(A) Three questions on Averroes & Truth

1a.         If “Truth does not contradict truth” per the Fasl al-Maqal, then WHAT IS the conclusion of dialectical and rhetorical arguments?  Do they serve a role for Averroes?

a.Truth does not contradict Truth

i.“For truth, As Aristotle says, is consistent and bears witness to itself in every way” (Crawford, 1953, 3.5.368-369)

b.Philosopher’s have truth

i.Demonstration reaches truth per se because it uses reasoning from necessarily true premises

c.What does everyone else have? Useful fictions?

i.Dialectical reaches truth per accidens because even though it uses reasoning, it is from uncertain or merely accepted premises

ii.“some propositions may be rhetorical with the goal of emotively urging on the less well educated to a life of moral goodness, while others may be dialectical with the purpose of using agreed upon yet per perhaps not fully and properly founded principles to argue in a way that convinces auditors to follow a good life.” (Taylor, Topoi, 6).

1b.        Building on (subset of) Question 1, is there a division of Aristotle’s theoretical and practical knowledge among the people for Averroes?

a.Does Theoretical Knowledge = Truth?

i.Such that demonstration produces theoretical knowledge?

b.Does Practical Knowledge = moral goodness?

ii.Such that the rhetorical & dialectical fail to achieve truth (theoretical knowledge), but are still means to the ends of Practical knowledge?

c.Can Practical Knowledge omit truth? For “the good state is truth in agreement with right desire” (NE 6.2.30)

2.How much of Averroes thought is a return to the ideas of al-Farabi? If so, what is new?

a.Attainment of Happiness (AoH)

i.Only philosophers have access to the theoretical virtues

1.(aka, parallel to demonstration for Averroes?)

ii.Only the Deliberative virtues, Moral virtues, and Practical arts can be expected of the masses so they can achieve happiness in accordance with their position

1.“Man's specific perfection is called supreme happiness,' and to each
man, according to his rank in the order of humanity, belongs the
specific supreme happiness pertaining to his kind of man.” (AoH, 43).

2.(aka, parallel to rhetorical & dialectical for Averroes?)

iii.Thus, philosopher/prophet/imam must provide images by the “imagination” so people can achieve moral goodness (practical knowledge?) without

1.“persuasion and imaginative representation are employed only in the instruction of the vulgar and the multitude of the nations and the cities” (AoH, 51)

3.How much of al-Farabi’s thought is a return to the ideas of Plato’s Republic, and the “Noble lie?”

a.al-Farabi explicitly states he relies on Plato at AoH, 40

i.The Noble lie, "a contrivance for one of those falsehoods that come into being in case of need, of which we were just now talking, some noble one. . . ." 414b–c & "this myth . . . [it] would have a good effect, making them more inclined to care for the state and one another." (Book 3, 415c–d) is parallel to al-Farabi’s “images” provided by the philosopher imam

ii.The Phoenician tale (Book 3, 414e–15c) of men of gold, silver, etc. are “assign[ed] to each the status due to his nature” is parallel to al-Farabi’s ordering based upon his cosmology of intellects

b.Karl Popper & Leo Strauss on the Noble Lie as basis for religion?

2. (B)JA:
   

3. (C)Hi everyone,
   

Unfortunately I have some bad news. My computer stopped working last night. My other computer had already kicked the bucket on Saturday night, so I'm in a bit of a bind (I'm borrowing a computer to send a message right now). Since it's finals week here at Loyola, all the computer-equipped study rooms are already reserved.

In case I can't find a device to use this afternoon, know that this class has been the highlight of my semester and I thank you all for it, especially Dr. Taylor. Below are my prepared questions in case they are useful to anyone.

Several of Ghazali's arguments center around the proper use of language. What is his motivation for this? I'm guessing because he's judging the philosophers' adherence to the Qur'an, so the final question is whether they can actually interpret the Qur'an the way they have to.

    Farabi talks about analogical predication, so thinking about language is part of the philosopical tradition. I assume there was a pretty sophisticated traditional science of Qur'an interpretation and Arabic grammar in Ghazali's time. Is Ghazali drawing on any of this?

    Does Ghazali ever lay out an explicit philosophy of language or hermeneutical approach to the Qur'an? If Ghazali and Averroes (and "the philosophers") don't seem to have an explicit hermeneutics / philosophy of language in common, or even carefully articulated differences, to what degree are they just talking past each other?

Does Ghazali show successfully that the kind of emanation described in Avicenna and preceding philosophers can only generate a linear chain of causes if the oneness principle is true? Is there anything he has overlooked?

Does Averroes' response to Ghazali's criticism of OP create more problems than it solves?

    First there's the question of whether his more Aristotelian metaphysics is tenable in light of Avicenna's distinction between essence and existence. I tend to think not but I tend to be biased toward Avicenna most of the time.

    But even if it's coherent philosophically, doesn't it just make the religious situation worse? In effect Averroes has given up on OP but given up on creation ex nihilo too. I don't think Ghazali would be impressed with this, and I doubt Averroes would have imagined otherwise. So what is Averroes trying to accomplish? Is he, as we wondered, principally attacking Avicennism? On the other hand, he says the T al-T is dialectical, and he avoids explicitly denying creation ex nihilo. Is he trying to refute Ghazali's doctrine in a way that satisfies both philosophers and lower classes? If so, I am not understanding how he pulls this off.

    Related: What exactly is the place of the T al-T in the schema described in the Decisive Treatise? It's dialectical, not demonstrative; but it has to do with philosophy and liberally employs philosophical concepts; but it does seem to stop short of its own implications.

(C) Hi all,

Here are my three questions:

1)      Regarding Double Truth, how has this doctrine (which we know is not authentically Averroistic) been cashed out particularly by Latin ‘Averroists’? Was the supposed doctrine similar to Stephen Jay Gould’s NOMA (non-overlapping magisterial) solution to the conflicts between religion and science (i.e. was philosophy the arbiter of ‘what’ questions and religion the arbiter of teleological ‘why’ questions)?

 

2)      Averroes seems to follow Alexander by labeling the subject of metaphysics as both being qua being and the principles of being qua being, namely the first principle, the absolutely real substance (i.e. God). How does this work? Isn’t one subject required to know the other? In other words, if we are to know being qua being, mustn’t we know God as the cause of being to know being? Or if we are to know God as the subject of metaphysics, mustn’t we know being as the (explanatory) cause of God’s essence? Even though Averroes describes God as the absolutely real (حقيقى) substance, God is still a substance, not being qua being. Are we left not knowing either being qua being or the first substance? Does this mean metaphysics is disjointed without a clear aim?

 

3)      It seems to me that Averroes holds 3 important doctrines regarding providence: 1) God’s ‘knowledge’ of me merely consists of the fact that he knows Himself, thereby knowing the cause of all things, thereby ‘knowing’ what is caused; 2) God’s act is as an ultimate teleological cause in which the heavens move by love, not by emanation; and 3) God’s providence is an expression of 1 and 2, whereby God acts as a teleological, ‘knowing’ cause of my actions (and this is called providence). Given Averroes’ doctrines about God and providence, is it fair for me to describe Michael Jordan as providentially helping my jump shot, as he: 1) Knows himself as the cause of my earnest (and pathetic) attempt to be a good basketball player, and thereby ‘knows’ me as a basketball player; 2) His 1997 Flu game is the teleological aim at which all of my athletic attempts aim, and he is thereby the cause of my (minimal) basketball prowess; and 3) the combination of 1 and 2 is what is meant by providence?

(D) Does Averroes in his philosophical works have a notion of divine will and if so, does it differ from that of Avicenna due to their differences on the nature of God’s causality of the world in creation?

-In the Incoherence he seems to argue that God has will in some sense which is different from human will, but is this just part of a dialectical argument adopting commonly used religious terminology of God having will which is not brought into his philosophical works?  Is divine will less necessary for Averroes due to his different understanding of creation?

-If God does have a will, how does this work in terms of God being only a final cause of all things?  Does God, as with Avicenna, simply will himself in knowing himself?