Translations

Text # 1

The first proposition of the Arabic text of the Kalam fi mahd al-khair (Discourse on the Pure Good) known in Latin translation as the Liber de causis.

Chapter <1>

Every primary cause emanates more abundantly on its effect than does the universal second cause. And when the universal second cause removes its power from the thing, the universal first cause does not remove its power from it. For the universal first cause acts on the effect of the second cause before the universal second cause which is immediately adjacent to (the effect) acts on (the effect). So when the second cause which is immediately adjacent to the effect acts, its act is not able to do without the first cause which is above (the second cause). And when the second (cause) separates itself from the effect which is immediately adjacent to it, the first cause which is above (the second cause) does not separate itself from (the effect), because it is cause of (the effect's) cause. The first cause, therefore, is more the cause of the thing than its proximate cause which is immediately adjacent to (the thing).

As examples of that we give being, living and man, for the thing must first be a being, then living, then a man. Thus, living is the proximate cause of the man and being is his remote cause. Being, then, is more a cause of the man than living because (being) is a cause of living which is a cause of the man. Likewise, when you make rationality a cause of the man, being is more a cause of the man than rationality because (being) is a cause of (rationality's) cause. The proof is that, when you remove the rational faculty from the man, it does not continue a man but it does continue living, breathing and sensitive. And when you remove living from it, it does not continue living but it does continue being, because being is not removed from it when living is removed. Because the cause is not removed with the removal of its effect, the man continues being. When the individual is not a man, it is an animal; and when it is not an animal, it is only a being.

So it has become clear and evident that the remote first cause is more encompassing and more a cause of the thing than its proximate cause. On account of that, its act has come to be more strongly adherent to the thing than the act of (the thing's) proximate cause. This came to be so only because the thing is first acted on by the remote power, then secondly it is acted on by the power which is below the first. <Moreover,> the first cause aids the second cause in its act because every act which the second cause effects, the first cause also effects, except that (the first cause) effects it in another, transcendent and more sublime manner. And when the second cause separates itself from its effect, the first cause does not separate itself from it because the act of the first cause is mightier and more strongly adherent to the thing than the act of its proximate cause. Furthermore, the effect of the second cause has been made stable only through the power of the first cause. For, when the second cause effects a thing, the first cause which is above (the second cause) emanates  on that thing from its power so that it strongly adheres to that thing and conserves it. Thus, it has become clear and evident that the remote first cause is more a cause of the thing than its proximate cause which is immediately adjacent to (the thing) and that it emanates its power on it and conserves it and does not separate itself from it with the separation of its proximate cause, but rather it remains in it and strongly adheres to it in accordance with what we have made clear and evident.

(c) Richard C. Taylor 30 May 2015

Text # 2

al-Kindi on the True Agent

al-Kindi: THE AGENT IN THE PROPER SENSE, BEING FIRST AND PERFECT, AND THE AGENT IN THE METAPHORICAL SENSE, BEING IMPERFECT.  

Tr. A. Altman and S. M. Stern in ISAAC ISRAELI (OXFORD 1958) pp.68-69.

We must explain what is action (fi'l) and in which senses it is used.   The first kind of action in the proper sense is making existent existences from the non-existent (ta'yis al-aysat'an lays). It is clear that this kind of action belongs properly to God, who is the end of every cause, because making existent existences from the non-existent does not belong to anybody except Him. To this kind of action belongs properly the name of 'innovation' (ibda').

The second kind of action in the proper sense, coming immediately after the preceding, is the influence (athar) of one who influences the thing that is influenced. The true Agent is one who influences without being influenced by any kind of influence; the true Agent is therefore one who makes what he makes without being acted upon in any way. One who is acted upon is one who receives some influence, i.e. who is acted upon by an agent.

Therefore, the Agent in the proper sense of the word, who is not acted upon, is the Creator, the maker of the universe, may He be praised. On the other hand everything beneath Him, i.e. all His creations, are only called agent in a metaphorical, not in the proper, sense; because in the proper sense they are all acted upon. The first of them is acted upon by the Creator, the rest by each other: the first is acted upon, and through this passiveness the next is acted upon, from the passiveness of the latter another is acted upon, until we reach the last thing which is acted upon. The first among these is called 'agent in a metaphorical sense' of the first thing which is acted upon, and is the near cause of its passiveness; similarly, the second is the near cause of the passiveness of the third, until we reach the last thing which is acted upon. The Creator, however, is in the proper sense the first cause of all things that are acted upon, both those that are acted upon through an intermediary and those without an intermediary, because He is active, never passive; only He is the near cause of the first passive thing, and a cause through intermediaries to those things that He acted upon after the first.

This kind of action, viz. that belonging to a thing which is acted upon - which is action in a metaphorical sense, not in the proper sense (as none of the agents which are also acted upon is exclusively active but exclusively passive, as its passivity is the cause of the others' passivity) - can be divided into two kinds. One is that kind to which this general name, viz. action, belongs in the proper sense, to wit those things in which the influence ceases simultaneously with the passiveness caused by its agent. For instance, the walking of a man, which ceases when the man ceases to walk, as the passiveness of the walker ceases and no influence remains to be perceived by sensation. The second kind is where the influence remains in the thing acted upon even after the source of the influence ceases to cause passiveness; for instance, the impression of a seal, or an edifice, and similar products of the crafts. This kind of action is more particularly known by the name of 'work' ('amal). 

This is sufficient answer to your question. End of the epistle, praise be to God.

Text # 3

The criteria of the definition of creation according to Thomas Aquinas in his Commentary on the Sentences:

n II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2

creation is said to be from nothing in two ways. One is such that the negation negates the order of creation in regard to something preexisting implied by the preposition from, so that being is said to be from nothing because it is not from something preexisting. That is with respect to the first. The other is such that the order of creation in regard to nothing preexisting is affirmed with respect to nature so that creation is said to be from nothing because the thing created naturally has non being prior to being. If these two suffice for the meaning of creation, then creation can be demonstrated in this way and in this way the philosophers have asserted creation. (tr. R. Taylor)

Text # 4

An extract from the Theology of Aristotle

No one must imagine that this description applies to the wise Creator, for that is absurd and impossible and inappropriate to that perfect, surpassing and noble substance. It is impossible for us to say that the Creator first reflected over how to originate things and then after that originated them, for the things over which he reflected must be either external to him or internal to him. If they are external to him then they existed before he originated them, and if they are internal to him they are either other than he or identical with him, in which case he does not need reflection in creating the things because he is the things by the fact of his being the cause of them. If they are other than he then he is assumed to be compound, not simple, and this is absurd.

We say that no one can say that the Creator first reflects about things and then originates them, for it is he that originated reflection, so how can he enlist its aid in the origination of anything when it does not yet exist? This is absurd. We say that he is reflection, and reflection does not reflect too; for it would then follow that that reflection reflects, and so ad in infinitum, which is absurd. Now it is clear and confirmed how right they are who say that the creator originated things without reflection. We say that when craftsmen wish to fashion a thing they reflect on that thing and copy what they see and contemplate within themselves. Or they cast their eyes on one of the external things and model their works on that thing. When they they work with their hands and other instruments, whereas when the Creator wishes to make something, he does not envisage patterns within himself, nor does he imitate in his workmanship any workmanship external to him, because before he originated the things there was nothing. Nor does he envisage patterns within his being, for his being is the pattern of everything and the pattern does not envisage patterns. He does not need any instrument in the origination of things because he is the cause of instruments, it being he that originated them, and in what he originates he needs nothing of his origination. Now that the unsoundness and impossibility of this doctrine are made plain, we say that there is, between him and his creation, no intermediate thing on which he reflects and the help of which he seeks, but that he originated things by the mere fact of his being. The first thing he originated was a form which drew tight from him and appeared before all things, almost resembling him in the greatness of its power and light and extent. Then he originated the rest of things through the medium of that form, as if it were fulfilling his will in the originating of the rest of things, this form being the upper world; I mean, the minds and souls. Then there came into existence from that upper world the lower world and the sensible things within it.

Plotini Opera. Tomus II, Enneades IV-V, P. Henry & H.-R. Schwyzer, eds. Arabic to English tr. G. Lewis (Paris & Bruxells, 1959), pp. 393-395.

Text # 5

An extract from the Sayings of the Greek Sage

He said : The First Creator — He is great and exalted — has no form and shape similar to the forms of the high things and the forms which are in the lower would, and no potency similar to their potency. He is above any form and shape and potency, because He is the Creator of every sensible shape and form through the medium of the intellect. When the thing which comes into being is brought into being, it must be a thing, and it must have some shape and form. The First Creator — He is great and exalted — however, whom no one brought into being and whom no one created has no shape and form, because He is the real maker of forms and the creator of all identities (read: beings). He said : The Real Creator is not a thing. He is all things and not all things, because (all) things are from Him.

Plotini Opera. Tomus II, Enneades IV-V, P. Henry & H.-R. Schwyzer, eds. Arabic to English tr. G. Lewis (Paris & Bruxells, 1959), p. 481.

Text # 6

An extract from chapter 8 [9] of the Kalam fi mahd al-khair / Liber de causis

Another Proposition (8)

   The stability and the subsistence of every intelligence are only through the Pure Good which is the First Cause.

   The power of the intelligence has stronger unity than the second things which are after it because they do not attain its <level of> cognition. This came to be so only because it is a cause of what is below it. The proof of that is this: the intelligence exercises providence over all the things which are below it through the divine power which is in it, and by it (: the divine power) it sustains the things because by it (: the divine power) it (: the intelligence) is the cause of the things. It sustains and encompasses all the things which are below it. For every thing which is primary for things and a cause of them sustains and exercises providence over those things and none of them escapes it owing to its exalted power. The intelligence, therefore, is the ruler of all the things which are below it, and sustains and exercises providence over them, just as nature exercises providence over the things which are below it through the power of the intelligence. Likewise, the intelligence exercises providence over nature through divine power. And the intelligence came to sustain and to exercise providence over the things which are after it and its power is exalted over them, only because they are not a substantial power for it, but rather it is a power of the substantial powers because it is a cause of them. The intelligence encompasses comings-into-being and nature and what is above nature, namely soul, since it is above nature. For nature encompasses coming-into-being and soul encompasses nature and the intelligence encompasses soul. The intelligence, therefore, encompasses all things.

   The intelligence came to be so only thanks to the First Cause which is exalted over all things because He is the cause of the intelligence, soul, nature and all other things. And the First Cause is not an intelligence nor a soul nor a nature, but rather He is above the intelligence, soul and nature because He is the Originator of all things. He is, however, Originator of the intelligence without mediation and the Originator of soul, nature and all other things through the mediation of the intelligence. <Moreover,> Divine Knowledge is 30 not like intellectual knowledge nor like the knowledge of soul, but rather it (: Divine Knowledge) is above the knowledge of the intelligence and the knowledge of soul because it (: Divine Knowledge) is the Originator of all types of knowledge. Furthermore, Divine Power is above every intellectual, psychic or natural power because it (: Divine Power) is cause of every power. And the intelligence possesses shape because it is being and form, and likewise soul possesses shape and nature possesses shape, but the First Cause does not have shape because He is only being. So if someone says: He must have shape, we say: His shape is infinite and His essential nature is the Pure Good pouring forth all goods on the intelligence and on all other things through the mediation of the intelligence. (tr. R. Taylor)

Text # 7

An extract from chapter 17 [18] of the Kalam fi mahd al-khair / Liber de causis

Another Proposition (17 )         

   All things possess entity because of the First Entity; all living things are self-moving because of the first life; and all intellectual things have knowledge  because of the first intelligence. For, if every cause gives something to its effect, then inevitably the First Entity gives all His effects entity. Likewise, life gives all its effects motion because life is the first procession proceeding from the First Quiescent Eternal Entity and the first motion. And, likewise, the intelligence gives its effects knowledge, for all true knowledge is only in the intelligence, and the intelligence is the first knower to be and it pours forth knowledge on the rest of the knowers.                

   We resume and say, then, that the First Entity is quiescent and is the cause of causes, and if He gives all things entity, He gives it in the manner of origination. The first life gives life to what is below it not in the manner of origination, but in the manner of form. And, likewise, the intelligence gives knowledge and the other things to what is below it only in the manner of form, not in the manner of origination, because the manner of origination belongs to the First Cause alone.

Text # 8

Liber de causis

IV  Capitulum aliud.  Prima rerum creatarum est esse et non est ante ipsum creatum aliud. Quod est quia esse est supra  sensum et supra animam et supra intelligentiam, et non est post causam primam latius neque plus causatum ipso. Propter illud ergo factum est superius creatis rebus omnibus et vehementius unitum. Et non est factum ita nisi propter suam  propinquitatem esse puro et uni, vero in quo non est multitudo aliquo modorum. Et esse creatum quamvis sit unum tamen  multiplicatur, scilicet quia ipsum recipit multiplicitatem. Et ipsum quidem non est factum multa nisi quia ipsum, quamvis sit  simplex et non sit in creatis simplicius eo, tamen est compositum ex finito et infinito. Quod est quia omne quod ex eo  sequitur causam primam est achili [id estl intelligentia, completa et ultima in potentia et reliquis bonitatibus. Et formae  intellectibiles in ipso sunt latiores et vehementius universales. Et quod ex eo est inferius est intelligentia iterum, verumtamen  est sub illa intelligentia in complemento et virtute et bonitatibus. Et non sunt formae intellectibiles in illa ita dilatatae sicut est  earum latitudo in illa intelligentia. Et esse quidem creatum primum est intelligentia totum, verumtamen intelligentia in ipso  est diversa per modum quem diximus. Et quia diversificatur intelligentia, fit illic forma intellectibilis diversa. Et sicut ex forma  una, propterea quod diversificatur in mundo inferiori, proveniunt individua infinita in multitudine, similiter ex esse creato  primo, propterea quod diversificatur, apparent formae intellectibiles infinitae. Verumtamen, quamvis diversificentur non seiunguntur ab invicem, sicut est seiunctio individuorum.  Quod est quoniam ipsae uniuntur absque corruptione et separantur  absque seiunctione, quoniam sunt unum habens multitudinem et multitudo in unitate. Et intelligentiae primae influunt super  intelligentias secundas bonitates quas recipiunt a causa prima, et intendunt bonitates in eis usquequo consequuntur ultimam earum.

Translation of the Latin Text

The first of created things is being, and there is nothing else created before it. This is because being is above sense, above soul, and above intelligence, and after the first cause there is no effect more extensive or prior to it. As a result, then, it came to be higher than all [other] created things and to be more powerfully united. It came to be so only because of its nearness to the pure being and the true one, in which there is no multiplicity of any sort.  

Although created being is one, nevertheless it comes to be multiple because it receives multiplicity. And, it became many only because, although it is simple and there is nothing among created things more simple than it, it is nevertheless composed of the finite and the infinite. All the part of it that follows the first cause is achili,'  that is, an intelligence, complete and ultimate in power" and all the other goodnesses. And the intelligible forms in it are more extensive and more powerfully universal. The part of it that is lower is also an intelligence, though it is below the former intelligence in completeness, power. and goodnesses. The intelligible forms in it are not as extended in their breadth as they are in the former intelligence. First created being is wholly intelligence, yet intelligence in it is diverse in the way we have said. And because intelligence is diversified, the intelligible form there becomes diverse. And, just as from one form, because it is diversified in the lower world, there proceed individuals infinite in multitude, so too from the first created being, because it is diversified, there appear infinite intelligible forms. Yet, although they are diversified, they are not distinct from one another as are individuals. This is because they are united without corruption and are separated without distinction, for they are a one possessing multiplicity and a multiplicity in unity. And the first intelligences infuse the second intelligences with the goodnesses they receive from the first cause, and they spread goodness in them until they reach the last of them.