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Discussion Questions
9 March 2017
(QQ from 7 March, Kant, section 3)
Phil 2310-116
If freedom will is is independent of other causes how would Kant think of when people act out of animal instincts ? This would be when they are acting in a extreme situation, even though they have free will but they are not acting on it at the time.
In the third section, Kant makes a distinction between the "intelligible world" and the "sensible world". Kant argues that in the sensible world is full of appearances and requires natural laws and experiences. In contrast, the intelligible world is something described as "a priori" and is dictated by reason and is free because nothing forces us to reason in any given way. Thus is Kant saying that humans are not free anywhere outside of the mind, which is why humans tend to enjoy the use of reason?
According to Kant, we must attribute to every rational being who has a will also the idea of freedom. If it is not necessarily just moral law that these freedoms fall under, what does freedom to a rational being truly mean and how do we recognize our freedom?
Kant discusses the idea of free will and how all rational beings must have this presupposed idea of free will. How would Kant argue against the idea of a predestined future and that God or a higher being knows the choices we are going to make ahead of time?
When Kant talks about freedom, it seems quite contradicting. He seems to be saying that we are only free when we adhere to a moral and universal law. How would Kant view todays idea of "freedom", which essentially is doing what you want to do when you want to do it?
When additionally discussing the Kingdom of Ends, Kant infers that at the Kingdom, respect is universally mutual. However, does it take into account how people perceive respect from culture to culture? Does everyone belong in the same Kingdom, or does everyone have their own idea of a Kingdom of Ends?
Kant articulates in Section Three the importance of free will in relation to morality and decision making. Kant then says that free will is only associated with "rational beings." (448) He then further says that morality serves as a law but only for rational beings. "And since morality must be derived solely from the property of freedom, one must show that freedom is also property of the will of all rational beings." Therefore, my question to pose is: How can someone prove that they are free? Does Kant have specific requirements for this? Or is he similar to Aristotle that we just have to have a high rationale to be considered "free?"
I am confused with Kant's notion of a "free will." He mentions that only free will can only be done through moral actions, however, he explains that we cannot know what moral acts feel like because feeling derives from experience. If my understanding of this is correct, what does Kant constitute as moral actions and how do we know the difference between good and bad?
If people lived exclusively in the intelligible world, they would possess a perfectly free and autonomous will. On the other hand, if people lived exclusively in the sensible world, all their actions would be governed by the law of nature and the rules of cause and effect. So I propose the question, how does one find the balance between the two, and if you can't, which one would Kant prefer to live?(49-61)
In section 3, Kant talks about how "a rational being must reward himself qua intelligence...as belonging not to the world of sense but to the world of understanding" (452). However, he then goes on to say that there are two standpoints in which one could regard themselves, the first "belongs to the world of sense subject to the laws of nature," and the second "belongs to the intelligible world subject to laws" (452). These two statements confuse me as Kant first says that one should belong to the world of understanding, then says that one can belong to both the world of sense and the world of understanding. My question is which statement is correct, is a world of sense included?
On page 49 of the Third Section, Kant says that "if freedom of the will is presupposed, morality follows by merely analyzing the concept of freedom. However, the principle of morality is, nevertheless, a synthetic proposition: viz., an absolutely good will is one whose maxim can always have itself as a content when such maxim is regarded as a universal law..." If morality follows by analyzing the concept of freedom, why does Kant say that "free and and a will subject to moral laws are one in the same" if first will is predisposed and moral laws comes after? Are moral laws and morality not relatively the same? Is he saying that free will and morality are the same? For example, I have the free will to choose right or wrong, but does that choice ultimately define my morality/moral laws? Doesn't moral incontinence, from Aristotle, play a role in decisions?
Kant states that morality is an issue for all rational beings that does not include just human beings. However according to Kant, we cannot base this notion of morality unless we already have established that all rational beings have “free will”. Following Kant’s notion that affects more than just humans, does this issue of morality extend even to animals if they have free will?
Just after 454, Kant introduces his notion of "ought" w/r/t the categorical imperative. That is, that as rational humans we know we ought to have a pure will. Yet just after this intro, he states "not even the meanest villain" would reject the desire of obtaining an honest life by following steadfast good maxims and by showing sympathy. How would Kant relate this definition to the meanest of villains, e.g., Hitler? Would Kant say that at his core, Hitler wanted to live a "good" life?
It is said by Kant that one can be "free", if that person allows them to do so. Also, they are free and have free will if they do something based on their own personal reason. However, if someone were to do a favor for somebody because it is the correct thing to do, would that count as being "free" because they are just being a good person or no?
After reading this section, I am still confused about Kant's idea of freedom and find it paradoxical. If Kant is saying that we are only free when we submit to moral law, doesn't it seem ironic that we must follow rules to achieve "freedom"? I understand that choosing what we want all the time may lead us to choose physical desires, but how do we have freedom if we are restricted by these moral laws?
By stating that there is a contradiction between freedom and the natural necessity of human actions, is Kant saying that if things are not caused, then there is no morality or no moral responsibility? I am confused as to how he comes to this conclusion. Can one not make a free decision and be morally responsible if this decision was not in line with moral standards? Or is Kant saying that if there is an idea of a priori moral standards then we would not be free to make a morally unsound decision?
On page 56, Kant says that "all men think of themselves as free as far as their will is concerned" but then he later says "even though one might never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible", I guess my question is how can we consider ourselves free if we can't even understand what freedom is? Also he explicitly says "men" does he include women and slaves in this remark (if not what is his view on that?)?
Kant presents a dualism between the intelligible and sensible worlds, and suggests that our decision making and rationality is somewhat complicated by the fact that we are caught between the two worlds. The difference between intelligible and sensible worlds mirrors the difference between body and soul. I am wondering what Kant thinks the true self, the body or the soul, or both?
459 (page 58) “For we can explain but what we can reduce to laws whose object can be given in some possible experience.“
According to this excerpt, Kant is stating that a law explains an experience that occurs. Therefore, from my understanding, if there is a proposal for a law, but the law cannot explain an experience, it cannot be a law? I struggle with the universality of laws. Not everyone has the same experiences, so then how can laws apply to all people if laws cannot be adequately shown through all people?
In this section, it talks about how freedom is an a priori idea. So, freedom is in innate concept for human beings, not something through experiences. I understand the theory behind this, but let's say someone is born into slavery. How would they know what freedom is without experiencing it?
In the third section of Kant's Metaphysics in the section "Freedom must be presupposed as a a property of the Will of All Rational Beings", Kant argues that all rational beings have a will, and that from the will comes an idea of freedom. Does this statement imply that non-rational beings (ie. humans with mental disabilities incapable of rational thought) do not posses the same free will or idea of freedom as a rational individual?
Kant explains that humans are all free because we are aware of what we must do to be moral beings. Therefore, true freedom can be found through making moral decisions. This made me wonder if Kant thinks that freedom comes at a certain point in our life, or is it something that we are born with? Do we work towards freedom, or are we naturally free because of our human nature?
On page 52, (section 451) Kant explains that, "we must admit and assume that behind the appearances there is something else which is not appearance, namely, things in themselves. Inasmuch, we can never cognize them except as the affect us [through our senses], we must admit that we can never come any nearer to them nor ever know what they are in themselves". My question is, while a priori knowledge is supposed to be how you determine a moral law, what happens when a person is brought up from a different cultural upbringing? Their moral thoughts about a moral law come in conflict with someones' moral thoughts from a different culture, so how does Kant determine a moral law for all if there are different a priori cultural beliefs within the population?
At the end of the Third Section, Kant discusses the limitations of reason, stating, "This is all that can be fairly asked of a philosophy which strives in its principles to reach the very limit of human reason." Is he directly disagreeing with Aristotle's notion of reason as being "pure potential," "having the capability to understand all things?" (Aristotle III.4, 429a18-22)
On page 55 Kant describes a man who could be the "meanest villain" in the whole world but if this person has a sense of reason they would ultimately wish to possesses the qualities of honesty, steadfastness, and sympathy. Is Kant saying that no matter what the circumstances every person who uses reason has a natural inclination toward morally good things? How would he describe the people who use reason to commit evil acts or individuals who simply enjoy doing bad things because they are bad?
In the third section of Immanuel Kant's Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals it talks about that all humans have free will and are able to make their own decisions based off of reason that align with societies' morals. If you are expected to follow the morals that society has laid out through your free will, are you really using free will. Does society some what have a role in deciding what we do?
Kant suggests that we are only free when we follow the moral law. He thinks that when you follow the moral law and act rationally, then you are free. My question is: would he accept that different people have different ideas of what freedom is? It seems that his idea of freedom is pretty far from what people generally think it is (I have never heard someone describe it the way he did), so I’m just wondering if he thinks everyone is wrong and that they don’t truly know what freedom is.
Kant's entire notion of morality is based on freedom, which he can't prove or disprove. And even the Categorical Imperative can be unpractical at times, causing what we call today to "overthink" things. Is it ok for us to just know how things "ought" to be, even if they aren't that way? And is there such as a thing as overthinking, or reasoning too much, when it comes to freedom and morality?
Kant argues that all rational beings have free will, and therefore any being endowed with reason and with a will must think of itself as free. What if a human does not think of themselves to be free? A prisoner, someone riddled with a mental or physical disease, or a child incapable of these types of thoughts? Where does Kant place these humans, and are they rational beings?
In the Third section, Kant talks about how the categorical imperative is a possibility because of the idea of freedom and under this idea a “rational being counts itself as an intelligence among the world of understanding.” However, what does it mean when Kant later says that the world of understanding is only a standpoint that reason “sees itself necessitated to take outside appearances”. This statement is why I need a bit more clarification because if human being are rational and intelligent among the world of the understanding then, why are we not, so to speak, “intelligent enough” to not allow reason to take outside appearances and instead see the world as it is?
Phil 2310-117
What are the universal moral laws? Who decides these laws? Who agrees on them? Do most people respect them?
Immanuel Kant in his Third Section of his work, Grounding of the Metaphysics, offers a couple possibilities of why human's seek to be moral beings, however never really seems to give a definite answer as to why humans seek to be moral. I understand that "when we think of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and know the autonomy of the will together with its consequence, morality."(Kant 54). My question is, what would be Kant's reasoning as to the reason why we seek to act morally?
Following the progression of thought that thinking (therefore reasoning also) of oneself as qua intelligence forces the nature of one as having free will which in turn brings about morality, do 'freedom as an idea of reason' and 'nature as a concept of understanding' invalidate a priori knowledge? Discuss in terms of their seeming contradicting definitions and affinities towards either theoretics or experience. If the answer cannot be yes or no, do the applications of one school of thought take precedence over the other--do theoretics' applications have more value than experience's applications when? Finally, if no, does this invalidate the need for morality?
Pg: 57. Kant explains that If a man perceives him self as intelligent that he is put into another order of things. I am curious how one is suppose to see them self as intelligent. I feel like most people see them self as intelligent, what sort of basis is used to determine if someone is intelligent or is it just the fact of someone thinking that they are intelligent that truly matters?
Kant discusses the relationship of laws and freedom early in the reading stating: "Rather, one must show that freedom belongs universally to the activity of rational beings endowed with a will. Now I say that every being which cannot act in any way other than under the idea of freedom is for this very reason free from a practical point of vie. This is to say that for such a being all the laws that are inseparably bound up with freedom are valid just as much as if the will of such a being could be declared to be free in itself for reasons that are valid for theoretical philosophy." What is the end goal of a law if it restricts our freedom?
How can Kant say that we are free only when we follow moral laws? This to me doesn't make sense because if we only follow moral laws then do we really have a choice?
“But since I intuit myself at the same time as a member of the world of sense, my actions ought so to accord” (55). Kant discusses the term “ought” at length the section How Is a Categorical Imperative Possible? My interpretation of “ought” is that it is basically the same thing as Aristotle’s moral incontinence. Is this “ought,” Kant’s way of explaining why our actions don't always coincide with the theoretical, perfectly moral intelligible world?
Kant talks about freedom and from my understanding we are most free when we abide by the moral law which is essentially a priori. Couldn't you argue that one is acting free even if they are not abiding by moral law? One could say that they are acting free when committing an act of murder, but murder could also be considered immoral by most people. Or is morality essentially in the eye of the beholder?
Kant talks about the world of reason and the world of senses. Does Kant think that these are two distinct separate worlds and we have a foot in each? Or is he using this language to illustrate different aspects of one world, which is a combination of reason and senses?
Can you explain what Kant means by being free or having free will only when it is in line with moral laws?
Kant says that we are only truly free when we follow the moral law and reasons universal demands. Wouldn't we not be free in this scenario though, because if you're always doing what moral law and reason dictate and not what you want to do then how are you truly free?
In the third section of Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explains what free will is in connection to morality. He explains that morality only exists if free will exists. Free will is one's ability to choose what she/he must do. For Kant, free will is possessed by all rational beings. What would Kant say about slavery? Specifically the morals of slave owners, and the free will of slaves? One could argue that slaves did have the ability to choose their actions. Yet, when if a slave acted upon something that was not allowed (they'd be punished), or refrained from doing something in fear of being punished is that really free will?
Kant writes that the will is a kind of causality that beings to rational beings. Ok, but then he says that natural necessity is the property of the causality of all non-rational beings. But don't rational beings have a natural necessity? I as a human have a necessity for food, water, and shelter. I need those things to survive.
Kant could not explain how a mere thought, that in itself has no sensation, could give one pleasure or displeasure. He categorized this as "quite" impossible to understand. Do you have an explanation to how this is possible?
Since morality follows the notion of free will and in order to have free will one must be a rational being, then do all rational beings have the ability to follow moral law?
In section 3 Kant looks into free will. He suggests that everyone has free will and this freedom of choice is guided by one thing, the categorical imperative. He goes on to suggest that when someone does something wrong they consciously know that the act they are doing is incorrect. Does this mean that anytime someone goes against the categorical imperative they know and are making a conscious choice to do so? Are there instances in which someone may not know that what they are choosing to do is wrong?
Kant states that even the most evil villain will wish for good qualities when presented to them. How is that possible as a rational being if he is inherently evil? (page 55)
I'm not sure I grasped the relation between freedom and the categorical imperative. Does he say that regardless of the "ought" in the categorical imperative, it is a priori and freedom is just in accordance with the imperative?
If morality changes with the times, or as we realize that what we did in the past was wrong (slavery), how can one truly have free will, if what they are doing cannot be recognized as wrong?
In this section, Kant discusses the distinct parallels between freedom and nature. He states that freedom is not a concept of experience, since all men think of themselves as free (pertaining to their will). Contrarily, nature is not a concept of experience either, but rather confirmed by experience. "Freedom is, therefore, only an idea of reason whose objective reality is in itself questionable; but nature is a concept of understanding, which proves, and necessarily must prove, its reality by examples from experience." Would our freedom not be a direct cause of the laws of nature? It's hard for me to see such a line drawn between the two.
In the Third Section, Kant begins by discussing morality and its relation to rational beings. He juggles with the confusing logic that we are free due to morality, but that our understanding of morality hinges off of the concept that we are free. He further clarifies how this is not circular logic upon itself, but talks about the intelligible and sensible worlds. I believe I can semi-wrap my head around the difference between the two, but can you further clarify the distinction between the two worlds?
If Kant cannot explain why rational humans live moral lives just for duty's sake (for no outside reasons), why does he even pursue an explanation? Why is he not satisfied with the fact that rational humans live moral lives because of outside interests?
Kant asserts: "Nevertheless, even though we should never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible, we must at least remove this apparent contradiction in a convincing manner. For if the thought of freedom contradicts either itself or nature, which is equally necessary, it must in competition with physical necessity be entirely given up." I do not understand Kant's argument about freedom. Why can humans not comprehend the possibility of freedom? And why do freedom and nature necessarily contradict each other? Gravity makes me fall back to the ground when I jump, but it has no part in deciding whether I eat McDonalds or Burger King for lunch. Why must freedom and nature necessarily be contradictory according to Kant?
When Kant is discussing how to be free is when you follow the moral law ans abide by reason's universal demands. How do you think he would be able to get this idea through to younger audiences such as teenagers and young adults who enjoy doing spontaneous acts the most?
Kant brings up in his closing remarks that the speculative use of reason comes down to the absolute necessity of some supreme cause of the world. Is this supreme cause more on the subjective or objective side of the spectrum?
If what an individual wants to do does not directly line up with a certain universal moral law, should it be fair to say that we are free when we subdue our wants and desires and do exactly as the universal law says?
So if Kant is saying there are 2 parts of this one world that we must live in, but we literally only live in and see one world (practical anthropology), is the other part only internal to us? is this universal to all human beings or can this other world be distorted since its not physically in front of us?
Kant suggests that reason is unlike sensibility because reason is spontaneous and it offers more than sensibility. What is an example of both reason and sensibility, and why does this example of reason offer more spontaneity?
If reason helps provide a basis for autonomy and morality, how would Kant explain the concept of human slavery? Because if we each as rational human beings accept that we are autonomous individuals, and reason cannot be subject to control from outside sources, then where does the idea of holding another rational being as a slave even come from?
Kant differentiates between the two worlds that rational beings can ascribe themselves to. One world belongs to the senses, and the other world belongs to qua intelligence. It is my understanding that the world of sense is something that is ascribed to by cause of appearances, and through empiricism, and is therefore determined by our desires and inclinations. Is Kant saying here that the world of sense is essentially incontinence, where through experience we know what's right and wrong, but we are too weak to do the right thing so we fall victim to our desires? Further, Kant continues that the world of qua intelligence comes about by the autonomy of our will and therefore our morality, because we can choose to do what we want to do and we choose to do the right and moral thing. Essentially my question is, can we live between both worlds where sometimes we make mistakes and live in a world of sense, but then can redeem ourselves and make the right decision and go back to the world of qua intelligence?
27 Feb 2017
Phil 2310 - 116
For there to be moral right and wrongs, there must be an understanding of metaphysics. How can one understand metaphysics of reality without there being a concrete definition of what metaphysics is; thus how can moral philosophy be possible?
Why is the good will the only thing that can be good in itself since it can also have a negative outcome or does it relate more to the intentions behind the action vs results? Also, if reason is a key component in bringing about the good in itself, shouldn't it as well be recognized as good?
Kant begins by explaining the 3 fields which are logic, physics and ethics. At the end of the preface, Kant asserts that the goal of his work is to establish the "supreme principle of morality." (5) He does this through the lens of moral philosophy. In Chapter 1, Kant describes the path to happiness and self preservation that individuals aspire to attain. However, Kant explains that reason in not up there in high regards for the process. He establishes that "Reason...is not competent enough to guide the will safely as regards its objects and satisfaction of all our needs." (9) It is very interesting how Kant thinks this in contrast to Aristotle who held reason as a high trait for the rational human beings. Kant then explains that reason is not entirely needed because the good which we strive for is "already dwells in the natural sound understanding and needs and not so much needs to be taught." (9) Why does believe in the innate good in people? Can't we argue that that is a bit naive to say? Shouldn't all human beings be educated in the idea of good and to develop our skill of reason?
In his preface, Kant explains that the basis of a moral law must be pure, or "a priori", which means reason without influence of what we perceive. Anything empirical, or based off of experiences, "can indeed be called a practical rule, but never a moral law" (p. 3). Kant believes and argues that people must follow a universal moral system because that which makes sense to everyone is rational, and what is rational brings out good in itself and is for no other purpose. But how can we know what is pure and universal if Kant tells us not to base the moral law in experiences? How else would we know whether something is universal if we do not experience other cultures?
On page 4 of the Preface, Kant seems to say that a moral system should be solely based on reason. Is it possible to dismiss other aspects of humans, such as feelings, intuition, nature and culture, and be expected to make decisions based on analytical reasoning? It seems to me that this is something that would detract from our humanity, and make us more like machines.
Phil 2310 - 117
Page 11 Kant talks about the doing actions to make others have joy, it is said that this has no true moral worth. Why is it only if someone performs this action without any inclination make the action have real moral worth? If someone has inner joy for giving others joy shouldn't that make those actions real moral worth also?
Kant says that only a good will is good and that it is good regardless of what it accomplishes. How can this be? If someone has a good will and does bad things, that is not good. Shouldn't whether someone is good be determined by there actions and not just by there will?
I feel like the reading is contradictory. It compares reason to something like happiness. Reason is something people need in order to become happy. And yet, it says if people have a refined reason, it makes them less happy. So if you're smart about decisions that makes you less happy?
Kant says "On the other hand, to preserve one's life is a duty; and furthermore, everyone has an immediate inclination to do so". Does Kant look at hesitation to preserve one's life as "a way one assess the situation at hand to make sure they aren't putting their life in danger", or does he think that there should be no hesitation when someone's life is at risk?
As stated in the preface, ancient Greek Philosophy is divided into 3 parts - logic, physics, and ethics - is there any order of importance to these 3 categories? Is ethics the most important and that is why Marquette students are required to take an entire class focused on it? Philosophy can also be divided by pure and empirical. Is pure philosophy more important than empirical or vice versa? Is it even necessary to rank these concepts based on importance?
Kant writes: "The object of respect is the law only." Later he claims that "respect for a person is properly only respect for the law." What if a law is not respectful? What is showing respect to the law is showing disrespect to a group of people? For example, in the early 19th century, it was legal (lawful) to own slaves. Would Kant say that possessing slaves (showing respect for the law) is showing respect to the slaves? What if laws err from respect? Since they are human creations, they are not perfect and sometimes disrespect groups of people. What does Kant have to say about this?
7 Feb 2017:
Phil 2310-116 / 117 Student Questions
In Book VII, Aristotle explains that incontinence is the lack of control over our ability to reason. Aristotle's explanation of the difference between beasts and humans was somewhat confusing to me in light of incontinence. At 1147b, Aristotle states, "beasts are not incontinent, because they have no universal supposition, but only appearance and memory of particulars." What does Aristotle mean by "universal supposition," and why does it manifest in humans rather than in beasts?
Aristotle talks about how pleasure throughout book VII. He says that "some sources for pleasure are necessary" (1147b25). However, further in the book he gives three ideas that relate to pleasure; "no pleasure is a good...some pleasures are good...[and] even if every pleasure is a good, the best good still cannot be pleasure" (1152b8-12). My question is, which thought does he actually think in regards to pleasure, considering even food, a necessary item, may be considered a pleasure?
25 Jan 2017:
Phil 2310-116 Student Questions 25Jan2017:
(1) Book 3 Chapter 1 reminds me of a discussion I had in my previous philosophy class in which we studied Frankfurt's Thought Experiment. We made up an example to fit the Halloween spirit of Frankenstein having a chip implanted in his head by a mad scientist. The mad scientist wants Frankenstein to kill his enemy; however, if Frankenstein doesn't want to kill the enemy, the chip will over ride his mind and kill the enemy. We questioned whether Frankenstein could be held morally responsible for the reason that we don't know if Frankenstein did voluntarily or in voluntarily. This yes is hypothetical, but in a more logical sense: if a dictator forces his people to do heinous things in order to avoid punishment, does this make them not virtuous? Are these people morally responsible for their actions even though technically they did them voluntarily?
(2) At 1112b exactly, Aristotle states that we can't deliberate things that are exact in nature (e.g. that 3 plus 3 is 6) because there is no denying or doubting facts. We can, though, deliberate about "what is up to us" and where the "outcome is unclear and the right way to act is undefined." He goes on to say "we lay down the end, and then examine the ways and means to achieve it." I want to extend this definition of deliberation to the reason or goal of life in general. To Aristotle, we know life is about happiness (defining it, finding it, etc.). How would he handle objections (i.e. deliberations) that perhaps his opinion on the end goal of life is in fact not happiness? There are those, for example, who believe that the acquisition of money is THE end all in life. Would Aristotle say that our purpose for being a living species is a topic worthy of deliberation?
(3) In 1111a line 19-21 Aristotle says 'the agent who acts involuntarily is the one who acts in accord with this specific sort of ignorance, who must also feel pain and regret for his actions.' Would Aristotle say that if someone provided terrible CPR in an emergency situation without knowing how to do it and ended up hurting the person more, they deserved to face consequences for their lack of knowledge even if the intentions were good? According to Aristotle is the person's decision to give CPR with the ignorance of knowledge murder and they should be held accountable? Would it be a better decision just to let the person die and not give an attempt at CPR then?
Phil 2310-117 Student Questions 25Jan2017:
(1) Aristotle argues that bad people make decisions in attempt to achieve an apparent good instead of the actual good (as a person of good character would do) due to their ignorance. If they have gone through every measure available to them in attempt to learn what a truly good decision(s) is/are, but were unable to discover this anyway, would they still be a bad person or would that be considered a nonvoluntary decision?
(2) In book 3 chapter 4, it is said that " for each state of character has its own distinctive view of what is fine and pleasant. then, the excellent person is far superior because he sees what is true in each case, being himself a sort of standard and measure." If it is that the excellent (good) person is far superior because he sees what is true in each case, what if it is talking about a characteristic of something being heavy, and 2 excellent/good people perceive it as one being heavy and one being light, how can you determine which is correct? or is it dependent upon the person, if it is dependent upon the person could they both be excellent/good people but the measurement have 2 different perceptions?
Secondly, how does pleasure seem to cause deception, since it appears to be good when it is not. Is this again dependent on the character of each individual, because people can be deceived or have different feelings about something that they see to be pleasurable but ends up being pain in the end, but pain being different based on the person?
(3) In book 3 chapter 4, it is said that " for each state of character has its own distinctive view of what is fine and pleasant. then, the excellent person is far superior because he sees what is true in each case, being himself a sort of standard and measure." If it is that the excellent (good) person is far superior because he sees what is true in each case, what if it is talking about a characteristic of something being heavy, and 2 excellent/good people perceive it as one being heavy and one being light, how can you determine which is correct? or is it dependent upon the person, if it is dependent upon the person could they both be excellent/good people but the measurement have 2 different perceptions?
Secondly, how does pleasure seem to cause deception, since it appears to be good when it is not. Is this again dependent on the character of each individual, because people can be deceived or have different feelings about something that they see to be pleasurable but ends up being pain in the end, but pain being different based on the person?
Phil 2310-116 Questions 23Jan2017:
(1) In order to acquire any of the virtues, people need to get into the habit of practicing the virtues. What if, then, someone gets into the habit of being brave for example, by putting themselves in frightening situations, what if they are cowardly? Aristotle states that that doesn't count as being brave, but what if they think they're being brave just by even taking that step of putting themselves in a frightening situation. Does doing the virtue, in this case bravery, only count as being brave if you are not scared in a frightening situation, or are there different levels of bravery? And if not, then what counts as being brave?
(2) In 1106b, Aristotle describes how two different people have two different 'intermediates' in their appetites, depending on their lifestyle. I interpreted this to mean that people also have different means and intermediates in terms of their virtues as well. My question is, where do these differences come from? Is it also from different lifestyles, or is it something innate that people are born with? Is there one mean that I should work towards throughout my life, or is it a moving target depending on my lifestyle changes?
(3) On pages 20-21, Aristotle talks about the importance of a healthy upbringing at an early age to “make us find enjoyment or pain in the right things,” thus being correct education. A child does not have the choice to ‘parent’ themselves if the upbringing is unhealthy. Therefore, are children who find enjoyment and pleasure in the ‘wrong’ things at fault for what they were taught and the environment they grew up in, or are their parents at complete fault? Once children get to an age where they can make their own judgments on right or wrong choices, is it too late because these choices may have already become habitual?
Phil 2310-117 Some additional Questions 23Jan2017:
(1) Given the nature of virtue as a state of the soul trained through habituation, does a lacking in the conviction of temperance bring about expedience and/or vices? Its distinction as a good state seems to be the indicator altruistic, temperate practitioners of virtue are the only ones who can therefore have a good soul. Over-commitment to or lack there of for virtue makes a person disingenuous which leads to the conclusion of expedience to only appear virtuous but not have it instilled as a part of them (habituated).
(2) Would Aristotle agree with the phrase "practice makes permanent" over "practice makes perfect?" or the other way around? with regards to virtue of character, he says virtue of character comes from habituation. and theres a difference between true virtue of character and someone just completing virtuous acts, not habitually.
(3) In book two Aristotle talks about virtue and how it is about pleasure and pain and our actions are based on pleasure or pain. But he also does talk about how virtue and vices are the somewhat the same thing and virtue is fine, expedient, and pleasant and vices are shameful, harmful, and painful. So becoming virtuous we need to base all of our actions and decisions on pleasure or pain we experience? Also how do we get rid of our vices whatever that may be to become virtuous which is the end goal to happiness.
18 January 2017:
PHIL 2310-116
(1) To determine if something is good, the ability to complete its function well is evaluated. If the human function is "activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason" (Chapter 7), being excellent at reasoning throughout life makes a person good. Aristotle also defines happiness in many ways: as the greatest good, prosperity, virtue, and the end to all action. So what is Aristotle suggesting as the meaning of happiness, and does it require being good at reasoning?
(2) When there is mention of happiness and how it can encapsulate a person's entire life, the argument of whether someone can be happy while they are alive or not. This made me think about relating it back to the question of a standard of happiness. My question would then be can someone live their entire life thinking they are happy by their standards, but after their death be marked as an unhappy person based on someone else's criteria?
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(3)On page three Aristotle says that the youth are unable to take part in political science because they follow their feelings rather than reason (Terrence,1999). Because good is found through the science of politics do you think that the youth find what good is through out their life or do they gain the understanding of good when they gain the ability to reason? And why do you think that's the case?
PHIL 2310-117
(1) Why is it assumed that just because you are young and have less life experiences you are deemed unsuitable to be a student of political science? I understand that Aristotle is saying they do not have enough life experiences and are just overall too young but why is that a legitimate assumption?
(2) In the text it says that money, wealth, honor are all good, but there is a higher good or happiness. That higher happiness is prudence, virtue which is something to strive for. But my question is that in the book he does say that happiness is somewhat based on the person but there is still a higher happiness. How is that because some people may say that wealth and having financial freedom is happiness for them; how can Aristotle say that is not true happiness if money and financial freedom is what that person classify happiness is for them.
(3) In chapter four, Aristotle mentions that an individual who experience a good upbringing can only fully understand what right versus wrong is. He quotes Hesiod who states that those who do not have an acceptable upbringing are "useless" men. Does that mean that those who have been unfortunate and given a bad upbringing that they could not control, do not understand right versus wrong?
