which was in an
unformed way (informe) such that it changes from one form
into another which it does not have."
3. Again, it is seen by argument. It is clear that the
angels were created without place, because then one would
not have order with respect to another according to
existence (existentiam): it was necessary therefore that the
fiery heavens (empyreum) come to be; and furthermore, the
concavity of that was not able to be empty: therefore etc.
4. Again, the distinction of days is noted according to
the distinction of things, therefore the production from
nothing precedes every day: therefore since the matter of
corporeal things was produced from nothing, as also the
angelic nature, inasmuch as (quemadmodum) the angelic nature
is before time, it seems similarly the case that matter
<is>: and if this <is so>, then <it is so> in the beginning
of duration: therefore <they were created> at one and the
same time (simul).
On the Contrary: 1. Ecclesiaticus 1: Wisdom was created
before all things; it is clear that he speaks of non-divine
wisdom, but rather <he speaks of> what was created; this
however is the angel, as the Gloss says. If you say that it
is prior in dignity; one objects from Hilary, On the
Trinity, 12: "How great that before every creature God
generated our Lord Jesus Christ, since even the origin of
the angels is found to be more ancient than the creation of
the earth."
2. Again, this is seen by the argument which Isidorus
makes: "In the first creation (conditione) of things there
was created the place of torments;" but God did not prepare
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 55
the torment for the innocent: therefore the devil sinned
before the production of things.
3. Again, it seems that they could not have been at one
and the same time, because no power is greater than the
infinite; but it is necessary that infinite power be
exhibited for the production of one creature: therefore if
infinite power is required for this effect, and there can be
nothing more than the infinite, then that power cannot
produce another effect in that time.
4. Again, the simple is what is such that when it
directs itself upon something it is completely directed:
therefore if divine power is the most simple, when it
directs itself to the production of some effect, it is
impossible that it direct itself to something else, and thus
that it produce something else: therefore it is impossible
that it produce many things at one and the same time.
5. Again, it is asked: why are only those four said to
be created first?
Conclusion
Four Things Were Created First, Namely the Fiery Heavens,
the Angelic Nature, Matter and Time.
I respond: For the understanding of the aforementioned
it should be understood that, as it is drawn from the Gloss,
four things were created first, namely the fiery heavens,
the angelic nature, matter and time.
However the reason for this is able to be assigned in a
twofold way: one, because in the beginning first things in
every genus were needed to be created, namely in things and
measures, and in things corporeal and spiritual, and in
active and passive corporeal things. Since therefore the
first among the spiritual substances is the angel, first
among the active corporeal substances is the fiery heaven,
and first among passive things is the matter of the
elements, and first among measures is time, because not only
does it indicate the measure of duration but also of
egression: for this reason these four are called the things
created first.
The other reason that can be assigned is that the
angelic spiritual substance needed to come to be as first as
the leader and less dependent, and when it had been made, at
one and the same time (simul) it had distinction and order;
but it did not have an order of existence except in
something containing: therefore the fiery heavens were
created as the greatest of bodies at one and the same time
and for this reason <it is????> the most powerful
(capacissimum). And again, since there cannot be a vacuum,
it was necessary that corporeal or supple matter come to be;
and because every production is in some measure, these three
follow upon time of necessity.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 56
Therefore it should be conceded that there are four
things first created and that the angelic nature and the
corporeal nature were created at one and the same time with
regard to the concomitance of measures, because the duration
of matter and of the intelligence began at one and the same
time, as was proved.
1.2. Therefore to the objection that before all things
etc., it should be said that, as Augustine says at the end
of of the 12th Book of the Confessions, prior is said in
four ways, namely with respect to eternity, time, choice and
origin. With respect to eternity, God precedes all things,
with respect to time, the flower the fruit, with respect to
choice the fruit the flower, and with respect to origin the
sound the song. Therefore by priority of duration neither
is the corporeal nature before the angelic, nor the
converse; but by priority of choice or dignity, wisdom was
created before all things. --- To the authorities of Hilary
and Isidor, it should be said that those are speaking
according to that position which he posited, that creation
precedes distinction in time. Whence in the beginning of
time the angel and matter were created; but things were not
distinguished until the third day. --- Or it can be said
that Hilary speaks according to opinion and Isidore
concerning priority according to foresight.
3. To the objection that God exhibits/employs all his
power for the production of one thing, it should be said
that, although he employs all his power, nevertheless he
does not employ <it> totally. For divine power is called
infinite not only because it is able to make being from non-
being but also because...... ........... ........ ........
...(non potest tot, quin plura; unde nunquam tot simul
producit, quin adhuc possit plura); whence He is able,
inasmuch as he is of his own nature, to make the infinite in
intension and extension. And for this reason that does not
prevail.
4. To the objection concerning the simple, it should be
said that that has a place in that simple thing in which
there is at once simplicity and finitude; but concerning
that which is simple and infinite once and for all (simul et
semel), it does not have truth. For even if by reason of
simplicity it turns its whole self to that to which it turns
itself, nevertheless by reason of its immensity it never
turns itself totally to the production of an effect.
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 57
Richard C. Taylor copyright 1985
Selected texts translated from
St Bonaventure's Commentary on Book 2 of the Sentences
(ed. Quaracchi 1885)
Distinction III, Part I
Article 1: On Simplicity of Essence in Angels
Question 1
Whether Angels Are Composed of Matter and Form
It is ask first then whether in an angel there is a
composition of of diverse natures, namely of matter and
form. And that it is so is shown <as follows>:
1. Through the notion of change. No mutable thing is
simple; but an angel of its own nature is mutable and
changes (mutatur): therefore it has composition. But
further <it is composed> of matter: for anything whatsoever
in which change is present there is present a principle of
change: therefore etc. The first is manifest; the second is
clear through Augustine in the 12th Book of the Confessions:
"Every changeable thing brings with it a certain lack of
form (informitatem) by which form is seized or changed or
transformed (capitur, vel mutatur, vel vertitur)". And
Boethius in the 2nd Book of his De Trinitate <says>:
"Nothing which is purely form can be a subject for
accidents". And again he expressly says that "form does not
take on accidents because it does not take on these unless
with a material subject". If you say to me, changeableness
(mutabilitas) comes to things because they are from nothing
(ex nihilo), as Augustine says (vult) in many places; <I
say> but it is clear (constat) that changeableness is not
pure privation but rather it indicates some positing <of
something> (immo dicit aliquam positionem): therefore it
does not have pure privation as its cause. It is necessary
therefore that it have a cause indicating a positing <of
something>, but not every sort of positing whatsoever since
it also does indicate a privation: therefore <it indicates>
something which is not altogether something nor altogether
nothing, but which is mediate between something and nothing;
but this Augustine calls matter: therefore etc.
2. Again, this very thing is shown through the notion
of action and passion: because nothing acts and is acted
upon at the same time and in the same way (nihil idem et
secundum idem agit et patitur); but an Angel acts and is
acted upon at the same time (idem): therefore it has two
different principles, one according to which it acts and
another according to which it is acted upon. But the
principle according to which it acts is form, while the
principle according to which it is acted upon can be nothing
but matter: therefore etc. The major is clear per se; the
minor is similarly clear; for it is characteristic of an
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 58
angel to receive and give illuminations: therefore etc. If
you were to give perhaps the counterexample (instantiam)
that the medium through its own nature receives and gives
light, as is clear in <the case of> air, <that> is no
counterexample because the medium does not have the notion
(rationem) of the active and the cooperative. And again,
this counterexample cannot come about (non potest fieri) in
true action and passion: for the angel acts and is acted
upon; for when it does what is ought not, it suffers what it
ought; when it does something blameworthy, it suffers the
penalty, so that in no way is the blemish of sin without the
honor of justice, and this is passion properly <so
considered>.
3. Again, this is seen through the notion of
individuation. For in angels there is a distinction of
hypostases, not through origin. Therefore an argument such
as this comes to be: every distinction according to number
comes from an intrinsic and substantial principle, because,
when all the accidents are set aside, <things> are diverse
in number by a differentia; but it does not come from form:
therefore it comes from the material principle: therefore
etc. The major is manifest per se; the minor is clear
through the Philosopher who says in the On the Heavens: "
When I say 'heavens', I indicate a form (dico formam); when
I say 'these heavens' I indicate matter." And he says the
same thing in many places, <namely> that "in every case
matter bears the characteristic of being numerable." If you
say that matter is called the hypostasis itself or the very
what is (ipsum quod est), then I ask you about the
hypostasis: either it adds something to the essence and form
or <it adds> nothing. If it adds nothing, then it does not
cause contraction: therefore as a universal itself is so
constituted as to be always and everywhere, thus <is> the
hypostasis itself, as is clear in divine things, because the
person does not add to the essence, but is everywhere and
boundless, as <is> the essence. Therefore since the
hypostasis of the angel is finite, contracted and limited,
and so here and now, it is necessarily requisite that beyond
the form it adds something substantial causing it to
contract itself; this however can be nothing but matter.
4. Again, this itself is shown through the nature of
essential composition. For the angel is defined and thus
participates the nature of genus and difference: a nature in
which it holds something in common with others and a nature
in virtue of which it differs. Therefore since it is
necessary that the truth of the definition really be found
in any angel whatsoever, it is necessary to posit a
diversity of natures in it. But it is impossible that many
natures come together for the constitution of a third,
unless one has the note (rationem) of the possible and the
other the note of the actual; because from two beings in
potency nothing comes to be nor similarly from two beings in
act: therefore it is necessary etc. If you bring forth to
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 59
me a counterexample in whiteness and the other forms which
have the ability to be defined and have genera and
differences, and nevertheless do not have matter as a part
of themselves, it is no counterexample at all because it is
otherwise in the natures of accidents which do not arise
from another genus. Whence it follows necessarily that
either whiteness has diverse natures in itself or the
nature(s) of the species and of the first and subaltern
genus are caused by diverse natures found in the subject;
but if it cannot be so posited in the angel, then the first
<position> should be put forth.
On the contrary: 1. Boethius <says> at the end of his
book, On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ: "Every
incorporeal substance rests upon no foundation of matter;
but there is no body for which matter is not the subject." -
-- And again: "Since one thing rests upon a foundation of
matter, as <does> the body, but another in no way requires a
material subject, as <is the case for> an incorporeal thing,
then it can in no way come to be that a body changes into an
incorporeal species." From this authority it is expressly
held that the angel does not have matter.
2. Again, the Philosopher says in the On the Soul that,
"neither is it a body, nor is it a form in a body, nor is it
mixed with matter in any way"; and he says this is true
concerning the intellect; but the angel is of this sort:
therefore it does not have matter.
3. Again, it is shown by an argument (ratione). The
universe is most perfect according to the order of nature in
such a way that something more perfect cannot rationally be
thought (perfectius non potest cogitari rationabiliter); but
some substance can rationally be thought to be spiritual and
immaterial: therefore that is in the universe: therefore
etc. The major is clear through the fact that God made all
things very good (omnia valde bona); it is clear also
through John Damascene in chapter 29 <of his De Fide
orthod.>: "All things which come to be through the
providence of God receive the suitable leading forth <into
being> and, as there is none better, have been made." (NOTE:
I need to rethink this translation of: "Omnia quae per dei
providentiam fiunt, deductionem convenientem suscipiunt, et
ut non est melius, facta sunt.") Augustine in his On Free
Choice <says>: "There can be something in nature (in rerum
natura) which you do not know by your reason; what is such
that by true reason you know it not to be, that cannot be."
The minor is clear because a substance similar to God
through spirituality and immateriality can be rationally
thought; and this is seen <thus>: for since there is some
nature which is the act of matter according to substance and
being (esse), as material and corporeal forms; and another
which <is the act of matter> according to the act of being
(secundum actum essendi), not according to essence, as the
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 60
rational soul; there will therefore be a third which will be
separate according to <both> act and essence.
4. Again, it is seen <to be the case> through a
deductive argument toward what is inappropriate. For it is
inappropriate that some created nature is more noble than
the angel; but every cause is more noble than its effect:
therefore the angel does not have any cause but an uncreated
one. But that cannot be a material or formal cause:
therefore the angel does not have matter or another form,
but rather is essentially a form.
Conclusion
If matter is taken in a wide sense with the extension
of the name to every potential constitutive <element>,
then the very substance of the angel is composed of
matter and form.
I respond: It should be said that it is certain that an
angel does not have an essence simple through the privation
of all composition; for it is certain that an angel is
composed with multiple composition. For it can be considered
with respect to its principle; and thus in so much as it is
composed does it also have dependence on it. For the most
simple is the most absolute and every dependent on this has
in itself some composition. --- Secondly it can be
considered with respect to its effect; and thus it has to be
composed of substance and potency. --- Nonetheless it can be
considered as being in a genus; and thus according to the
metaphysician it is composed of act and potency, but of
genus and difference according to the logician. --- Again,
it can be considered as being in itself; and in this way
with respect to actual being (esse actuale) there is in it a
composition of being and to be (entis et esse), with respect
to essential being (esse essentiale), <there is a
composition> of that by which it is (quo est) and of that
which is (quod est), <or> with respect to individual or
personal being (esse individuale sive personale), and thus
<there is a composition of> what is (quod est) and who is
(quis est). --- Although therefore the angelic essence is
called simple, this is not through the privation of these
compositions.
But this is sure, that some compositions are removed
from the substance of the angel, such as composition of
quantitative parts, composition of heterogeneous parts, and
composition of corporeal and spiritual nature, such as it is
in man.
But regarding the composition of matter and form, or
material and formal, there is doubt about this. And some
wish to say that such is removed from the angel and the
earlier mentioned compositions <still> are in it. --- But,
as was shown above, since in the angel there is the note of
mutability not only to non-being but <also> according to
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 61
diverse properties, there is again the note of the ability
to be affected (passibilitatis), there is the note of
individuation and limitation, and lastly the note of
essential composition according to its own nature: I do not
see a cause or reason how it can be defended unless the
substance of the angel is composed of diverse natures, and
the essence of creature per se a being; and if it is
composed of diverse natures, those two natures are related
through the mode of the actual and the possible, and thus of
matter and form. And for this reason that position seems to
be more true, namely that in the angel there is a
composition of matter and form.
1.2. To the objection to the contrary on the authority
of Boethius, it should be said that he speaks of matter as
appropriated (materia appropriate), namely by reason of
passive potency, "which is the principle of being affected
and changing from another". And this is clear because he
himself wishes to prove that corporeal things are not
converted into spiritual things, nor the converse.
Similarly the Philosopher wishes to say that the soul has
been stripped of the note of matter according to which it is
a cause of mixture and corruption. And for this reason they
do not speak generally of matter, but as appropriated
(appropriate); otherwise Boethius would contradict himself
in the beginning of the De Trinitate, where he says that
nothing is subject to accidents except through matter; and
in the same place, that God alone is immaterial.
3. To the objection that a simple creature can
rationally be conceived etc., it should be said that when
the properties of the creature are considered, because the
creature, for the very reason that it is a creature, is not
pure act, it is necessary that it have possibility; because
it is mutable, it is necessary that it have a foundation;
because limited and in a genus, it is necessary that it have
composition: whence it cannot rationally be thought that it
is not able to be or to come to be. And if you object to me
that God is able make it the case that an accidental form is
without matter, as in the sacrament of the altar, it should
be said he never makes <anything> unless it is always
naturally constituted to be in matter, and to that, to the
extent that it is of its own nature, it has an inclination.
If therefore God fashions things, according as is fitting
for the natures of those, it is clear that he ought never to
make it the case that form stands without matter in the
constitution of things, although in miracles he makes
<things> against nature and above nature. " For in the
constitution of things we do not ask what God is able to do
but what is congruous with the nature of the creature
itself," as Augustine says.
4. To the objection that the cause is more noble than
the effect, <it should be said that> it is true concerning
the efficient and final <causes> which properly possess the
R. Taylor Marquette University Spring 1985 62
notion of cause; but concerning the material and formal
which are principles ordered to the composition, it does not
have truth absolutely (simpliciter), but only in a certain
fashion (secundum quid: or, to a limited extent).
