“Virtue, Emotion and Practical Reason in Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition”

Eighth Annual Marquette Summer Seminar on

Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition

24-26 June 2013

Presented by the Midwest Seminar in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy

and the Aquinas and the Arabs Project

with the support of the

Helen Way Klingler College of Arts and Sciences at Marquette

and the Mellon Fund

Marquette University

Department of Philosophy

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

OUR SINCERE THANKS TO THE ATTENDEES OF THE 2013 SUMMER SEMINAR AT MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY.  WITH SOME 35 ATTENDEES AND 17 PRESENTERS, THIS WAS A RECORD FOR OUR ANNUAL EVENT. THANKS TO WELL INFORMED PARTICIPANTS THIS WAS ANOTHER RICH AND REWARDING EVENT.

NEW IN 2014:

IN 2014 WE WILL PERMIT ONLINE ATTENDANCE FOR INTERESTED OBSERVERS UNABLE TO BE PRESENT IN MILWAUKEE THANKS TO MARQUETTE’S AVAILABLE MICROSOFT LYNC VIDEO SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE.

This Conference is intended to provide a formal occasion and central location for philosophers and scholars of the Midwest region (and elsewhere) to present and discuss their current work on Aristotle’ and his interpreters in ancient, medieval and contemporary philosophy.

ATTENDING ONLY: Send Registration check with name, address, academic affiliation.

CONFERENCE REGISTRATION FOR ALL PRESENTERS AND ATTENDEES

(fees cover breakfasts, refreshments, dinner one night)

Advance Registration ($45 by check) Deadline: May 1.

NOTE => After May 1 Registration only at the door: $50 cash.

CHECKS SHOULD BE MADE OUT TO: Marquette University

(Fees are waived for Marquette students, faculty and staff.)

Conference Proposal Submission Guidelines

Established Scholars: send a title and tentative abstract;

Graduate Students: send a title, abstract, CV and a supporting letter from your faculty advisor or dissertation director.

NOTE: Abstracts should be 150 words or fewer.

Send applications by email to: Owen.Goldin@Marquette.edu

OPENING DATE FOR SUBMISSIONS: January 1, 2013.

The Selection Committee will select presenters on the basis  of quality of proposals (title and abstract) and scholarly record as the primary criteria.

PROGRAM ANNOUNCED: March. The first review of submissions will take place March 1. This date should be considered the deadline for submissions since it is likely that the conference program will be completed at that time.

Presenters will be asked to confirm their participation by paying the registration fee when offered the conference slot.

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Registration Form.

=> ALL ATTENDEES (including the Marquette community) are asked to register.<=

NAME:

TITLE: 

ACADEMIC AFFILIATION:

ADDRESS:

EMAIL ADDRESS:

TELEPHONE:

CHECK NUMBER: 

(Registration fees are waived for members of the Marquette community.)

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Print the Registration Form above and send your check made out to “Marquette University” to:

Owen Goldin

Philosophy Department

Marquette University

P.O. Box 1880

Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881

Registered Attendees:

forthcoming

*Fee paid, or waived for Marquette students, faculty, staff.

Conference Schedule

All sessions will be held in the Beaumier Conference Center in the lower level of Raynor Library at 1355 W. Wisconsin Ave.. (See below for location link.)

MONDAY JUNE 24 :  Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library

 

Presentations 

 

8:45-10:00: [1] Prof. Robert Bolton, Rutgers University, “Phronesis: Aristotle’s Conception of Moral Knowledge”

 

10:05-11:20: [2] Prof. David Ebrey, Northwestern University, “Teaching and Habituation in Aristotle”

 

11:25-12:40 [3] Prof. Jeff Macy, Hebrew University, "(Religious) Law and Virtuous Ends: Aristotelian Influences on Maimonides' Treatment of the Virtues"

12:40-2:15 pm Lunch: suggestions: AMU (Student Union), Subway, Jimmy John’s Subs, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.

 

Presentations

 

2:15-3:30: [4] Ms. Eve Rabinoff, Boston College,  “Phronēsis and the Orthos Logos of Virtue”

 

3:35-4:50: [5] Prof. Bronwyn Finnigan, Marquette University “Phronēsis in Aristotle: Reconciling Deliberation with Spontaneity”

4:55-6:10: [6] Prof. Kristen Inglis, University of Pittsburgh, “The Female Deliberative Faculty as Akuron”

Conference Dinner (included in conference fee) at the home of Prof. Taylor 6:30-9:30 pm. Car pooling available.

 

TUESDAY JUNE 24 : Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library

 

Presentations

 

8:15-9:30: [1]  Mr. Daniel Tovar, Northwestern University, “Perception, Thought and Choosing Ends”

9:35-10:50: [2] Prof. Julie Ward, Loyola University of Chicago, “Perceiving the Triangle as the Ultimate Particular: Perception and Practical Reason in EN VI”

10:55-12:10[3] Prof. Howard Curzer, Texas Tech University, “Defending Aristotle’s Practical Syllogism”

12:10-1:45 Lunch: suggestions: AMU (Student Union), Subway, Jimmy John’s Subs, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.

Presentations

Introduced by Dr. David Chan, University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point

1:45-3:00: [4]  Ms. Ashley Dressel, University of California at Irvine. “How Virtuous People Might Come to Sin on Purpose: Aquinas on Willful Wrongdoing”

3:05-4:20 [5] Prof. Agnes Callard,  University of Chicago, "Enkrates as Phronimos"

4:25-5:40: [6] Ms. Lauren Sidlar, University of Western Ontario “Aquinas on Impetuous Akrasia and Freedom of Action”

7:00 pm Buffet dinner at Shahrazad, 2847 N. Oakland Ave., Milwaukee.

 

WEDNESDAY JUNE 26 : Beaumier Conference Center, Raynor Library

Presentations

 

 9:00 - 10:15: [1] Mr. Jerry Green, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin. “Divinity and Happiness in the Aristotelian Ethics”

10:25-11:40: [2]  Dr. Matteo Di Giovanni, Yale University, “Philosophy Liberated. On Averroes’s Islamic Reformism”

11:40-1:10 Lunch: suggestions: AMU (Student Union), Subway, Jimmy John’s Subs, Qdoba, Miss Katie’s Diner, and more in the immediate area.

Presentations

Introduced by Mr. John MacCormick, University of Toronto

1:10 - 2:25 [4] Prof. Katherine Withy, Georgetown University "Heidegger on Aristotle on Affective Virtue"

2:35 - 3:50: [5] Prof. Bonnie Kent, University of California, Irvine, “Putting Anger in Its Place: Peter Olivi Against ‘the Philosophizers’”

Dinner suggestion for those remaining in Milwaukee Wednesday night: The Seven Seas restaurant on Lake Nagawicka, Peewaukee. (Self-pay.)

For driving directions, see http://www.sevenseaswi.com/how-to-find-us.html.

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CONFERENCE LOCATION:

Conference sessions will take place in the Raynor Library (1355 W. Wisconsin Ave.) Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, June 24-26, 2013. For information on the Raynor Library and nearby parking see http://www.marquette.edu/contact/finder/raynor.shtml and the links there.

HOUSING:

On campus housing is available at a modest cost ($49 single; $70 double = $35 per person).   To reserve a room contact the housing office directly:  Carrie Enea at 414-288-4737 or via email at carrie.enea@marquette.edu. Cut-off date for room reservations: May 23, 2013. Rooms requested after the cut-off date are subject to availability.

Rooms will be at Straz Tower, 915 W. Wisconsin Avenue, a three block walk from the conference location.

PARKING:

Structure 1, located on 749 N. 16th Street, and Structure 2, located at 1240 W. Wells St ., have been designated the university’s visitor parking facilities. For information on the costs of parking ask at the check-in desk at Straz Tower, 915 W. Wisconsin Avenue.

Daytime visitors’ parking 6 am - 5 pm is ca. $5.00 per day at these structures.

Overnight parking (ca. $6) can be arranged at the check-in desk at Straz Hall.

New: For parking information, click here or go to:  http://www.marquette.edu/about/visitor_parking.shtml.

HOTELS:

Just a few blocks East from Marquette University is the Holiday Inn Milwaukee City Center, 611 West Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53203. Tel. 1-414-273-2950.

For further information on the hotel, see http://www.ichotelsgroup.com/h/d/hi/1/en/hd/mkecc?irs=null

A few blocks West from Marquette University is the very charming Ambassador Hotel: 2308 W Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, WI 53233. Tel.(414) 342-8400

For further information on the hotel, see www.ambassadormilwaukee.com

(Mention that you are attending a Marquette conference may get you a discount. Be sure to ask.)

DIRECTIONS AND MAPS:

For directions to the Marquette Campus, see http://www.marquette.edu/contact/directions/

For a map of the Marquette University campus, see http://www.marquette.edu/contact/CampusMap.pdf

For a map of downtown Milwaukee, see

http://www.wisconline.com/counties/milwaukee/map-downtown.html

For parking information, click here or go to:  http://www.marquette.edu/about/visitor_parking.shtml.

TRAVELING TO MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY (& DOWNTOWN MILWAUKEE) FROM

MILWAUKEE’S MITCHELL AIRPORT:

For a shuttle, see http://www.mitchellairport.com/getting.html

Downtown Milwaukee: info from http://kiwinc.itgo.com/mwc/mitchell.html

    * Expect a taxi to cost around $30 or more due to fuel costs.

    * Most convenient: Airport Connection shared ride van serves a frequent loop of most downtown hotels. http://mkelimo.com/ ($15-20)

    * Cheapest: MCTS bus route 80 serves 6th St. downtown, next to the Frontier Airlines Center and nearby hotels. Travel time is 25 minutes, often only a few minutes longer than taxi or van.

http://www.ridemcts.com/routes_and_schedules/schedule.asp?route=80

Straz Tower is at 9th and Wisconsin.

The Conference Center is in the lower level of Raynor Library at 1355 W. Wisconsin Ave.

Midwest Seminar in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy link:

http://web.mac.com/mistertea/Midwest_Seminar/Welcome.html

Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’ Project link:

www.AquinasAndTheArabs.org

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT link:

http://www.marquette.edu/phil/

Conference Abstracts – Alphabetical Order

Prof. Robert Bolton, Rutgers University, “Phronesis: Aristotle’s Conception of Moral Knowledge”

Prof. Agnes Callard, University of Chicago, "Enkrates as Phronimos"

     Aristotle is standardly thought to deny phronesis to any agent whose appetitive desires are not as they ought to be.  The textual evidence for the view that phronesis requires moderation (sophrosune) rests on comments in NE VI.12 and NE VI.13 to the effect that phronesis requires virtue.  I argue that those passages rule out not the enkratic phronimos but only the vicious phronimos or the phonimos who has natural as opposed to ethical virtue.   Furthermore, I show that the discussion of enkrateia in NE VII (esp. in chapters 4,7 and 10) is best read as not only allowing for but as demanding phronesis from the enkrates.  Aristotelian virtue ethics is, I argue, less perfectionistic in respect of the education of the irrational part of the soul than it is usually taken to be: complete rightness of feeling is not a prerequisite for practical knowledge, right action, or happiness.

Prof. Howard Curzer, Texas Tech University, “Defending Aristotle’s Practical Syllogism”

     Critics of Aristotle’s practical syllogism object that Aristotle provides no general principles for the virtues, and that he thinks choices are made by perception rather than reason.

     But Aristotle gives a right rule for general justice. Since Aristotle describes general justice as “complete virtue – not absolutely, but in relation to others” (1129b25-27), general justice can be understood as a super-virtue encompassing the interpersonal parts of the other virtues. Applying Aristotle’s right rule for general justice to the distribution of safety, money, honor, etc. yields the right rules for the rest of the virtues.

     When Aristotle says, “the decision rests with perception” (1109b23), his point is not that we should use perception instead of reason, but rather that we need both perception to provide the particular facts and reason to provide the right rule. Reason clearly plays a crucial role in action choice for Aristotle.

Dr. Matteo Di Giovanni, Yale University, “Philosophy Liberated. On Averroes’s Islamic Reformism”

     The question of practical reasoning is an ideal vantage point to analyze the position of Averroes (d. 1198), a prominent Aristotelian in the Islamic tradition, on the relationship between reason and revelation. This is constructed along rationalistic lines insofar as it accords priority to reason over revelation. I shall analyze the significance of Averroes’s rationalism both as a philosophical option in its own terms and in the historical context of Muslim Spain. With regard to the latter, Averroes attempted to revive the foundations of pre-Almohad culture while, ironically, serving as a high official of the Almohad regime. On one side Averroes reformed the ‘imperfect’ rationalism advocated by the Almohad Mahdī Muḥammad Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130) so as to harmonize it with Aristotelian philosophy; on the other side, he challenged the anti-rationalistic stance of kalām accommodated by Ibn Tūmart himself and by Almohad society in his wake.

Ms. Ashley Dressel, University of California at Irvine. “How Virtuous People Might Come to Sin on Purpose: Aquinas on Willful Wrongdoing”

     Following in the Aristotelian tradition, Aquinas claims that even the most deliberate sort of wrongdoing involves ignorance.  However, Aquinas also believes that there are instances of truly clear-eyed wrongdoing -  instances in which the person acting knows, at the moment she acts, that what she does is morally bad.  These are not instances of so-called weakness of will, or akrasia.  These are instances of willful wrongdoing, which Aquinas calls sins “from evil” (malitia).  Though Aquinas believes even sins from evil involve ignorance, his acknowledgment of these actions represents a major and seldom-acknowledged departure from Aristotle.  In describing sins from evil, I argue Aquinas offers both a new way of understanding actions committed from vice, and even a defense of the radically non-Aristotelian idea that the virtuous person might sometimes
do what she knows to be wrong without the mitigating influence of
ignorance, passion, or vice.

Prof. David Ebrey, Northwestern University, “Teaching and Habituation in Aristotle”

     This is part of a larger project on teaching and habituation in Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle says that some virtues are acquired from teaching, others from habit (NE II.1, 1103a14-18). I argue that this is in contrast to Plato, who uses the term “teaching” in a broader way that encompasses what Aristotle calls habit. Not seeing this difference between Plato and Aristotle confuses our pictures of each of them. In part because of this, the distinctive features of Aristotle’s account have not been properly appreciated. In response to the question of whether virtue is teachable, Aristotle thinks we cannot give a uniform answer. It depends on what sort of virtue. The intellectual virtues are teachable, but the character virtues are not.

     There are a number of questions about how Aristotle’s account works. First, how we can be changed through habit at all?  Habit is what affects the part of the soul that does not have reason, but can be persuaded to listen to reason and can obey reason. How can this part do these things without reason? How does habit affect its change on emotions and desires? Similarly, how do we understand teaching if we contrast it with habit? Aristotle thinks that technai, in particular, are taught. The repetitive practice involved in acquiring a techne seems similar to the process of habituation. How do we clearly distinguish them?

     Aristotle thinks that these two parts of the soul work extremely closely together. Every full-fledged action (praxis) is a result of both parts of the soul working in tandem: without the rational part of the soul, there would be no deliberation; without the non-rational part, there would be no desire (NE VI.2). He thinks that the excellences of one part of the soul require those of the other part, so they are mutually dependent. Nonetheless, he thinks that these excellences are distinct. Training and developing one part of the soul is still a distinct task from training and developing the other part, even if these parts and this training is mutually interdependent. There is no single place where Aristotle clearly lays out how this independent system works. I provide an account of how they are distinct and yet interdependent, drawing from NE I, II, VI, and X.

Prof. Bronwyn Finnigan, Marquette University “Phronēsis in Aristotle: Reconciling Deliberation with Spontaneity”

     A standard thesis of contemporary Aristotelian virtue ethics and some recent Heideggerian scholarship is that virtuous behaviour can be performed immediately and spontaneously without engaging conscious processes of deliberative thought. Moreover, it is claimed that phronēsis either enables or is consistent with this possibility. In the Nicomachean Ethics, however, Aristotle claims that phronēsis is the excellence of the calculative part of the intellect; that calculation and deliberation are the same; and, that it is the mark of the phronimos to be able to deliberate well. He also insists that virtuous action properly issues from rational choice, which he characterizes as determined by deliberation. It seems to follow that any exegetically respectable attempt to explain virtuous action within an Aristotelian framework would need to integrate with some account of deliberative choice. This creates a tension in Aristotelian scholarship. In this paper, I shall formalize this tension in terms of an apparently inconsistent triad of claims and shall investigate four strategies aimed at their reconciliation to substantiate the possibility of spontaneously virtuous action within an Aristotelian framework.

Mr. Jerry Green, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin. “Divinity and Happiness in the Aristotelian Ethics”

     In Nicomachean Ethics X.7-8 Aristotle argues that the best life is a life where one’s activities are directed by, and expressive of, the intellectual part of the soul. This is the most divine part, and therefore the best part; the corresponding life is the best life.

     In Eudemian Ethics XII.3, things appear different. Contemplation of the divine is still important, but plays a different role. Rather than structure our whole life around it, contemplation of the divine serves only as the criterion for choice of external goods.

     I hope to show that (i) this is a genuine difference between the NE and EE, and (ii) this difference is the result of a substantial revision of Aristotle’s conception of divinity, humanity, and soul, and hence of human virtue. Clarity on these issues will help illuminate Aristotle’s view of the content of eudaimonia, as well as the relationship between the two treatises.

Prof. Kristen Inglis, University of Pittsburgh, “The Female Deliberative Faculty as Akuron”

     There is a general puzzle about what Aristotle means when (e.g. at Politics 1.13) he attributes virtue of character to women. This is because Aristotle seems to maintain both that virtue is a mode of rational excellence and that women are by nature rationally defective. The solution to this puzzle, I suggest, is to conceive of a woman’s virtue as an approximation of the paradigmatic virtue that Aristotle presents in his ethical works.  In what way does a woman’s virtue approximate paradigmatic virtue?  How we answer this question depends on how we interpret Aristotle’s claim that women have a deliberative  (bouleutikon) that is “inauthoritative” (akuron). There are two dominant interpretations of this claim. I consider the pros and cons of both of these interpretations of “akuron” in light of Aristotle’s comments about women elsewhere—especially his comments that women are prone to “softness” (malakia). Which interpretation we ultimately go with has major implications for how we understand Aristotle’s attitudes towards women’s ethical capacities.

Prof. Bonnie Kent, University of California, Irvine, “Putting Anger in Its Place: Peter Olivi Against ‘the Philosophizers’”

     Later medieval philosophers commonly distinguished between irascible and concupiscible powers in the nonrational soul.  The irascible, which supposedly has as its object the “the arduous,” typically ranks above the concupiscible as closer to reason.  Drawing on Nicomachean Ethics 7.6, Aquinas proceeds to argue that anger is a less serious sin than concupiscience – a far more favorable view than that taken by Gregory the Great, who considered anger a spiritual sin far more serious than lust or gluttony.   Peter Olivi firmly rejects this division of the nonrational soul by “the philosophizers.”  On his view, the irascible and concupiscible are the same power, and the irascible has no closer a connection to reason than the concupiscible does.  Olivi grants that anger can be rational; but he distinguishes sharply between the zealous anger concerned to punish injustice and anger more broadly, so that anger remains as serious a sin as Gregory thought.

Prof. Jeff Macy, Hebrew University, "(Religious) Law and Virtuous Ends: Aristotelian Influences on Maimonides' Treatment of the Virtues"

It is well known that Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics exerted a significant influence on the preeminent medieval Jewish philosopher Moses ben Maimon.  Maimonides' Shemonah Perakim (Eight Chapters) borrows directly and indirectly (through al-Farabi) on Maimonides' formulation of the moral mean and the distinction between the theoretical-rational virtues and the practical-rational virtues.  This paper will analyze the similarities and the differences been Aristotle's treatment of the rational virtues and Maimonides' treatment of those virtues, as well as comparing their treatments of friendship.  By means of this analysis, the paper will show that Maimonides' use of Aristotle's frameworks of ethical and rational virtue restricts the centrality of traditional Jewish treatments of virtue and perfection and relegates Jewish law to no more than a supportive status to attain philosophically defined virtuous ends. The paper will also examine whether both Maimonides and Aristotle distinguish between the role of practical-rational virtue and law for the elite in comparison to the masses.

Ms. Eve Rabinoff, Boston College,  “Phronēsis and the Orthos Logos of Virtue”

     At the outset of Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle sets out to determine what the orthos logos that states the mean of virtue is (1138b18-20), and seems to conclude that it is phronēsis (1144b28). I explain the sense in which phronēsis fulfills this role. Virtue consists (in part) in experiencing passions in a measured way, which implies being right about the situation that the passion is a response to; for example, anger is a response to a perceived slight, and that perception must be true if anger is to be felt in a measured way. Phronēsis, I argue, is a true perception of the particulars of practical matters (1142a23-30) with respect to which the ethical agent is affected (experiences the pathē), and it is a logos in the way that perception is a logos and a mean: phronēsis consists in a balanced state from which one discerns particulars appropriately.

Ms. Lauren Sidlar, University of Western Ontario “Aquinas on Impetuous Akrasia and Freedom of Action”

     While much attention has been given to Aristotle’s central case of akrasia, the case of the impetuous akratês who does not deliberate at all gets considerably less attention. This case of impetuous akrasia, however, poses an interesting problem for Aquinas’ interpretation of Aristotle on akratic voluntariness. While striving to maintain Aristotle’s overall view of akratic action as far as possible within the psychological framework of the will, Aquinas' distinctly different characterization of freedom of action ultimately leaves him unable to justify the akratês’ freedom and voluntariness under the Aristotelian characterization. This paper elucidates this predicament through close analysis of the texts, and argues that reading Aquinas as being overly committed to the full preservation of the Aristotelian view of impetuous akrasia is to misunderstand Aquinas’ views.

Mr. Daniel Tovar, Northwestern University, “Perception, Thought and Choosing Ends”

     The following is a straightforward account of how practical reason operates as described in the Nicomachean Ethics. In deciding how to act, one’s intellectual faculty rationally determines what ought to be done (one’s good or telos), and the steps necessary to achieve it. If one is practically wise, after the intellect has made these calculations, a desire is formed to do precisely what reason prescribes and one acts. However, if one is not practically wise, even if one reasons correctly about what to do, desire may not follow reason and one may end up acting against what reason says is best.

     On this view, what I will call the rationalist view, reason determines the ends for which one acts. It is only in cases where practical reason breaks down that desire controls action. However, if we look at the Nicomachean Ethics in conjunction with De Anima’s discussion of perception and thought, a quite different, far more Humean view emerges: one rationally takes up only those ends for which one already has non-rational desires. Yet, as I will argue, practical rationality is not entirely at the mercy of desire when selecting ends. While desire constrains the intellect, the intellect can affect desire through the manipulation of visual images, altering one’s perception of what one sees as desirable and not desirable. The upshot of this view is twofold. First, it gives us a way of resisting Jessica Moss’s Humean reading of Aristotle, put forth in her recent book Aristotle on the Apparent Good. I argue that even if we accept much of Moss’s account of perception, we are not thereby forced to accept her particular reading of the Ethics. Second, this view gives us insight into the complexity of practical reason and shows what it would mean for someone to instill in themselves good character dispositions through habituation.

     Aristotle’s explanation of action in the De Anima has three main parts: desire, perception and reason. Desire is an impulse to obtain what one finds pleasant. This impulse is closely associated with perception. Once one has experienced an object as pleasant, one comes to literally see objects similar to it as pleasant and hence as good, and this perception generates a desire for these objects. Thought, too, is closely related to both perception and desire. Thought, Aristotle says, thinks the images that are delivered to one by perception. For instance, one thinks that the bottle is brown because perception delivers to one an image of a brown bottle. And since one literally sees objects as being good, the same holds in this case. One thinks that objects are good precisely because perception presents them as being good.

     In Aristotle on the Apparent Good, Moss concludes from Aristotle’s account of thought that in practical reasoning the intellect’s job is to simply make explicit what perception sees as good and to calculate how to achieve it. I will call Moss’s highly Humean view a bottom-up view. It is bottom-up because what one takes to be good originates in non-rational desire, is passed on to perception, and is then finally grasped, unaltered, by the intellect. Thought itself exerts no influence on perception or desire.

     Against Moss, I argue that the relation between perception and intellect goes two ways, up and down. Although Moss recognizes the close relation between thought and perception, she does not fully appreciate what it amounts to. Thought is able to both think the images that are presented to it by perception and actively recall past images. Moss argues that this makes no difference. The images that one recalls are images that were at one time received via perception. Therefore, just like occurrent perceptions, these images contain the properties of good and bad. But this ignores Aristotle’s contention in De Memoria (450b20-451a1) that by pairing images, the intellect can alter how one sees those images. Take the example of McDonald’s. Although one might see McDonald’s food as pleasant to eat, one can learn to be repelled by this food. By pairing the repulsive knowledge of how the food is made with one’s pleasant perception of  the food, one can actively cause oneself to find it revolting. I argue that the same kind of transformation can be initiated with respect to the virtuous action at the center of the Nicomachean Ethics. If one’s experience with a certain type of un-virtuous action has been pleasant, thereby causing one to see what is actually bad as good, one can actively pair one’s view of this activity with another, painful image, thereby causing one to see it as bad. In this way, I argue, although perception exerts a strong influence on thought from the bottom up, thought can exert influence on perception and hence desire from the top down. The result is a view that is Humean insofar as our desires are always one step ahead of rationality, but un-Humean in the sense that the intellect can exert pressure on those desires with the aim of determining the sorts of ends one pursues.

     As mentioned above, the upshot of this view is twofold. First, we can see that even if we accept Moss’s account of perception and thought, the intellect can be seen as playing a more active role than Moss allows. Second, it highlights the constraints that empirical experience exerts on practical reason, and shows that instilling good habits in ourselves is a highly creative matter, consisting in our ability to imaginatively combine past perceptions.

Prof. Julie Ward, Loyola University of Chicago, “Perceiving the Triangle as the Ultimate Particular: Perception and Practical Reason in EN VI”

     In Nicomachean Ethics VI, 9, Aristotle opens the chapter with a comparison between phronesis and he politike, politics, but moves on to draw various points of contrast, closing with an opaque comparison to mathematical perception.  At 1142a23-4, Aristotle draws a distinction between phronesis and episteme, or scientific understanding, stating that phronesis –here likened to perception—grasps “the ultimate particular” (1042a24).  The description of practical reason stands in contrast to the work of episteme in that the latter is concerned with apprehending definitions, not with particulars. Aristotle goes on to explain that the kind of perception that is comparable to some aspect of phronesis is “the kind with which we perceive…that the triangle is the ultimate particular” (1042a28-9).  The passage, especially the last lines in the chapter, raises several questions, including the following: (1) what kind of perception is involved in the case of perceiving the triangle as the ultimate figure, and (2) what light the comparison sheds on the kind of activity that constitutes phronesis.  

Prof. Katherine Withy, Georgetown University "Heidegger on Aristotle on Affective Virtue"

     Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is often charged with changing the subject: it is morally denuded and based on misreadings of the text. I argue that Heidegger’s interpretation of affective virtue can be redeemed. Whereas many interpreters take the story of the affects in NE to engage with problems of passivity and choice, Heidegger takes it to be about the moral relevance of emotions as modes of ‘moral perception’. First, his reading illuminates the ‘cognitive’ dimension of the emotions through his notion of disclosure, and supports this with a novel interpretation of the mean. Second, Heidegger provides a non-dispositional interpretation of virtue, which is based on a strained reading of the notion of hexis but which nonetheless vindicates the moral relevance of emotions. Heidegger’s interpretation is thus a genuine dialogue that puts Aristotle in a new light, can engage substantively with other interpretations, and reveals important features of affectivity.